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While Lithuania, a former empire, is a small Baltic nation, wedged 
between major players on the global stage, Russia, Germany, Poland, 
which always made claims to being the “rightful” masters of Lithuania and 
its Baltic neighbours – Latvia and Estonia. The inconvenience of being at 
this geographic location was – and still is – based on the constant tension 
between such powers. Anytime they wanted to tear each other apart, they 
had to go through the Baltic States, which ware to become vassals of one or 
another major power. Of course, toward the last mid-century, the powers 
had a vast propaganda machinery, each claiming that they are “liberating“ 
Lithuania, and the other Baltic states, from some contrived oppression. 
Thus the indigenous Baltic States had to be grateful for such favours. Having 
occupied Lithuania, the Russian empire, under the new name of Soviet Union 
and a new Tsar – Lenin, made sure that it will be a docile and subservient 
“republic” under the guidance of the all-knowing and all powerful Moscow 
“leadership”. To achieve such aims vast segments of the population, above 
all the educated, productive and independent, had to be tortured, killed or 
sent to concentration camps for “re-education” and mainly death. After fifty 
years under the military rule Lithuanians decided that they do not belong 
to the Byzantine Russian Empire; they are Westerners and began to speak 
of independence. It was an opportune time, since Gorbachev was speaking 
of all sorts of reforms and told Lithuanians not to make trouble; after all, 
Soviet Union has done more for Lithuania than any other Republic. Despite 
such requests, Lithuania declared independence from the empire and faced 
a future that would be the West. This text is a philosophical investigation 
into the nature of this West that Lithuania turned to, initially by joining 
European Union, and through it entered globalization. Issues of national 
identity, i.e. retaining Lithuanian culture, tradition, history, language in 
the context of globalization have become of paramount importance. Other 
aspects, such as an opening to the West and the West becoming open, 
became a crucial issue concerning emigration. Will the expatriates return, 
or will all those talents and others are destined to disappear from Lithuania 
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and as Lithuanians. The globalising context, provided in this text, will offer 
some insights into these issues. 
Since this is a philosophical text, in the sense of presenting arguments 
that aim at disclosing the principles which are inevitably presumed 
by any theme or system, the method used will be “Platonic” insofar as 
the latter is the preeminent way of helping to separate distinct types of 
globalization and then showing, in specific cases, their relationships and 
partial overlappings. Many would proclaim that such a method is based 
on “essentialism” or even “logocentrism” and thus no longer valid, since 
both concepts have been “relativised” and even “deconstructed”, and above 
all shown to belong to one civilization  – the West, and thus cannot be 
imposed on others. This is the charge levelled from numerous sides, such as 
postmodernism, deconstruction, feminism, Freudian Marxism, all the way 
to various hermeneutics – and all of them western, even if not written by 
westerners. Yet there is a methodological issue to such claims: to challenge 
the so-called essentialism, one cannot assume an essential position without 
a contradiction. In this sense to speak of Eurocentrism, or logocentrism is to 
make a claim that there is a recognition of what Europe is essentially; in other 
words, the notion that there is nothing essential and by extension there is no 
essence to Europe, and at the same time to claim that one recognises Europe 
as logocentric, is to grant essentialism. Moreover, the claims against Europe 
come from Europeans, suggesting that Europe is not only logocentric, but 
also contains within itself deconstruction, showing that there is not only an 
identity but also difference. But this is nothing new; the mentioned Plato 
discussed the topics of identity, difference, permanence, flux and so on. In 
this sense, our methodology of articulating different forms of globalization 
in order to show clearly what type of globalization has entered or is entering 
Lithuania is essential to anyone discussing current encounters in all areas 
of Lithuanian life. 
This type of methodology is “Platonic” insofar as Plato was able 
to show differences, for example, among social systems, ranging from 
monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, in order to raise a 
question what sort of justice one could find in each. While our task is only 
tangentially relevant to justice, the methodological delimitation is essential. 
In addition, the method proposed avoids the current claims in Europe, 
that at base everything is power, whether it is military, technological, 
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ideological, discursive, feminine, social, psychological or cultural. Thus, 
while attempting to abolish essentialism, proposed in our study, such 
European thinkers posit absolute essentialism: everything is power. Of 
course the credit for this overdetermined claim goes to Nietzsche, but even 
Nietzsche was not blinded by his occasional playing with the notion of 
“Will to Power”. All one needs to do is to be convinced of this is read Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra – and read it philosophically and not in the “Human all 
too Human” form. As a matter of argument, the “Platonic” method allows 
for a precise and careful delimitation of the great variety of globalizations, 
without the essentialist claim that they all are power laden. If post-modern 
Europeans presume that every claim falls apart into differences, and then 
add that all is power, then they assume an essentialism which is, in fact, 
abolished by Platonic method of differences and thus multiple typologies 
one distinct from others. There is also the constant appeal to relativism in 
light of different civilizations and their own symbolic designs, abolishing 
the Western claim to be the bearer of universal truth. The problem with such 
relativism is this: it is the result of the modern Western thinking and hence 
belongs to the West. This means that the post-modern and deconstructivist 
writers cannot grant it universal validity without a contradiction. This 
is to say, if relativism is invented by the modern/postmodern West, 
then it cannot claim that all civilizations are relative. As is evident from 
contemporary global confrontations, some civilizations would claim that 
everything is absolute, and any position of relativism is absolutely wrong. 
Why the argument against the so-called post-modern and deconstructivist 
theses must be emphasised depends mainly on the phenomenon of the leap 
toward the West; after the declaration of Lithuanian independence, there 
was a leap into the arms of the “latest thinking” in Europe: deconstruction 
and post modernism, with all sorts of proclamations concerning the death 
of philosophy, the death of the subject, truth, ethics and even the death 
of death. The only trend in philosophy holding its philosophical ground 
in Lithuania, is phenomenology. We shall address positivism and neo-
positivism in the context of modern globalization.
Empires
Various mixed concepts appear with the question “what is globaliza-
tion”: one, that is very familiar in the west, could be called traditional “uni-
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versalism”. It purports to present an all-encompassing system of symbols, 
designed to give the structure of the world, with human place within it, 
and required rules of relationships for humans and in many cases – a di-
vinity for humans and some designated supreme authority. This suggests 
a particular understanding that belongs to a given civilization, such that 
each civilization and its vocal representatives, make a claim that its sym-
bolic designs, such as language, rituals, way of life, morality, interpretation 
of the universe, encompass all phenomena, including the symbolic designs 
of other civilizations. For Westerners, this is most clearly expressed in Mid-
dle Eastern civilization, consisting of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For 
example, Christianity, following the edicts of Rabbi Jesus, declared itself 
“Catholic” (katholikos), universal, with a duty to subject all the others to its 
one autocratic ruler. Its duty is to impose its symbolic design over the entire 
humanity. Islam, following the same monotheistic design claims to be the 
“universal civilization” subject to one Caliph and his edicts, legitimated by a 
posited supreme authority. And Christianity in general, as well as different 
branches of Islam, must treat the other civilizations as heretics, living under 
symbolic designs that are deviating from the only one universal law, willed 
by a sole figure. While for the initial tribe, having a sole Lord, the conquest 
of the “promised land” was the first step, others, who became the followers 
of this Lord, under the guises of his son, prophets, took for granted that the 
entire world must become the promised land to be conquered in the name 
of the supreme authority – either by “missionary” work or by the sword. 
After all, the popes regarded the conquered lands in the new world as his, 
and would parcel them out to his subordinates, the kings, as grants and thus 
their property. 
There is no doubt, that if it were not for the modern Western enlight-
enment, with its secularism, the efforts to conquer the globe under one of 
the banners of monotheism would have been achieved. Of course, it could 
be objected that the three major trends of this “universal” civilization‘s sym-
bolic designs do not agree and, in fact, are at odds all the way to violent con-
frontations among them; yet such antagonisms do not mean that there is a 
surrender of one or another to be truly universal. Each branch will claim 
that the other interpretations of Lord‘s will are “wrong” and thus they too 
must be conquered and brought in line with the true truth. Each, claiming 
to be universal, wants to be a master over the entire globe – a form of “glo-
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balization” at any price, at the symbolic level which must be proliferated by 
missionaries. Sending expeditions around the globe to do whatever it takes 
to bring all others to their knees was sanctioned by highest authorities, such 
as popes, who absolved all the soldiers and missionaries from sin for what-
ever atrocities they might commit. The excuse for such atrocities is simple: 
those who are not subjects of the Lord, are at the service of his enemy – the 
devil himself,
The universal/global aim of this type of civilization is manifest in their 
“spread”, with one common claim: one ruler, as the representative of the 
supreme Lord, such that the final reading of the Lord‘s will depends on the 
sole ruler – whether the latter is chief Rabbi, Pope, supreme ruler, Imam, 
the Byzantine emperor who is a head of state and church  – extended to 
Russian emperors, or a Protestant pastor, declaring that the new world “dis-
covered” by European Christians, is the promised land. It must be under-
stood that the rhetoric of this universal/global symbolic design is couched 
in benevolent terms: the conquest is done for “the good” and/or “salva-
tion” of the others who have not yet received the “word of the Lord”, and 
who, so to speak, must be made aware of “the good tidings”. The Byzantine 
and Russian empires strove mightily to extend this type of globalization till 
they were replaced by another, equally Middle Eastern mode of “saving” 
the world from its fallen state – Marxism. The latter is a secular disguise of 
the same universal symbolic design. Humanity was once paradisiacal com-
munity, then it transgressed the communal life, fell from grace and now 
“historical materialism” must slowly and painfully return humanity to its 
lost paradise – of course the price is high: those who are deviant and live a 
heretic life must be abolished in the name of “historical progress” and the 
laws of dialectics – known only to the “wise leader”. But the final purpose is 
universal/global rule which is the recognition of necessity and inevitability 
of the final outcome – global salvation of humanity – and mainly by mili-
tary conquest. This is the Christian and Islamic mode that includes send-
ing “missionaries” with final intervention by force to guarantee the success 
of missionary efforts. After all, Soviet Russia sent missionaries around the 
globe to prepare the soil for final occupation of global Promised Land – un-
der one paternal ruler who is infallible. 
It is well established that the rulers, representing such universal sym-
bolic designs, settled in the occupied territories not to provide some materi-
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al benefits, but to insure that the populations learn to incantate the rhetoric 
prescribed by the symbolic designs. Of course, the extended rhetoric also 
intoned that a life of obedience to such incantations will bring – someday – 
material fulfilment, if not in this world, then in another. Here appears the 
difference between Christian and Russian/Marxian designs; the former of-
fers paradisiacal rewards, the latter, always postponed, future rewards. The 
most obedient and subservient of the conquered territories, i.e. those most 
capable of repeating the rhetoric incantations, are offered favours, such as a 
more elevated position in the hierarchy of beings – yet not the highest posi-
tion. The latter belongs to the centre from which infinite wisdom and power 
radiates. Since this type of globalization makes a claim to be universal, then 
it cannot rely on fallible humans, unequipped to understand the meaning 
of such symbols. In this sense, there must be a system of mediation with 
a constant presence of mediators who can translate the incomprehensible 
verbosity of the symbolic design “for the masses”. Of course the masses had 
to pay the price: provide material sustenance for the vast hierarchy of the 
mediators. 
The mediators, meanwhile, having taken control of a conquered place, 
proclaimed the right to legitimise and appoint any authority to rule such 
a place. We know well that the missionary excursions into the lands of the 
heathen and heretics did not go “to the people” but to the ruling figures 
that they had to convert to “true faith”. Once converted, the rulers were, in 
turn, legitimated in the name of the “highest” authority. The spread of this 
symbolic design is very significant to Lithuania. No need to go into detailed 
accounts of historical events; it is sufficient to engage in philosophical ex-
plication of such events in principle. Missionaries began to appear, always 
demanding an audience with the rulers in an effort to convince them by the 
rhetoric of such symbolic designs to accept the “word of the Lord”. Some 
of the missionaries were not well received, since Lithuania had its ancient 
traditions and did not appreciate being told that their beliefs are false. Thus 
the missionaries lost their lives and became “martyrs”. It should be men-
tioned that symbolic designs, prescribing a way of life, comprise a frame 
of meaning for a given people. If another symbolic design is offered, then 
the traditional one is regarded as meaningless. In situations where peoples 
have lived for centuries in the context of their traditional symbolic design 
that provided a total understanding of the universe, then the intrusion of 
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another design would introduce a chaotic situation, to the extent that the 
old is regarded as invalid and wrong, and the new completely incompre-
hensible. One defence against such an intrusion is to resist and abolish it. 
Of course, such missionaries were most interested to become martyrs 
and even to be declared saints – as mentioned – with a guaranteed rewards 
in “the other world”. But the upshot of their success was the acceptance of 
the claim to universal symbolism by Mindaugas who is even now celebrated 
as having been coroneted by “the church”, and thus became a vassal of non-
Lithuanian symbolic design. Hence, his legitimacy to be a king depends on 
a mediator who has the appropriate rhetoric to make rulers into kings or 
to deprive them of that position, in the name of the higher, earthly author-
ity who is the mediator and the true spokesman for the absolute author of 
the symbolic design. Legitimation comes from the new hierarchy which as-
sumes higher authority over the now diminished rulers. The latter become 
subservient vassals at best, if not slaves, of the global empire of symbols 
design. While the de facto ruler is the local king, the de jure ruler is an 
appointed mediator from the centre of such an empire. With a wave of a 
magic wand, Lithuanians became a nation of slaves. It is no wander that the 
battle of Grunewald depicts Lithuanian warrior, Vytautas, in the middle of 
the battle, but the legitimated king Jogaila is depicted as kneeling, as any 
vassal, and begging for help from his Lord. It is an obvious sign of submis-
sion and subjection. While repelling the Nights of the Cross, who were also 
sanctioned by the Pope to “convert the Lithuanians” by sword, the accept-
ance of the new symbolic design allowed the mediators – in this case called 
the priests and bishops to be rulers. The priests, of course, sent to settle and 
create temples, became supreme authorities among the “ignorant masses”, 
who were awed by the gilded robes and rituals incarnated by mysterious, 
magical words, incomprehensible to the local people. Thus the priest could 
“interpret” the message of such a language mainly in a threatening way.
Lithuania went through another form of the same global universalism: 
Russian promotion of the “Third Rome” as a replacement of Byzantium 
by an Orthodox symbolic design in which the emperor and the divinity 
were merged into one. Of course, the emperor was legitimated by the 
mediators – the prelates – who had the mission to save the world from its 
fallen state, appearing in its most decadent form in the West. Lithuania took 
the brunt of this salvific mission insofar as Lithuanian printed language 
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and its Latin script were forbidden and russification was an effort to make 
the empire universal. The Third Rome was an extension of the claim that 
there is one truth known only to the initiates who must keep the masses 
protected from contamination by forbidden ideas, and the latter were 
basically philosophical, i.e. thinking. And thinking must be decadent 
and dangerous, because it accepts any truth as long as the latter is fallible, 
leading to a challenge of the mediators who insist that their messages are 
the sole truth. That thinking and literate public is dangerous was revealed 
in Lithuania by expatriates who began to publish Lithuanian books and 
journals (by 1831) such as “The Dawn” (Aušra) or “The Bell” (Varpas) which 
were secretly transported across the border and distributed in Lithuania 
by dedicated persons called “book bearers”. They were the wake up call to 
“nationalism” and resistance to russification. The images of farm mothers, 
in closed rooms, by their spinning wheels, reading such journals and books 
in Lithuanian to their children, still inspire generations to be Lithuanians.
The globalization of such a universal symbolic design in Russia was 
transmitted to the communist party with its strict hierarchy of positions – 
the emperor on top, and the trusted “friends” in lesser positions. Their task 
was not to help the public, but to promote a symbolic design inscribed 
in texts and its meaning transmitted to the masses by mediators. Their 
task was to provide a rhetoric that the masses could understand, since the 
meaning of sacred texts of Marx, Engels and Lenin, was known only to the 
mentioned ultimate authorities. The importance of such mediators lies in 
their missionary task to proliferate the message across the entire globe. 
Thus forming of local parties and cells was a prerequisite activity in any part 
of the world. The missionaries were sent everywhere not only to present 
their rhetoric, but also to solicit members of different nations to join and 
become vassals to the empire, i.e. to receive orders for their actions and 
to report to the centre in Moscow. The envoys of the latter would have to 
make legitimate the local parties, their leadership and insure that the new 
vassals were following the line, depicted in the symbolic design. The local 
leaders had to be monitored from the centre of the empire by authorities 
in Moscow and the activities of such leaders were judged, corrected, or 
dismissed (usually by death). The ritual of initiation into the empire was 
quite specific. The high officials of the communist party in some part of the 
world would travel to Moscow and petition the emperor or his subservient 
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to be accepted as members of the empire  – going by the well-known 
name – Soviet Union.
As with the first universal globalization by Catholic symbolic design, 
Lithuania also was missionised by the communist rhetoric radiating from 
Moscow, soliciting adherents to the symbolic design of historical salvation 
of humanity, including Lithuania, from the decadent “bourgeois” society. 
The new converts formed a communist party whose leaders then travelled 
to the centre of the empire and humbly begged to become vassals to the 
emperor – at that time by the name Stalin. The “delegation” departed for 
Moscow with a mission to “bring the Stalin‘s sun” to Lithuania, declaring 
that Stalin is the “leader of nations”. Of course, just as the old universal 
symbolic design required the adoption of the new arts, such as singing 
praises to the Lord, so this time, the delegation contained “poets” who 
heaped praises on the new emperor and pledged eternal allegiance and 
gratitude for bringing salvation to the Lithuanian masses. And thus, the 
new rulers of Lithuania became vassals to the “universal symbolic design”, 
returning one more time to destroy national identity. Upon returning from 
Moscow, the new legitimated leaders took up the missionary work at home: 
first requirement  – destroy all thinking, intellectuals, their books which, 
according to the new rhetoric, were erroneous and misleading relics of 
an outdated historical thinking, with such nonsense as freedom, honour, 
dignity, self-reliance. After all, with thinking people the new symbolic 
design, presented in fabulous rhetoric, would not have any effect – in fact 
it would be immediately specified as sheer nonsense. Thus evoking massive 
tortures, killings, and deportations to concentration camps. Meanwhile the 
new vassals, taking direct orders from the centre, establishing themselves 
firmly with the support of Russian military.
We must not be misled by the other side of the rhetoric of this symbolic 
design: scientific progress. Under its guise, the entire country was pushed 
towards poverty, lack of simple things like bread; with farms destroyed, 
farmers deported, collective farms established, but not in the name of 
progress. To the contrary, the easiest way to enslave the “masses” is to herd 
them into closely guarded collectives without a chance of ever leaving, and 
feed them daily rations and, of course, rhetoric about the great deeds and 
achievements of the new “sun” the leader of many nations. The very means 
of subsistence of farmers and traders was robbed, and thus what was left 
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ware the “masses” which were not allowed to perform a simple task without 
first being ordered to do so. Thus, collectivisation was not only a prison, but 
also a militarised prison where one lived in accordance with commands. 
There ware “brigades” to perform assigned tasks, there ware students 
brought to help dig potatoes, there ware writer unions which wrote praises 
to the great leader and praises to the exemplary worker, and there ware 
censors to make certain that the rhetoric designed to maintain the ultimate 
truth was enforced, and only designed news ware printed. In this sense 
any literacy, obtained through “education” coincided with the temporary 
edicts of the “immortals”. It ought to be clear, that this sort of globalization 
was coextensive with colonisation, engaged in many parts of the world, 
including Western European. This brief delimitation of the globalization of 
symbolic designs ought to suffice to make distinctions among the variety 
of globalizations. As we continue investigating other types, we must also 
be cognisant that they become mixed and thus confusing, leading specific 
disciplines to select one or another as the “real” one.
There is another, somewhat simpler and limited mode of globaliza-
tion: trade. One of the great examples is the “Silk Road” that connected 
civilizations and continents and provided an open space for encounters 
among diverse tribes and even empires. But such globalization lacked the 
transportation means to bridge the vast spaces, including oceans, to make 
a significant impact. Of course, China benefitted from this globalization, 
embracing different cultures and technical inventions, providing a place to 
discuss diverse mythologies, to learn about new technical inventions, and 
to deploy a fleet of ships unmatched in any other country. In one sense, 
trade opens contacts not only for commodities, but also minimal levels of 
cultural understanding of differences that create a modicum of tolerance of 
strangers – in brief, it allows the understanding of one‘s own limits, even 
if one might want to persist in claiming that his is the universal way. One 
danger to such a cross cultural encounter is the notion that the others are 
either totally wrong, or a threat to one‘s own identity and superiority. The 
one option is either to destroy the others, or to close ones borders and even 
within the geographical region, exclude the others, at least their cultural 
difference. This is the case of China which decided to abandon the trade 
form of globalization and closed itself from the rest of the world – leading 
to its complete exclusion of everything except Confucianism and result-
14
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antly to its diminishment and exposure to other, globalising civilizations, 
which, as was the case of China, enter as colonial powers. This could be 
a warning to nations or even vast civilizations, that closing off is a disad-
vantage, since it prevents the necessary learning about the others, and the 
understanding of the capacities of what the others are and can do. In brief, 
China had no monotheism to be exported and imposed on the rest of the 
world as some sort of mandate from the Lord and his prophets. Not until 
Mao‘s “revolution” that China joined the Middle Eastern mode of globali-
zation, spreading the word of salvation and, in fact, competing with Soviet 
Russia for supremacy in this venture of salvation. 
Apart from globalization as trade, there is a dual form of globalization: 
military and wealth. The military form must define all others as enemies, 
comprising a threat to be deflected both internally and externally, whether 
the threat is real or not. To protect oneself against the threat lurking at the 
border, the best strategy is to eliminate it by “pre-emptive strike”, or simply 
invading the neighbour. This globalization follows the logic of total con-
quest: first, the nation across the border is a threat, and thus has to be con-
quered, but then on the border of the conquered nation is another one and 
also poses a threat – must be conquered, till all nations next to the new bor-
der are conquered. Of course, the wealth of the conquered belongs to the 
victorious empire. This mode was another way that Soviet Russia pushed 
ahead to incorporate nations with Afghanistan being the latest. It is a com-
mon form of globalization everywhere; the Inca formed a centre and from 
there expanded their empire by conquest of the rich neighbours, making 
their rulers into vassals to Inca kings. Yet their expansion, as the expansion 
of the other forms of globalization was always thwarted, either by other glo-
balising powers of the same type, or by limited resources, or, as we shall see 
later, by a very different form that redefined the very structure of the world.
After all, we marvel at the sea faring capacities of the Polynesians, the 
Inca superhighway across the Andes, stretching for thousands of kilome-
tres, and the mathematical genius of the same Inca, and are in awe in face 
of the Great Wall of China, and marvel by China’s technological genius that 
invented gun powder, compass  – all the other marvels not found in the 
West. We also know of the conquests of vast spaces by the Mongols who, 
after all great efforts, shrank back into their own region. No doubt, Alexan-
der took over from Cyrus an entire empire with its wealth and trade routes, 
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but the empire ended with him and the routes sank into the sands. We still 
marvel at the longevity of the Roman Empire, with its vast administrative 
network, roads and acceptance of every cult as long as none presumed to 
be above or equal to the goddess Rome. Unprecedented achievements in 
trade, manufacture, powered by armies of slaves, driven by arrogance of 
conquest for the sake of the conquest: “I came, I saw, I conquered”. But 
all roads lead to Rome, and all edicts radiate from Rome. While Romans 
ruled and created diverse centres of power, they did not establish local rule, 
with local administration (unless it was completely subservient to Rome) 
and hence globalization was Roman. Russia took its own turn of expand-
ing across Eurasia, forming an administrative network loyal to the Tsar, 
where all roads led to Moscow. Lenin did not deviate at all from the Russian 
reaches as an empire; he simply replaced the “head” while the rest remained 
the same. 
Not to be outdone, Lithuania had its glory days of expanding Eastward 
and dominating the vast reaches, and it was sufficiently wise to welcome 
diverse ethnic groups to live in the empire, participate in trade and 
commerce, practice their cultural rituals, and even establish their secluded 
communities. But the expansion, even if it might seem to represent a global 
venture, did not reach beyond the occupied lands. All that the rulers wanted 
(while squabbling among themselves) is a recognition from the West in 
the form of the royal crown. Yet what was unique among Lithuanians is 
their establishment of “universal” laws that set limits to autocratic and 
aristocratic arbitrariness. This comprised the period of Enlightenment 
that resembled an emergent “democratic” West. What is at issue for this 
emergence is that Lithuania did not know the nature of its own identity. 
The nobility, which was acculturated by Polish mannerisms, regarded itself 
as a true representatives of Lithuania, while other groups, such as the vast 
peasant population, which spoke Lithuanian language, were not regarded 
as Lithuanians. It took the expatriates to introduce Lithuanian language as 
a principle of Lithuanian identity. We shall return to this topic subsequently 
in the context of globalization.
A claim could be advanced that great Civilizations, such as China, 
possessed sophisticated technical skills and made spectacular innovative 
strides in practical spheres. The question still remains concerning their 
globalization. It seems that they were restricted to military needs and the 
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ruling segment of the population, without becoming common means for 
everyone – above all not for the vast populations toiling the fields. In this 
sense if technology has something to do with globalization, in China it did 
not even reach China‘s population. To understand this phenomenon, we 
shall have to understand the difference between practical life technology, and 
Western modern technology, premised on entirely different philosophical 
foundations. This is not to deny philosophical credentials of Chinese genius; 
after all, Taoism has a lot to say about radical individualism, and Confucius 
is being discussed in contemporary West about ethical issues. Even China, 
today is “exporting” Confucian centres not as an effort at globalization, but 
as a legitimation of China as a civilization, possessing unique features. It 
would seem that China wants to preserve its uniqueness and, just as many 
others, resist the overwhelming flood of total globalization. In other words, 
this is an effort to preserve China‘s identity which is being swamped by 
the modern Western globalization, despite the claims to the contrary, viz. 
China‘s communist party has lost its claim to be a moral bearer of Chinese 
life and thus it must seek legitimation by extolling Confucian virtues. To 
extricate the essence of this state of affairs it will be necessary to bring in 
the nature of “communism” and its relationship to globalization. Once this 
aspect becomes clear, then China‘s toying with Confucianism will appear 
in a different light.
Colonial India, occupied by Britain, one of the major European powers, 
with a burden to civilise the deprived and depraved others, might seem as an 
example of being “globalised” and especially when it had to accept British law. 
The “acceptance” of course was under the strict supervision and guidance of 
Lord Governor. But for colonialised India the major “accomplishment” was 
the acceptance of such a rule, with added attraction of imposed judgments 
as to what is moral, what is decent, and mainly, what is a “true faith” and 
human interaction. The “globalization” was – and by virtue of enculturation – 
dependent on British symbolic design. While India was a local place, with 
its mode of dressing, its erotic sculptures and painting, including passionate 
poetry which, in terms of its own major stories, were cosmic, the British 
culture, in terms of its own interpretive context, had to regard all these 
cultural features as “immoral”, uncivilised, and all the understanding of such 
features as cosmic, was made into Western “subjective psychology”, inner 
and inappropriate feelings that had to be degraded and expunged. In such a 
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context, the cultures of India were immediately seen as low, uncivilised and 
thus requiring the British to accept the “burden” of paternal management 
of the newly acquired “subjects“ of the crown. Any traditional arts were 
reinterpreted as immoral and damaging the virtues of such new subjects. 
This kind of judgment was not strictly Western, but was mixed with Middle 
Eastern personality cults and their “morality” which was radically fearful 
of anything that exhibits passion, erotic fire, and even images of the other 
as dancing with their own divinities. And thus the female temple dancers, 
exhibiting the cosmic passions and play, were regarded and subsequently 
made into an exotic allurement seeking customers. Direct descent from a 
temple dancing goddess to a street girl.
World Views
Having gone through the major forms of globalization, we have found 
out that they could not sway away from the centre or leave the centre behind, 
so to speak. This “inability” is dependent on the background awareness of 
the symbolic design which cannot be explicated as something to which 
one could point to, refer to, or base one’s analysis on. It is the very “cosmic” 
composition in the context of which all things, humans, divinities, all 
relationships make sense. One just cannot leave this cosmos and still live 
a life that would make sense. Thus our brief task is to explicate various 
symbolic designs not as the previously delimited social and human worlds 
of civilizations and powers, but as a totally pervasive presence which needs 
not to be available to the awareness of persons living in such a cosmos. The 
understanding of the cosmos is distinct from the life world that has become 
a major part of European philosophy. A variety of the life worlds may belong 
to a similar cosmos, but the latter is present only as a symbolic design. 
Moreover, we must note one major aspect while analysing various forms of 
globalization: all awareness, all positions of persons, whether emperors or 
leaders, were given in terms of the “medium”. The pope legitimates the king, 
the bringing of the “Stalin‘s sun” legitimates the Lithuanian communists, 
and so on. Now, we shall explore the mediating presence of the cosmos (in 
distinct forms) without which other mediations would make no sense. As 
we shall see, the modern globalization is possible on the specific cosmos 
that mediates all events, including humans. We shall distinguish to which 
extent diverse globalizations are parts of one or another cosmos and how 
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the possible mixture of cosmic awareness might retard or enhance the 
acceptance of the modern Western globalization. This is most the relevant for 
Lithuania, since it has gone through various mentioned globalizations, and 
after independence made a leap or, to speak in modern terminology, mutated 
into a globalised entity. At the outset a brief conception of “cosmos” must be 
presented. I make a philosophical claim that it is impossible to think or to 
depict any reality without a priori assumption of space, time and movement. 
These three factors are involved in all civilizations, in all globalizations and 
in all explanations – including those mediated by “eternal” beings. Hence 
our question is this: what sorts of interpretations there are of space, time and 
movement that frame a particular globalization. 
Numerous stories, stemming from all cultures, point to an awareness of 
an initial identity of all events in such a way that each event is transformable 
into any other event. This is to say, each event can be identical with every 
other event, each saying, sketch, dance, can be the sketched, said, danced 
event. To understand this process requires a depiction of space, time and 
movement that comprises one way of having a cosmos. Let us begin with 
the meaning of the poetic sayings that are designed to be identical with 
what they say, with the very appearance of all things and events. What we 
call poetic is, at one level, associated with architectonic production of the 
ways people have a world. The poet’s words set up the structure of the world 
and all events in it; it prescribes the ways that people live, and die, love and 
worship. Indeed, they establish the places of all that is sacred and profane, 
human and divine. It is by now known that initial language was  – and 
continues to be – the power to be identical with and thus to make the very 
events which the language speaks. We can note this power in numerous 
spoken – poetic – rituals all the way from Vedic sayings to contemporary 
cults. In Vedic practices, the word is experienced as having capacity to 
enable and to deprive the power of making events happen. This happening 
is identical with poetic-ritualistic words. When a Vedic priest pronounces 
something, it is with the power of making that something is to happen. His 
very speaking is the happening. When the shaman performs a rain dance, 
the dance is identical with the power of rain. When a tribe performs a ritual 
of “killing” the sketch of an animal, the sketch is the very power that is 
identical with the powers of the animal. And when the members of the tribe 
consume the animal, they become the powers of that animal.
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While our modern age is enlightened, our ritualistic practices still 
presume the world of identity. The poetic sayings and ritualistic practices 
have remained intact. Again, numerous examples can be offered. If there is a 
dry season, our shamans – the priests, ministers, presidents, governors, call 
the public to pray for rain. The prayer consists of rhetoric sayings that, once 
ritualistically performed, are identical with the power of rain, or the power 
of some maker of rain. When a modern shaman, such as a priest, minister, 
rabbi, or an herbal dispenser say eat of this, this is my body, drink of this, 
this is my blood, they offer a ritual which says that you will be identical with 
the body and power of the founder of the cult. For some major personality 
cults, such as Christianity, not only sayings, but the statues, the paintings, 
are not representations of some entities, but are identical with them. People 
kneel before them, kiss their feet and implore favours; the paintings, the 
statues are carried in processions and, at times, accused of not making 
events happen that the population wants, and as the result – are beaten. 
It must be clear that this identity is not one of representation, but one of 
the very presence of the thing or event. The statues are the divinities, the 
saints, the chanted words are the health, the curse, all the way to the stories 
of creation: some “highest” entity spoke, said “let there be light, and light 
appeared.
The identity in this cosmos extends to human individuality. Note how 
people claim to have an identity on the basis of verbal designations: I am the 
president, or I am a Christian, I am a socialist, or I am a priest, etc. Identity 
is gained from the very function, event, entity, which one enacts, speaks, 
and literally embodies. This identity is at times enacted in more mundane 
events, from television advertisements to sport events. Every advertised 
product is surrounded by pictorial and musical imagery in order to make 
the product identical with that imagery. If you buy these shoes, you will 
be the sports star, if you use this cream, you will be the Cher. Nonetheless, 
the imagery and sound comprise the ritual that makes the simple shoes 
and the overpriced cream into the power to make you identical with 
such an imagery. Similar identity takes place in athletic imagery. Some 
Spanish team wins a game, say in Brazil, the Spanish population in Madrid, 
sitting in a bar, will jump up and chant: we are number one, or we won. 
The persons in the bar were sitting and watching television thousands of 
kilometres away, yet they became identical with the team. Indeed, this type 
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of phenomenon occurs globally, all the way to performance of violent rituals 
on the streets. Fires are set, property is destroyed, and the lives are lost in 
the ritual chant of identity: we are number one. This phenomenon helps to 
account for the revolutionary mass movements, led by incantatory slogans, 
designed to make the population identical with the ideological chants and 
rhetorical sayings. Indeed, in such events one may become identical with 
the exaggerated paintings of the leaders who are the pure embodiment of 
ideology and revolution, and the population attempts to fit itself into the 
image of the leader. 
Given the proliferation of this type of identity, we must now decipher 
it in terms of our proposed space, time, and movement requirements as 
cosmos, and not as a sum of things, events, and entities. A verbal incantation 
done here and now is identical with an event there and then. The rain 
dances, the call for prayers for rain, in every sacred space, are identical with 
the power of rain in every area of the sky. In this identity, there is no modern 
notion of distances, and is not dependent on events one after another 
and one next to the other, as a causal system. This is to say, that the ritual 
chants and dances are not the causes that make something happen; they are 
identical with the happening, and hence an immediate identity – without 
the distance – of the saying with the event. Of course, some might argue 
that a sports event in Los Angeles caused a riot in Detroit. Yet even such 
an explanation breaks down the laws of causality. After all, a cause must be 
(a) in space-time proximity, and (b) commensurate with the effect, i.e. the 
latter cannot be greater than the cause. Yet there is a vast variation between 
the sports event and the riot, or between a ritual dance and a hurricane. 
In this sense, the riot that is identical with the event cannot be related in 
any causal way. They are mutually identical as space, time, and movement 
events. And in the sacred rituals the bread and the wine are the body and 
the blood, and those who partake of them become one with the founder of 
this personality cult. Indeed, they become reborn, dramatically new, with 
different embodiments, important duties and responsibilities, killing and 
dying for the “lord” in order to join him in a rhetorically constructed place 
where he will become “one with” the lord. 
One has only to consult the literatures of revolutionaries and the story 
line which such literatures disclose. We mentioned the Marxian story line 
of initial “paradisiacal” society, without social divisions, which failed and 
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“fell” from its perfection into corruption and evil ways, and history, with its 
“dialectical laws” is progressing to overcome the evil ways and to return to 
the “higher” level of society where everything will be mastered by “scientific 
discourses” to provide all human needs and to allow humans to be one with 
the utopian images of the Marxian story. Entire societies were subjected to 
this story, full of miracular rhetoric of “making a new man” by the power of 
scientific socialism. Just look at the literatures and arts emanating from the 
Marxian story line: romantic and erotic novels, such as “Olga meets her first 
Tractor”, where a milk maid, on a collective farm, is promoted to be a driver 
of a new socialist tractor – she and the tractor are totally impassioned and 
the passion spreads throughout the collective farm and the entire region. 
Look at the statues of the heroes, the faces turned toward the glorious future, 
aglow with joy, revealing the presence of the “utopian tomorrow”. We can 
marvel at the “major controversy” in Lithuania about the Soviet statues on 
the bridge. The rhetoric of the supporters of the statues focused on “art” 
and Lithuanian “history” but in this cosmos, the statues were identical 
with the glories of the empire and with the inevitable paradise. They were 
not representations, but the very presence of such paradise. It seems that 
Lithuanians are not averse to this cosmic structure, since it appears after the 
declaration of independence: “We are Western, we are Europeans”.
The world of direct rhetoric, ritualised speaking, of incantations, 
and statues, suggesting the way all events can become all other events, is 
metonymic. Every term, event, entity, thing can be replaced by any other 
event, saying, ritual, and entity. If we strip away our modern presumptions 
of sequential awareness, we would be in a position to open this cosmos 
that is all pervasive and even dramatically effective. The awareness, at this 
level, is completely immersed in, and coextensive with the metonymic 
rhetoric wherein nothing is excluded from the logic of identity of all 
with all, of transposition of all into all without a distance. It could be 
said, in contemporary terms, that there is no specific essence of anything. 
Everything can become everything else. Nonetheless, this cosmos can 
be distinguished from another world. Indeed, the leap from the world of 
identity to another space, time, and movement, shows the forming of a 
different cosmic awareness.
While in the world of metonymic identification of any term with any 
other term, of sayings with the presence of divinities, of recitations that “are” 
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rain, and ritual dances as the very identity of the danced events, whether the 
latter are storms, demons, divinities, or ancestors, in the new cosmos where 
time and space depend on a different composition, the cyclical and rhythmic, 
of eternal return, all phenomena are reinterpreted. Thus ritual dance is no 
longer perceived as a power of rain, but assumes different symbolic pre-
eminence. It’s very style – the rhythmic – is an intimation of space, time 
and motion that comprise a cosmos within whose context all events are 
articulated. We must be clear about the use of dance as the most preeminent 
in this cosmos: dance is a metaphor for all events depicted rhythmically and 
in such a way that rhythmic movement composes music, seasons. Thus daily 
affairs could be regarded in the terms of rhythmic dynamics, such as seasons 
with their assigned labours, celebrations, all of which are repeated in annual 
cycles. Lithuanian traditional life was immersed in such seasonal rhythms 
that were repeated cyclically. The agrarian life was seasonal and seasons 
were divided by seasonal tasks and climate, vegetation, animal gestation, 
bird migrations, crop planting and reaping, forest bounties – seasonal wild 
barriers and mushrooms. Yet what is also characteristic of this dynamic is 
that it forms a cyclical closure. In daily affairs there is a rhythm of seasons, 
of life from birth, to life, to death, from death to birth to life, leading to 
cyclical repetitions. Thus, the entire universe moves in cyclical repetition of 
rhythmic dynamics. It is important to note at the outset that in this cosmos 
any essentiality is to be avoided. If we follow the activities in this cosmos, 
we shall have to learn to understand them as tracing and maintaining this 
world and not as a depiction of essential realities. 
The first awareness that composes the art works in this cosmos is the 
polar dynamics such that a movement toward one is also a movement 
toward the other pole. The eminent literatures and stories in this world 
depict events  – including human actions  – as a bifurcation, an initial 
separation that offers the separated beings an exchange of positions and 
functions. What is high and divine, becomes low and demonic, while 
the demonic becomes divine. What is light becomes dark, and the dark 
becomes light, and in such a way that one cannot be without the other, one 
contains the other. Indeed, if we move to one, we are also moving to the 
other: movement toward love is also a movement toward hate, a movement 
toward sound takes silence with as a requisite polar aspect. The grand myths 
of the fall of a man are universal. At first there was a paradisiacal unity – 
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identity  – of the human with the source of the world, then the human 
transgressed this identity and had to go down. Yet through the hard labour 
the human will go up again. From good and beautiful to evil and ugly, from 
evil and ugly to good and beautiful. These stories abound across the globe, 
even if Westerners are mainly familiar only with one version. What we must 
avoid is a dualistic interpretation. The latter, as we shall see, belongs to a 
different world awareness. Male and female are together in polar tension, 
and each gender carries traces of the other gender. This is to say, human is 
androgynous and, as Plato suggested, eros, an attraction of male to female 
is a way of uniting the two which initially was one being. 
Preliminary hermeneutic that appears in texts, sayings, stories, 
and even philological erudition very strongly suggests that the stories, 
regarded as myths, stem from a concrete action of speaking: mythenomai, 
leading to the distinction between mythos and logos, with the former 
being originary with the spoken language and not deconstructable by the 
critics of logocentric prejudgments. Mythos, as the voicing-speaking, is 
never present without its polar counterpart, mukas-mutus, silent-mute. In 
this sense we encounter the domain that is pervaded by sound-silence. 
A further refinement of this cosmos is offered by other terms related to 
the first two: myein, to verbalise, mouth and music, and their variations 
by mystes, mysterion, mystery and muse. The connections can be made 
between music and muse, and indeed between them and the mother of 
all muses, mnemosyne, as the memory of a tradition and its “inspiration”. 
The latter is the very soul, the psyche of orality. It connects with spiritus, 
spirare, the breath and breathing, the inspiring-expiring, with Russian 
dusha-dichat, or soul-breathe, the previously mentioned Indian Brahman-
Atman, the cosmic breath and the singular breath, the anemos-wind, as 
the animating principle of the Greeks, and even the Newtonian cosmic 
psyche. It is to be noted that sound is voiced breath, and thus sounding 
is identical with psyche. The way we voice our words, is identical with 
the ways of oral expressivity and imagery. The expressivity is the aesthetic 
domain in the rhythmic cosmos. The voice is sad, indifferent, cold, distant, 
soft, warm, aggressive, bombastic, uncertain, hesitating, etc. leading to a 
direct presence of the psyche not as something interior, but as the imagery 
of the voiced breath, the spoken word. To say it in the other words, psyche 
is identical with oral expressivity, and the latter is identical with musical 
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imagery and poesies. Thus the oral musicality is inspirational, literally, 
breathing in the psyche in direct sound/silence encompassment.
A preeminent characteristic of the voiced breath is periodicity and 
rhythm; this is to say negatively, non-directionality. The rhythmic nature 
of the sound/silence cosmos is therefore coextensive with the rhythmic 
polarity of mythos. This is even expressed in the symbolic personae of 
mythological musicality: all divinities are poets and singers, and they are 
equally encompassed by the passions of their musical instruments and 
voices. This also intimates another characteristic: the voiced breath, the 
rhythm, is manifested in the dance. In this sense the body is primarily 
musical. Again, we can allude to mythical symbols such as Shiva as the cosmic 
dancer, or the wandering nymphs, made visible in the wreathing dance of 
young maidens. Across all the worldly phenomena, the cosmos to which 
they belong, provides inspirations that are sung, danced, or announced 
by “mystics”. This is literally transmission of mythos in numerous ways, 
including musicality. The latter is a ground of sound-expression reflexivity, 
from the simplest binary sound/silence, each reflecting the other, to the 
complex expressive reflectivities, such as soft-hard, sharp-flat, irritating-
soothing, dark-deep-desperate-tormenting  – light-flat-frivolous-vibrant. 
Although this might still seem to be polar, the point is that intersections – 
oral imagery – come in clusters and ambivalent tensilities. 
Sound and silence, just as much as the dance or the rhythm of waves, 
the cycles of the planets, the sun, and the seasons, are equally employed in 
aesthetic creations to articulate this type of world awareness. In the world 
of rhythmic cycles, there are no fixed, reified things and their neutral-
objective empirical characteristics. All things are musical, enchanted, 
dancing, returning and vanishing, and hence in constant shift from polarity 
to counter-polarity. One could call such a shift periodicity. Associated 
with the cosmos of rhythmic cycles – the eternal return – are oral-sound 
imageries. Such imageries have been understood as constitutive of mood 
space. The argument for such a space is based on the notion that rhythms 
and their audial variants, carry with them moods, such as exciting, violent, 
pacifying, dynamic, indifferent, passionate, cool, sad, erotic, and in such 
a way that the entire environment is understood to be pervaded by such 
moods. Indeed, the latter draw everything in their imageries. It should 
be noted that the expressivities are not yet associated with objective or 
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subjective meanings, but with participatory dynamics. Hence, a particular 
musical rhythm moves a person to join the dance, the chant, the humming 
of the tune, the excitement of the environment. In brief, in this cosmos 
and its space, time and dynamics, there are no neutral things. While this 
dimensional space, time, and tensile movements are dynamic and with 
shifting polarity, they have no orientation, and neither do the participants 
in them. This can be seen in dance and music. Dance does not move in 
any linear fashion; the rhythms, so to speak, have no teleological direction, 
and hence do not aim at anything, just as sound and music, with their all-
pervasive and overlapping volumes are going nowhere. 
But this rhythmic, cyclical cosmos, which is pre-eminently musical, is 
most significant for Lithuanian understanding of its traditions. Let us take 
musicality in the sense that Lithuanians “sang everything”. This unique saying 
means that they did not sing about something, but sang its very rhythm, 
whether it was the pattern of the bees dance, or the dawn inscribing the 
path of the sun, or the passionate voices of maidens “longing” to enter the 
path of womanhood. Whether it was a young man ploughing the field in 
the morning and “hymning” the sun with the songs of birds, or the women 
chanting with the rhythmic bending of their bodies to tie the just cut wheat 
into bundles  – all chores were musical. This helps us to understand the 
mythical pronouncements (mythical in the sense articulated above) of those 
who participated in Lithuanian struggle for independence: “Who could defeat 
a singing revolution?” This saying is understood by any Lithuanian who 
recognises his tradition – belonging to a rhythmically understood cosmos.
We should note that the mutation from identity, time and space cosmos 
to the rhythmic and cyclical cosmos, does not abolish what was present in 
the identity cosmos. The logic of identity of everything with everything, 
of every word with an event, of every ritual with the power of the thing 
performed, is not gone. It becomes a background phenomenon that at times 
reappears as a significant one. Thus, in the polar movement of the fall of 
man, there is also a background of resolution wherein man will become one 
with the paradise lost, or one will become truly human, after the historical 
process will move the human from its fallen state of primitive communism 
to the utopian salvation where the human will become identical with the 
community and herself. The return to the lost identity may take various 
forms, such as reclaiming the sacred site that gives one identity, such as 
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would be the case of Lithuanians constantly returning to the same “sacred” 
forest, or the return of seasonal celebrations which are identical despite the 
changing seasons. The claim here is that the return is not a polar rhythm, a 
repetition of cycles, but an appearance of the past and future times, and sites. 
What appears is a leap in reconfiguration of space, time, and movement in a 
way that yields another awareness on whose background all events, things, 
and humans will find their significance and topology.
Of course, singing and dancing is part of every civilization and requires 
no globalization; what can be globalised is a particular style which becomes 
attached to and an aspect of a unique cosmos that provides a symbolic 
design for interpreting all events in ways that other civilizations lack or, 
even if they possess, such a cosmos is over determined by the two cosmic 
morphologies disclosed so far. This is philosophically important because 
the cosmic awareness cannot be derived from the traditional claims by 
various philosophical schools, such as empiricism or its counterpart, 
rationalism, which presume that a particular cosmic awareness is derivable 
from a specific sensory field. Thus, the identity of every saying with the 
thing, must be visual, while the rhythmic and cyclical cosmos must be 
explained by audial sense. But the argument presented so far suggests 
that the visual can be over determined by the audial and interpreted 
rhythmically. And as we shall shortly see, the cosmos that composes the 
modern western globalization also includes the audial, but in a very specific 
way, characteristic of this modern cosmos.
The mutation from the rhythmic and cyclical cosmos to the modern-
western, consists of “fragmentation” of the polar into strict distinctions, 
such as high/low, forward/backward, past/future, implying a space, time 
and movement as linear, sequential, such that all things are deployed one 
after the other and one next to the other. The transformation of the rhythmic 
cyclical cosmos into a sequential, linear cosmos received an impetus with 
the disclosure of perspectival space and time. This disclosure refines the 
linearity by deploying space and time as having recognisable points on a 
line which can be identified and fixed, and a point in spatial depth that can 
be accessed from a positional point of the observer. Such positional points 
comprise a condition that allows things and events to be fixed, substantial, 
with characteristics that are also located on the thing. In addition, the 
positioning requires that anything without a position, anything that 
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is dimensional, such as moods and expressivities, must be located as 
qualifications of something. The world laden with psychic dimensions is 
relocated into a subject who is also an ego, having a perspective to the 
thing facing it. This means that the permanent ego, separate from other 
egos, requires an establishment of the sequentially and perceptively 
positional cosmos, such that things move from past to present, and from 
here to there. The ego is recognisable as a point in space-time position from 
which other space-time points can be accessed. Other positions, occupied 
by other egos, allow them to be equally separate individuals. Once again, 
the ego must also be the topos where the psychological worlds of mood 
dimensions become located as inner states. This new cosmos requires 
the transformation of the dimensional, expressive world, into subjective 
psychological states that, accordingly, can be projected on the impartially 
located things. Here the essentialism is born that allows things to have 
their determinable – eternal characteristics and their causal – space-time 
locations and sequence. In this cosmos, the individual is not transferable, 
since he has an identifiable space and time position that no one else can 
enter. The identity of each individual is premised on the identities of fixed 
locations. What happened in the past can be recognised on a designation 
of the specific point and special location. 
Moreover, this cosmos also allows the continuous fragmentation of 
space, time and movement into smaller and smaller segments – space-time 
atomic fragments which can be always subdivided into smaller fragments. 
This is so obvious in the increase in disciplines. Each discipline has its 
own perspective that can be split into sub-perspectives where each sub-
perspective can become an independent perspective. At the outset, this 
universe calls for reification. All things must be material and thus divisible 
into parts  – perhaps into infinity. Yet we also notice that the reified, 
serialised and perspectival cosmos grants tacitly an incrementation in 
awareness. This incrementation becomes the condition for the possibility 
of the serialised cosmos. At the issue are the inevitable dualisms that are 
premised on the separation of space and time: space is articulated in terms 
of the deployment of material components, while time is the measure of 
this deployment in sequence. Thus, in principle, this cosmos is dualistic 
because the two fundamental aspects of general cosmic a priori, space and 
time are separated. This separation leads to a static conception of all things, 
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specifically when temporal movement is a measure separated from spatial 
things. The measure is allotted to the subject who is distinct from spatial 
body and thus can transcend the present moment in time toward the future 
and is in a position to recollect the past. As we shall see subsequently, this 
cosmos becomes the condition for modern western globalization. It is no 
accident that once this mutation of cosmos took place, the entire globe 
became a three dimensional space, to be explored, mapped, and conquered. 
The rhythmic, cyclical world was reinterpreted three dimensionally and 
all places on the globe became positions in measurable distances and 
fragmented time measures required to traverse such distances. Colonialism 
was a result of new world awareness.
Thus what was lacking in the kinds of universal/global ventures was 
a very different system of “world” morphology. As just stated, the latter 
was constructed in Western Renaissance, and consisted of deployment of 
all events in a sequential pattern and spatial proximity. Such space and 
time provided global coordinates and offered a framework for calculating 
directions and distances, required for efficient transportation of military 
forces and commercial commodities. There was hardly any doubt that 
this world morphology played a transforming role that lent Europeans an 
advantage over other civilizations. The explosion of explorations, mapping 
of geographical locations, centres of commerce and amassment of wealth 
led to the growth of European power and, of course, rivalry and colonialism. 
And the latter meant a growth of empires, new markets and cheap labour. 
The emergence of capitalism was premised on such a new cosmos. Of 
course, the initial explorations were a part of the old European kingdoms 
which maintained their Middle Eastern missionary zeal which, as just 
mentioned, appropriated vast tracts of land as if they had no inhabitants. 
If they were “discovered” they became material property of reified world.
No doubt, having invented a structure that could be regarded as global, 
European commerce turned global, exporting products and importing raw 
materials  – and shipping slaves as agrarian labour in the new world. To 
keep slave, and other forms of labour, including in the colonies, working, 
one had to couple production and expansion of global trade and markets 
with another form of globalization – the missionary, charged with the duty 
to bring Christianity under the guise of “morality”. Such a coupling had 
dire consequences for other civilizations and their modes of life. Schools 
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were established for indigenous populations as places of indoctrination 
to “Western” civilization under the false pretences that it is Christian and 
not secular. Yet it is not Christianity that was instrumental in promoting a 
morality of equality or freedom. It is clear that concerns for the poor have 
been a major debate among economic theorists and moralising clergy. The 
issue centred on how to reduce poverty without harming economy, and the 
rest was deemed to be irrelevant. But the economy had assumed a specific 
direction: it had to grow instead of remaining at the level of satisfying basic 
needs. In Europe from 16th century on, the poor were seen as a necessity 
for healthy economy. Such educated personsas B. de Mandeville  – an 
economist – bluntly stated that without the slavery, economic wealth of a 
nation depends directly on vast numbers of working poor. This implied that 
for the good of economic development, there is no need to diminish poverty. 
Whatever measures were offered, they were not intended to relieve poverty, 
but to help the poor in catastrophic cases. There were even voices claiming 
that the poor are at fault because of their laziness, perhaps even ungodliness 
and lustful life. A preacher, T. Malthus, was one of the major propagators of 
this view; for him economic progress depended on technology that might 
even help the poor, but due to the lust, the poor will produce overabundance 
of offspring and thus will always be poor. Indeed, his views prompted new 
laws which outlawed any relief and thus forced the poor to rely solely on 
their workplace. A. Smith proposed a vague solution in relationship to the 
taxes that the rich pay, but no consequences flowed from his “vision”. Marx 
of course had his solution: abolition of private ownership of the means of 
production, allowing the “masses” to take control of such means and thus 
become owners/workers. Lenin attempted to implement Marx’s views but 
all that was achieved is a life above the poverty line for the majority, and a 
luxurious life for the minority, the “revolutionary elite”, the de facto owners 
of all property, of course “in the name of the people”, constituting “state 
capitalism”. The “morality” coupled with economy was and still is a major 
factor in globalization. 
A good example of encounter with the modern West is Japan. Japan 
was compelled to become open to the novelties of the West at the level of 
civilization – commerce, technology, military. What is known as the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868, which ushered in a contact with Western world and 
its philosophies. During the third part of the Nineteenth century the Meiji 
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reformers abolished 250 years of military rule, restored the emperor to 
the “immemorial” position of supreme authority and changed Japan from 
feudal to modern-westernised society. The revolution was accomplished 
quite peacefully by three groups: feudal lords who wanted to improve 
Japan’s international position; bureaucrats who wanted to modernise 
Japan by emulating west, and low ranking warriors. Before this revolution, 
the supreme military ruler was from one of the great feudal “houses” the 
Tokugawa, whose secular ruler was known as shogun. While the emperor 
was the “spiritual” leader, and resided powerless in Kyoto, the shogun was in 
all matters a de facto ruler of Japan. He maintained peace among the lesser 
“great” lords, each possessing an army of warriors (samurai), who, due to 
imposed peace, had very little to do; many of them became poets and many 
more became adherents of Zen as a way of practicing their warrior art without 
any fear of “self-extinction”. By the date of Meiji restoration, the warrior class 
numbered two and a half million – close to 7% of Japan’s population. Yet 
despite this magnificent show of might, they were useless when United States 
was emerging as an empire and its squadron of ships, under the command 
of commodore M. Perry, arrived in Tokyo Bay in 1853 and demanded that 
Japan open up to the West. Up till then, under the rule of shogun, Japan was 
completely closed and no relationships with foreigners were permitted. (Zen 
Buddhism was brought to Japan from China way before the military rule by 
Tokugawa house). Shogun was forced to comply with American demands 
and was accused by Japanese elite as having formed an unequal treaty; 
rather than suffering under such humiliation, the emperor was restored 
as a supreme ruler and the previously mentioned three Japanese social 
levels decided to accept whatever the westerners have created in industry, 
technology and military as the best way to retain Japanese independence 
and identity and to compete with the west. The new emperor, Meiji, was 
associated with this vast transformation of Japan, abolishing feudalism and 
establishing modern bureaucracy, led by the samurai class. To compete with 
the west, Japanese bureaucrats attacked isolationism and sent individuals to 
study in Europe and United States. In this sense, while being globalised by 
the modern western cosmos, Japan decided to globalise itself and become 
western – at least at the level of modern West.
What happened to Japan is instructive: insofar as it was forced to open 
up to the West, it also accepted Western industrial mode of production and 
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a shift in its purpose. Instead of being closed, it assumed a role for Japan as 
globalization of as the spirit of Asia and a leader in modernisation, resulting 
in military expansion – equally in a global sense. After all, it was ready to 
conquer America – except that it had not yet acquired the means of mass 
production of every commodity, including military equipment. Due to this 
miscalculation, Japan has lost the war, but did not shake off all what the 
modern west had to offer. After the war, by choice or necessity, Japan’s life 
world was being culturally colonised in all social areas, from dress to film. 
American and Japanese cowboy movies, large posters advertising Marlboro 
cigarettes with “Marlboro man” regarded as a heroic figure, baseball mania, 
and Beethoven mixed with Jazz. It is no wonder that the writer Mishima 
declared a protest concerning the disappearance of Japanese tradition, to 
the extent that he made a film “Rites of Love and Death” and subsequently 
committed a seppuku, an honourable Samurai ritual to demonstrate what 
the real Japan is. This suggests that at least the modern Western globalization 
does not only engage in trade of commodities, but introduces a mode of 
thinking that is materially and culturally different from previous types of 
global excursions.
While rapidly becoming western, Japan wanted to remain authentically 
Japanese. Is it possible to return to the “purity of the past” or is it best to face 
the philosophical problems introduced by the west and to offer some of the 
traditional aspects, such as Zen, transformed into some sort of philosophy? 
After all, if phenomenology proposed a solution to the issues raised by 
dualistic thinking – subject/object, man/god, time/eternity, then Zen has 
offered a solution to the same problem  – even if it did so by borrowing 
examples from its own culture. Indeed, Japanese have agonised over this 
purity and identity, and even superiority over other races with which 
Japanese came in contact. It has been noted that since World War II, until 
1980, no less than 700 books were published in Japan on what it means to 
be Japanese. The exceptionalism is promoted to most comical extremes: 
advertisements state that foreign made skis cannot be used in Japan because 
of the uniqueness of the Japanese snow, or foreign foods are not acceptable 
because Japanese digestive systems are different from others. Even at the 
end of the Twentieth century, the myth of homogeneity was “proven” by 
sociological studies which revealed that up to 90% of Japanese claim to 
belong to the middle class. This uniqueness became enshrined in 1889 in 
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Meiji constitution under the notion of “national principle” (kokutai). This 
principle provided a story of the uninterrupted continuity of Japan through 
the unbroken line of emperors as descendants from divinities; the ancestors 
of the entire tradition stand guard to protect the Japanese people. Even if 
they disliked Japan’s lack of individualism and “human rights” Westerners 
tended to agree that homogeneity and cohesiveness of Japanese society is 
its advantage (work ethic, low crime rate), but also its failure – submission 
to tradition and thus to feudal mentality. 
But Japan, and its tradition was interrupted, not by colonialism of the 
mentioned types, but by the Western modernisation. A brief indication 
of the spreads of globalization can be seen in Japan’s becoming Western, 
not in terms of a colonial symbolic design, but precisely taking over 
the logic of globalization – at least in terms of military technology. The 
Meiji Restoration of 1868 also initiated Westernisation as a response to 
the humiliation brought by American gunships, forcing Japan to become 
“open” and face a possibility of being subjected to a foreign power, or 
becoming a modern power itself. Japan chose the latter and entered the 
path of global expansion. In two generations after the restoration, Japan 
became a modern power, under the slogan “rich country, strong army”. Up 
to the end of World War II, war production was central to Japan’s “progress”. 
No need to repeat Japan’s excursions into and annexations of lands across 
Asian countries; what is significant is the way Japan advertised itself as 
righteous and legal defender of the Asian spirit against the West. Indeed, 
the Western powers were equally impressed and invited their “student” to 
sit at the “global table” of major powers. It is of note that Asian nationalists 
admired the new Japan, and Asian intellectuals flocked to Tokyo to learn 
from an Asian power that was capable of expanding prosperity at home, 
and stand against the Western powers.
It is a point of contention what global modernisation does to 
societies. On the one hand, it is claimed that modernisation is not for 
war to commit aggression; rather the rhetoric was depicting Japan as 
a selfless defence of legitimate interests or a crusade against evils such 
as communism. In addition, the condemnation by the West of Japan’s 
aggression was regarded as a hypocrisy: Japan was the liberator and 
natural leader of Asian nations, oppressed by Western symbolic design 
and colonialism. Pan-Asianism was the symbolic design propagated as a 
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justification of Japanese expansionism. For Japanese the years in which 
it fought and subjugated vast tracts of lands and peoples was a spiritual 
quest to build “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, requiring a 
beautiful modern war. It is necessary to distinguish between globalization 
and colonisation. While Japan was not colonised in the sense of becoming 
a territory of another power, it became globalised by the discussed logic 
of Western ontology and metaphysics; after all, it sent its bright young 
students to study in the West the latest “scientific” achievements and 
their application. It could be said, that it globalised itself and then used 
the innovations to become imperialistic coloniser under the pretence 
of an Asian symbolic design: allowing Asia to recoup its own traditions 
distorted by western colonialism and its symbolic design. The crucial 
question in the case of Lithuania is whether its escape from colonialism 
of symbolic design or Russia/Soviet type and entrance into the global life 
world means the total dissolution of its own tradition, or can it resist the 
temptation to submerge completely into the global logic not by external 
force, but by becoming self-globalising nation.
The example of Japan is introduced to provide a moment of reflection 
for Lithuania as it is mutating towards globalization. If an ancient and 
powerful civilization, including its large population, is tormented by the 
efforts to remain Japan, how such a small country as Lithuania can maintain 
its traditional culture in the global cosmos? This is more problematic since 
Lithuania has a mixed history; it had expanded as an empire, had a union 
with Poland, became a part of Middle Eastern personality cults, contained 
diverse ethnic groups and cultural customs, and hence up till the end of the 
Nineteenth century did not know its exact identity. Is Lithuania identical 
with the establishment of nationhood after World War One and the brief 
period between then and World War Two, or is it identical with the post-
Soviet period which is permeated by globalization? We shall confront 
these questions as we unfold the logic of globalization at other levels in 
subsequent chapters. After all, we have only discussed the foundational 
morphology of the modern western cosmos, without showing other levels 
that are constituted philosophically and not merely posited as obvious. This 
is to say, there are other unique aspects of the modern western globalization 
not present in the previously mentioned modes and indeed in the two 
compositions of cosmos prior to the modern one.
34
LITHUANIA AND GLOBALIZATION
Meanwhile, our depiction of Japan as being globalised and becoming 
globalising power, contrasts markedly with the British way of globalising. It 
is obvious that the British were most adapt to the modern cosmos, evidenced 
by the fact that the British engaged in global trade, above all in supporting 
an unabashed capitalism which needed markets to keep its emerging 
production and over production of cheap commodities, functioning. 
Indeed, the fuelling of this production created a need for the raw materials 
and cheap labour to extract such materials. No doubt, but it is the case that 
the hub of production remained in England, and such production needed 
expansion nowhere else than in England. There is no need to explicate the 
conditions of the British workers subjected to the whims of the “captains of 
industry”, but there is a need to mention that neither the captains nor their 
workers could continue without the markets provided by colonialism. We 
might recall the concern of Gandhi when he declared a strike on British 
goods – the British workers will suffer for lack of work. This arrangement 
was not yet globalization but nationalism with the needs of its capital elite 
to continue its unabated greed for profit. National empires do not globalise, 
but nationalise. Even when there is the coupling of nationalistic colonialism 
with Middle Eastern personality cults and their “universal” moralities, 
the expansion is cultural, very distinct from modern globalization. Japan 
accepted such globalization and became itself a centre of it.
The brief examples presented so far, are a way of suggesting that to 
understand the question of what happens to a nation, and ethnic group, 
or an entire civilization, encountering the vast and complex phenomena 
of globalization. This might help understand the Lithuanian situation as it 
has entered the arena with which it was not familiar. After the declaration 
of independence by Lithuania, and its sudden encounter with the West, 
one colleague proclaimed that the Lithuanian population suddenly found 
itself between a plough and a computer. The latter, as we shall argue, is no 
longer a “thing” with a location and national identity  – even if the logo 
says it is ”Dell” and “made in China”. No doubt that the latter, while having 
been dominated by Western colonial powers, was not globalised by them; 
they simply needed raw materials and cheap labour and markets for mass 
production and above all for anything that can be sold – including opium 
the sale of which and the resulting addictions by Chinese peoples, led to the 
great rebellion, ending with Mao‘s “liberation” of China. Today China is no 
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longer a colony, but an extension of and a participant in the modern western 
globalization. In brief, it has entered the “world” history. To understand 
the latter, let us note what are the philosophical arguments that led to the 
construction of such history.
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CHAPTER II
Basis of “World History” 
Introduction
We have ended the last chapter with the notion that modern western 
globalization proposes to bring all civilizations into a world history. 
Indeed, as has been well established, not all traditions are historical, not 
even some that belong to the Western civilization. Let us take an example of 
China, which is emerging as one of the great global players in all the areas 
of modern West, but it also wants to retain its specific Chinese features. 
While speaking of the polar, rhythmic cosmos, it became clear that such 
cosmos does not have some of the positions which would be “above” in 
opposition to “below”. The rhythmic process constitutes itself in polarities 
such that one depends on the other and can shift into the other without 
losing the balance between them. The cosmos is “polarities in becoming” 
where all fundamental aspects are symmetrically related, each requiring 
the other in order to have a full articulation, popularly presented as yin/
yang. Yin does not transcend Yang, and conversely. Yin is always becoming 
yang and yang is always becoming yin, just as the night is always becoming 
a day and day – becomes a night. This world context is both, constituted 
by its elements and constitutes them. Let us be clear: the very notion of an 
element is to be transformed such that no element is separate as if it were 
some “transcendent” atom, but appears in its correlation to the rest. Each 
particular is only as an interaction with the other, and hence, we cannot 
speak of sequential causes as if one were a cause of another, since that 
would comprise a separation. Another way of saying this is that dualistic 
conceptions, ending in an asymmetrical relationship, which leads not only 
to creator/created, but also to substantive-essentialist ontology of discrete 
and independent components. Chinese understanding gives primacy to 
correlative terminologies appropriate for the dynamic cycles: condensing in 
differentiation and differentiating in condensation, scattering and gathering 
waxing and waning. Such understanding comprises a continuum on which 
all differ in degree and not primarily in kind. 
This sliding process does not allow some degree of inception, absolute 
beginning from which other events would follow. One basic conception is 
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a cyclical cosmos of rhythmic order and readjustment. It should be obvious 
that social and political philosophy is equally explicated in terms of this 
cosmos: personal cultivation and public administration, knowledge and 
action, where each aspect defines and is dependent on other aspects that 
cannot be dualistically separated – as is evident from the lack of dualism 
of mind/body. Thus if we associate qualitative aspects of matter only to the 
western notion as “thing”, Chinese will speak of hou, meaning physically 
thick and also generous, or po as physically thin and frivolous. This leads 
to another broad, yet intelligible difference between the modern West and 
China, the difference between history and tradition. 
The modern West is historical in the sense that it appeals to the makers, 
the agents of history. We tend to enumerate events and who did them, where 
and when, who was the first to posit a philosophical theory, who came after 
to criticise it, and who followed the critic, each positing a new, and even 
a radically new theory, comprising a break in history and forming a new 
beginning. The great figures who invent themselves or are at the service of 
grand-transcendent purposes, of divine plan, of dialectical agonal battles, 
always constitute a transcendent “ahistorical” arche that can break in at any 
moment. Indeed, we even imagine how the great philosophers transformed 
the course of history – while sitting in their ivory towers of theory, they 
moved armies, destined nations to be formed and comprised a catalyst 
for great revolutions and finally purposive progress and environmental 
disaster. Of course, for comparative analyses, it is appropriate that history 
and tradition may overlap, but the question is one of predominance. History 
is made by personages, while tradition has a pervasive presence that does 
not yield to the positing of origination or creators. History is “rational” 
in the sense that causes, motives, or reasons are ascribed to events, even 
if those events might be chaotic. Events follow the linear cosmos, each 
having a location in space and time. It is quite different with tradition, 
since its rationality is not premised on transcendent justification, but is best 
maintained through rituals, customs, solidarity and stability. There is hardly 
any need for intervention from “all seeing consciousness” that is disruptive 
and abstract – a sort of universal discourse that, nonetheless, has to become 
particularised in specific situations. Meanwhile, historical societies tend to 
depend on positive laws and sanctions, obedience and disobedience to laws, 
backed by explicit and coded requirements. Positive laws are external and 
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transcendent, and are obeyed on the basis of “rational” self-interest. Hence 
one calculates to what degree one can escape the rule of law without being 
caught. This means that positive laws, despite their claim to universality, are 
individuating, fragmenting, since such laws do not bind a community but 
are external to it. In brief, once a tradition and its community fail, then the 
laws are established.
Lithuania also has a tradition as its foundation that is distinct from 
history replete with grand figures, located by dates of their births, important 
deeds that changed the course of history, their deaths and monuments in 
their name. But the tradition that carried the people was “immemorial” 
because it could not be given a beginning in a sequential historical time. 
One lived with the rhythms of nature, with the seasons and assigned 
labours, with songs and stories consisting of wise sayings and advice from 
the family members who were always present to guarantee one’s position in 
the “extended” family. Thus those who died are not in the past, but belong 
to the family, village, regional community. Upon occasion the tradition 
would be disrupted by some historical figure or movement of expanding 
an empire so that Lithuanians became part of some grand scheme, but 
still, life had to follow the cycles and rhythms of a traditional cosmos. We 
shall have to consider this tradition after articulating the vast reaches and 
depths of globalization, specifically with the nagging question whether one 
can return to such a cosmos in light of a very different morphology of the 
modern western cosmos that became the basis for globalization.
Ontology
Meanwhile, it is necessary to explicate the philosophical aspects that 
gave rise to the conception of what, in the modern West, is called history. The 
understanding of this history is not possible without coming to terms with 
basic philosophical issues and their resolutions that are the background of 
historical reason. The subject matter that is at issue is one of ontology. The 
latter is reserved for the exposition of the basic principles that constitute 
the very essence of the nature. The latter has been a subject matter of debate 
within and among major schools of philosophy, yet all of them will have to 
be explicated at the level wherein the necessity for history arises. Despite 
some variations, classical Greek thought understood all natural events from 
their limits (peras). Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being 
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by the limit which cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in 
topos noitos (the place of ideas), or is the morphe (the inherent form of a 
thing) in each case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the 
essence of a being is what comprises its purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its 
intelligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, 
the essence, is what determines the way the given being will unfold its 
dynamis, kinesis, its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamics, 
therefore, is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the 
very purpose of its unfolding. 
In this sense, every being has its own purpose which is its own essence. 
This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them. Contingency 
or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of beings. An animal, 
engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpose, such as grazing, 
may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding its essence, would be 
considered an accident. Moreover, any notion of evolution is excluded a 
priori. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor does it evolve 
from itself by addition of elements from other events. In the former case, 
a parent does not produce something essentially higher than itself. It is 
the rule of aitia, an efficient cause, since the result can be equal, but never 
more than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result of its essential 
cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its essence that 
will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A monkey will 
produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings 
have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A 
human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not 
change the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters 
in specific settings. In brief, a human is born and will die a human. That 
we have Herodotus and Thucydides, as “historians” does not mean that 
there is anything necessary in “historical” accounts. Such accounts depict 
encounters, accidental intersections, which are subtended by the pursuit 
of human telos as the human essence. In this sense, historical events, such 
as encounters of armies, will be essentially forever the same, regardless 
of time and place. Essentially, there is no difference between Alexander, 
Napoleon, Bush or Hitler, battle of Gorillas or charge of elephants; they 
all pursue their essential natures. It would be nonsensical to speak of the 
history of Alexander or a history of a snail. All events and beings have their 
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essential natures which cannot be changed; conclusion follows naturally: 
nature neither has nor does it need history.
Given the fact that the Western civilization, interpreted as a modern 
Enlightenment, is at the centre of globalization, universalisation of science 
and technology, it is also most relevant to disclose what sciences and 
technologies are based upon. By “ontology” is meant the way that the 
composition of the universe is understood. Thus, if West is the main site 
of technological pursuits, then technology is not just a neutral mean, but 
also contains the modern Western ontological understanding and hence 
the philosophical issues from which such understanding results. This 
means that the modern West is not based on an arbitrary decision by some 
autocratic decree, but on rational debate, open to anyone and anywhere. The 
major philosophical problem concerning the nature of the universe is one 
of the whole and parts. It is concerned with the question of the ontological 
priority of the whole over the parts or of the parts over the whole. This 
question includes the issue of the attributes of the parts and the whole: does 
the whole possess attributes of its own, as a whole, or do its attributes equal 
the sum of the attributes of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue 
comprises the ground of instrumental reason and indeed of technological 
conception of the environment and – finally – of the human. Then what is 
the issue?
To face the issue it is necessary to point out that philosophy has no 
specific nationality or dependence on some ethnic language, its culture, or 
even its wise shamans. Rather, it takes an issue and in dialogical fashion 
sees what the issue is all about and offers a tentative resolution. In case 
of the issue of parts and wholes, it can be said that it can become obvious 
to anyone engaged in intelligent discussion. This issue was discussed and 
continues to be discussed in all disciplines, including the infamous Marxian 
“Dialectical Materialism”, and thus deserves to be addressed in principle. In 
the experience of encountered things, including other people, we regard 
them as a given, whole entity: it is a tree, a dog, a friend, Lithuanian, 
Japanese, African, panda, and countless others We see their colours, 
movements, behaviour, their similarities and differences, and seek out their 
basic characteristics. But we also are aware that each entity is made of parts, 
leading to a question whether the whole perceived thing has characteristics 
of its own, or is it a sum of parts. If the latter is the case, then the whole, such 
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as water, would be identical with the parts of which it is composed. Water, 
as a substance, possesses a qualitative attribute of being wet; the parts of 
which water is composed, hydrogen and oxygen, are not wet. They possess 
their own attributes. The aggregation of the parts should then be equal to 
the whole, and the latter should be equal to the sum of the parts and their 
attributes. Since these elements do not possess the attribute of wetness, then 
their aggregation, to form water, should not possess wetness. In this case the 
whole is equal to the sum of its parts and their attributes. The philosophical 
debate reaches an impasse: either the whole is a basic unit of nature, or the 
parts are all there is in the universe.
This means that the basic ontological component of the universe would 
be the part and all things would be equal to the sum of the parts. But in this 
sense, the attribute of wetness of water is an ontological mistake .Wetness 
would have to be attributed to the “mistake of the senses”. If one had a keen 
sight of Lynkeus, one could see right through wetness and recognise the basic 
reality as hydrogen and oxygen without any trace of wetness. In principle 
this position must claim that the experienced daily things, as wholes with 
their characteristics, are not the basic components of the universe; rather, 
the parts, to use the modern language, the “atoms”, are real and can be the 
basis by which everything can be explained. This postulation is the basis 
of the modern physics and all the varieties of “materialisms” and even the 
metaphorical talk of the “building blocks of the universe”. Up until now, 
the task of any science was to “explain” all human qualitative awareness of 
such factors as love, thinking, theories, mythologies, by genetics, biology, 
or chemistry. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction 
between secondary and primary characteristics, and, by implication, the 
subject-object division. This is an opportune place to point out why the 
modern western globalization is different from the other forms discussed 
in previous chapter. Its foundations are theoretical, intended to argue for 
a position that would be universally accessible, and fallible. So far, the 
theory reached by argument that the entire universe is a sum of parts, has 
not yet lost its attraction. It will not object that no “smallest part” has yet 
been found; the theoretical position allows one to search not for qualitative 
features but for “material part”. In addition, the notion of causal and 
mechanical functioning of the material world also presumes the modern 
theory of time and space. We can locate the parts in space and calculate 
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a linear succession of such parts in time, and predict the combination of 
such parts in the future. This cosmos is the condition for the functioning of 
mechanically conceived universe.
The consequences of this ontological decision were well developed by 
Galileo in natural sciences and by Hobbes in social and political philoso-
phy, and accepted by Descartes as the ground of his mind-body dualism. 
For him, the perceptible qualitative attributes of the whole are not only 
appearances but are dependent on the mental states of the experiencer. If 
the atomic parts possess only the material qualities, such as extension, size, 
position in space and time, then the entity as a whole is a numerical sum 
of parts. Resultantly, any experienced attributes of the whole must be ap-
parent perceptions of the subject. In turn, what the subject experiences are 
not attributes of the unified entity, while the parts of which this entity is 
composed cannot be perceived. In short, what is accessible to experience is 
subjective and what is objective, reality of the ontological world of material 
parts, is forever removed from direct experience. 
Thus, subject/object division is, in principle, premised on the theory 
that universe is composed of material, homogeneous parts and, the experi-
enced aspects of the world, the mentioned wholes and their characteristics, 
are not features of the parts and hence do not belong to reality. Yet since they 
are experienced, then there must be a “place” in which the characteristics of 
the whole must be present – the subject. All the perceived qualities, includ-
ing typological distinctions between things, such as animate or inanimate, 
all values, cultural phenomena, stories and beliefs, purposes and aims, are 
not parts of reality, and hence they are features of subjective perceptions. To 
speak in precise modern terms, the universe has no value, beauty, meaning, 
purpose, good or evil, reason or passion; it runs its course mechanically 
such that the parts are ruled by causal relationships. Human beings, in their 
natural world, are also mechanically functioning sum of parts. The differ-
ence between humans and other things is not some essential feature that 
is a feature of human nature; the difference is in the aggregation of parts 
and their functioning as mechanisms. Of course, since the subject does not 
belong to the objective material nature, then it is excluded from reality. We 
shall not enter the numerous debates as to its ontological status – is it some 
sort of “supervening quality” over reality, or is it a phenomenal state of such 
reality; our only concern is its role in the understanding of modern history.
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The initiating ground of modernity is a postulation of a self as an 
egological point whose primary activity is reflection upon itself, upon its 
own thinking, and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of 
all claims and the possibility of their realisation. All events must justify 
themselves in the court of the standards and rules established by a subject 
reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether it is a physical 
thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is 
in its own right, but must first justify itself before the self-reflecting subject. 
Hegel ended the modern tradition by demonstrating its ultimate principle: 
no longer thinking and being are the same, but reflecting thinking and 
being are the same. It will not do to argue that various philosophical trends 
of the last century posited various explanations, even of the egological 
subject, in terms of social conditions, material or economic conditions, 
biological conditions and numerous other claims. Yet all of them posit their 
methods and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Despite 
this inevitable ground, it is possible to disclose some aspects which do not 
allow such reflection to be the final ground, specifically in the context of the 
modern construct of history and its variants discussed above.
It is to be noted that the positing of a purposeless, mechanistic nature 
is the catalyst for modern historical consciousness. But this suggests that 
such consciousness does not primarily reflect upon itself, but at first from 
the material world to itself as excluded from such a world. The unfolding 
of reflection from something other than oneself comprises an opening to 
an awareness which traces first requirement to understand history. While 
discussing hermeneutics, it was noted that hermeneutics arose as a basic 
trend of humanities in distinction to the scientific or mechanistic explanation 
of nature. At the very outset hermeneutics assumes its own position by 
reflecting from the position of mechanical sciences. When hermeneutical 
understanding deals with scientific explanation and contrasts the latter with 
a broader linguistic process within which explanation is understandable, 
it assumes a comparative position which belongs neither to hermeneutics 
nor to scientific explanation. Although hermeneutics assumed that the 
linguistically transmitted historically effective consciousness is the final 
mediation of all awareness, in showing this final mediation as distinct 
from scientific claims, it must grant an inter-reflective awareness between 
hermeneutics and science, and be able to see the limits of each, even if one or 
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the other claims to encompass everything. Such an in between awareness 
is the condition for hermeneutical understanding of itself as historical 
and for the scientific awareness as explanatory. Moreover, hermeneutical 
understanding with its linguistic primacy in whose fluidum we live, have 
no signs disclosing that they are transmissions of a historical tradition. 
They become historical when they are mediated by inter-reflection which 
designates them as historical and, in addition, as temporally contingent. 
What is also to be noted is the return of both, hermeneutics and explanatory 
sciences to the rational world: the inter-reflection constitutes them both 
as something, as essentially different one from the other wherein they 
fall into the apophatic logic of rationality. Yet the appearance of this inter-
reflexivity is both linguistic and yet transgresses the given parameters of 
language; thus it is both language and explanation and also. To phrase this 
otherwise, it is neither one nor the other but is aware of both. 
Having established a subject distinct from the material world, the 
next step was to assign essential functions for this subject. There is no 
way of escaping the conclusion that the primary activity of the subject is 
reflection upon itself, upon its own thinking, and upon its own powers, 
as guarantees of the validity of all claims and the possibility of their 
realisation. All events must justify themselves in the court of the standards 
and rules established by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears 
to the subject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or 
even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify 
itself before the self-reflecting subject. In contrast to the classical tradition, 
the ultimate principle states that no longer the thinking and being are the 
same, but the reflecting thinking and being are the same. It will not do to 
argue that various philosophical trends of the last century posited various 
explanations, even of the egological subject, in terms of social conditions, 
material or economic conditions, biological conditions and numerous 
other claims. Yet all of them posit their methods and theories derived from 
and adjudicated by reflection. Such adjudication is regarded to be critical 
and hence objective and universal. This universality is regarded as global 
and should be either imposed on or accepted by all rational beings. 
A brief, although significant introjection must be added. In the first 
chapter it was noted that the colonising empires and their leaders, to be 
legitimate, had to be mediated by some figure representing a personality 
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cult – Rabbi Jesus, mediated by the pope, and the latter mediating a ruler’s 
legitimation to be a king, till finally, the entire bureaucracy of prelates of 
various ranks, became mediators to the public of what constitutes reality. 
This means that any question of reality, of social position, of one’s identity, 
appeared through a medium of some kind. The same thing occurred and 
continues to be the case in symbolic design systems, such as ideological 
constructs, which are the mediations of some presumed social, historical 
and economic laws which are mediated by the rhetoric of the leaders, and the 
pronouncements of the latter are mediated by local bureaucrats to “inform” 
the local public of the current truth. This is nothing extraordinary, since we 
know that the entire tradition of hermeneutics made a claim that human 
awareness is always mediated by interpretations which, in cases of “ultimate” 
pronouncements, require a “messenger” capable of telling the common 
people the will of the ultimate beings. The case is the same with modern 
theoretical sciences, having their “high” discourse that requires “scientific 
journalism” to translate such discourse into a rhetoric comprehensible by 
mortals. And this is above all the case for the modern western understanding: 
the “objective reality” must be mediated by a reflecting subject in whose 
court such a reality becomes judged, evaluated and exhibited. The exhibiting 
comprises a fundamental system of modern globalization. The latter will 
provide a sense of “human history” which everyone is invited to join. Let us 
turn to this fundamental, although complex, system.
Neo-Platonic Metaphysics
The arguments that led to the modern ontology are in place, resulting in 
the theory of atomism. Yet we still lack a specific theoretical method required 
to provide an access to modern ontology. What is at issue should be obvious 
from the theoretical division between objective reality and the subject. The 
awareness of the world by the subject is qualitative and is assumed to be 
subjective, while the objective realm is not given to qualitative perception 
and thus it is not accessible by sensory perception. This means that reality 
“transcends” empirical awareness and must be disclosed by a method that 
is not empirical. If the atomic parts have characteristics such as extension, 
size, location in space and time, then all the sensible phenomena, such as 
colours, sounds, tactility, do not offer us any awareness of the “objective” 
features. Given this situation, the modern, theoretically constituted, subject 
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must offer a reflectively constructed or, initially regarded as “discovered” 
appropriate method by the mind of the subject,. The latter cannot belong 
to any sense realm, even if the realm is subjective, such as psychological, 
consisting of feelings, images or traditionally transmitted qualitative stories. 
In turn, the method cannot be derived from the theoretical objective reality; 
after all, the latter is not accessible to experience and cannot be the ground 
of selecting which method would be appropriate. And thus it is necessary to 
explicate such a method not at the material, but a metaphysical level.
Although frequently confused, the two terms, metaphysics and onto-
logy, cover different domains. Metaphysics is concerned with the formal, 
invisible, meaningful, and repeatable, while ontology focuses upon the na-
ture of things of “this” world. No doubt, at times the latter might be inter-
preted equally as invisible, and thus assume a metaphysical character. This 
character depends on the ways that metaphysics assumes pre-eminence 
over ontology, and thus is placed in the position of defining what nature 
is. There is a protracted history of relationships between them, manifested 
usually in various dualisms: the formal and the material, the mental and the 
physical, the subjective and the objective. What interests us is the relation-
ship between metaphysics and ontology for the understanding of modern 
history. To grasp this relationship requires a multi-directional and multi-
layered exposition of a specifically selected logic. 
The modern scientific rationality assumes metaphysics which excludes 
the direct access to the perceptual qualities of objects and events. This 
exclusion lends priority to the formal, mathematical, and logical domains as 
the bases of scientific thought. The resulting conception of theory is subtended 
by metaphysics of the “invisible” subsisting in a mental space of a subject. 
Among a variety of factors, the subject selects the most pervasive assumption 
of metaphysics that would offer clear and distinct ideas which are not 
encumbered by perceptual ambiguities and subjective differences. Such ideas 
belong to an ever increasing quantification of all theory and methodology. 
Indeed, this assumption comprises a major ambivalence for modern subject. 
Since metaphysics, for this subject, must be discarded as non-scientific, it must 
locate all metaphysics in the subject. At the same time it is compelled to posit 
this metaphysics, in the form of quantification, as purely objective. Moreover, 
what is regarded as empirical, qualitative experience, turns out to be different 
from the metaphysics of quantification. In terms of such metaphysics, the 
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qualitative experience must be completely irrelevant to science and, as noted 
above, is part of the immanence of the subject, subsequently designated in 
terms of psychology and physiology. The modern revolution designates 
reality to be the reflection of the metaphysical constructs of quantification. It 
must be measurable and thus only the ontology of material, atomic parts, can 
count as reality. Following this, the subjective morphology of awareness is 
borne by a theoretical position that what is beyond doubt is a constitution of a 
precise reflective metaphysics capable of “universal, impartial, and objective” 
access to a specifically constituted reality, consisting equally of universal, 
impartial and homogeneous materiality correlative to the precise structure of 
quantitative metaphysics. 
For the modern West, mathematical or quantitative procedures are not 
only methodological, but founding for all theoretical thought. The specific 
composition of such procedures suggests that no intuitive, that is percep-
tual content is correlated to them. They contain structures and rules which 
can be formulated without any relation to perceptual qualities. Moreover, 
any concrete function such structures acquire, is not dictated by these 
structures. In other words, the function is a matter of will, but in such a 
way that the will is not compelled by such structures; they have no causal 
force. The implications of such non-necessary connections will be analysed 
subsequently. It is clear that in order for these procedures and structures to 
acquire any validity, the objective world must be constituted in accordance 
with these procedures. First, the procedures are indifferent with the respect 
to perceptual phenomena; they treat all events as if they were essentially 
homogeneous. Second, the perceptual phenomena, directly present to live 
awareness, are transcended in favour of metaphysical propositions and the 
posited homogeneous materiality. This is the source of the conception of 
mathematically idealised nature such that nature becomes a homogeneous 
mathematical manifold, i.e. everything can be treated as a sum of exchange-
able components. 
While we still might think in geometric metaphors, with mathematisa-
tion of geometry, and if one were to take the next step toward formalisation 
of mathematics, one would be able to regard the geometric as quanta, as 
numerical points, sums, and divisions, arranged in accordance with formal 
structures. Irrespective of the levels of quantitative-formal constitution, 
there is posited only one fundamental-transcendent reality. The problem-
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atic of the constitutive processes both of metaphysical and the transcendent 
domains, lead to a particular contradiction which cannot be solved within 
the limits of the metaphysical postulations. The quantitative metaphys-
ics is deemed to be universal, all-inclusive, and in a position to explicate 
all phenomena “objectively”. Thus the subject who calculates, formalises, 
must be either subsumed under this metaphysic, or be the condition for 
the constitution of this metaphysic. If the former assumption is accepted, 
then metaphysics must be granted a position of supremacy over the sub-
ject, i.e. be objective; yet this metaphysic permits only one kind of “reality”: 
homogeneous matter. The problem is that this metaphysic is not matter but 
ideality and indeed a necessary ideality. But, if the latter is taken for grant-
ed, then the ideality of metaphysics has no “place” in the subject, since the 
subject must be contingent and thus cannot be the basis for the metaphysi-
cal, mathematical and formal necessities. Such a subject becomes equally 
contingent. 
Ambivalent metaphysics
The modern subject, as a theoretical result of the argument over parts 
and wholes, must be posited to account for modern metaphysics in the form 
of mathematics. Not having any other locus for the modern metaphysics, 
the thinkers of the modern age had to claim that mathematics belongs to 
the subject but, just as the subject, mathematics cannot have any reality – 
after all, the only reality is the homogeneous world of material parts. As any 
other metaphysics, mathematics belongs to the immanence of the subject. 
The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the the-
oretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet objectively speaking, it 
is a contingent substance. Moreover, even the mathematical domain is seen 
as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of 
decision. In this sense, the domain of mathematics swings in the ambiguity 
between necessity and will, rules and choice. The importance of this “in-
decision” consists precisely in the option to either regard the mathematical 
as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. Various expressions are 
offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter 
option. The notions of nature as created in accordance with mathemati-
cal laws comprise one such expression. When this notion is coupled with 
the view that even the mathematical-formal domain is subject to an abso-
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lute will, then the result is obvious: the emphasis is on the primacy of con-
struction of the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot 
be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the material 
world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded 
as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, 
such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and prolif-
erating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the 
perceptual awareness. The mathematical procedures assume the modern 
cosmos of sequence and places, following a precise order: they must be ar-
ranged sequentially and uni-directionally. There is a progression from the 
“starting” point to the “finish”. The problem of the finish is not to be taken 
in a finite sense: the mathematical procedures lend themselves to indefinite 
progression and articulation; hence what could be regarded as “finish” is a 
decision to stop calculations. As we shall see, the latter can be “applied” to 
any homogeneous matter to be quantified and calculated without regard 
to the traditional, qualitative distinctions among things and events in the 
perceptual world.
At the outset of modern ontology, the material world was regarded to 
be mechanical, yet that notion had to yield to the metaphysics of calculation, 
compelling the material world to surrender its necessary status in favour of 
the necessity of mathematical formulations, leading to the notion that the 
objective world is “contingent”. Being inaccessible to experience, it must be 
posited in accordance with the formal definitions and procedures whose 
necessity would provide a model of explanation not for the perceptual 
components, but for possible processes present only in terms of calculations. 
Contingency excludes, at the same time essentiality, i.e. the possibility for 
a claim to maintain something permanent with necessary characteristics, 
accessible to perception, or in case of induction, essentiality with universal 
validity in the sphere of ontology. The abolition of essentiality (the Greek 
notion of essential composition of something real) opens the door to the 
notion of an access to this reality in terms of possibility. This is to say, since 
what is cannot be perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent 
reality does not offer any necessity for its composition, then it can be 
accessed and dealt with in accordance with theoretical-methodological 
formal possibilities. This is precisely the juncture at which it becomes 
“necessary” to regard this transcendent reality in accordance with what it 
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can possibly be. This means that there is no necessary connection between 
the theoretical methodological formalisms and the transcendent reality. The 
connection is arbitrary. This is to say there is no necessary law to connect 
the formal factors to the posited reality. The arbitrariness appears under 
various guises: the “application” of theory to “praxis”, the most lyrically 
stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the 
environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts 
to “humanise” nature and the “human animal”, the aims at improving 
nature, and the exclamations that something is good because we say it is 
good in accordance with our own prescripts. In principle, the intentional 
connection between the formal domain and the posited reality has no hold 
in anything, and it needs not to respect any prescription and qualitative 
composition of the lived world. And yet it is a required nexus between 
the theoretical and the real. After all, the signitive formal compositions 
do not point to anything that would be intuitively similar to them. In this 
sense arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to 
the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the 
imposition of the formally constituted methods on the real.
While this might seem obvious, there appears an unnoticed require-
ment for this correlation: concrete activity. The latter is directed by project-
ed choices of what is materially possible, i.e. what can be made. The formal 
compositions, not having any similarity to anything present to perception, 
cannot be correlated to anything perceptual; if the perceptual awareness 
is excluded, then the correlation requires an active intervention and con-
struction of the posited homogeneous world in accordance with the formal 
requirements. Since the latter are constructs, they too are invented for the 
sake of the reconstruction of the material reality in accordance with our 
chosen projects. All this seems to rest on nothing. Indeed, Fink has argued 
very cogently that modernity emerges as if out of nothing. This is to say that 
this complex state of affairs is implicitly designed to control the environ-
ment under whatever guise; thus it is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, 
Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the 
possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connection between theory 
and “reality”, an arbitrariness of the priority of will over reason and nature. 
Arbitrariness, is a ground for power, and we have noted that empires are 
premised on extending power to control greater territory, more people, ob-
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tain more wealth and thus the autocrats of empires intentionally use power, 
of course not restricted by any morality – they act arbitrarily with respect 
to others, all creatures, and the use of resources. But the modern western 
conceptions of formal methods and homogeneous atomism, as theoretical 
constructs, contain power to control everything in its own essence. In this 
sense arbitrariness lends itself to an emergence of power without “reason”, 
or at best from psychological whim, enhanced, prompted, and fed by “un-
limited possibilities” of formal and, as a result, material constructions. This 
turns out to be one of the bases of technology and of reason as instrumental. 
It should be recalled that the modern western globalization, even if it has 
a practical-technical dimension, is premised on theoretical concerns and the 
issues such concerns must face. After all, modern form of materialism is not 
the discovery of practical, sensory observations, but the result of theoretical 
considerations. Once an issue is resolved, other implications follow – even 
if they were not explicitly articulated in the initial ontological and formal 
conditions. To be true to the philosophical requirements not to leave out 
of consideration such unnoticed aspects, we must point out that modern 
philosophical trends wrestled with the issue of the connection between the 
formal and the material, leading to two divergent philosophical trends  – 
idealism and positivism. Both were theoretical positions, but neither could 
show how to account for the other. This includes the accepted judgment 
of Kant that the thing in itself, i.e. reality is unknowable. From our debate 
concerning parts and wholes and the modern acceptance of the atomic, 
homogeneous parts as the sole reality, it followed that there is no perceptual-
empirical access to such a reality; it is unknowable. This is the crux of the 
issue: we have subjective formal metaphysics which, in its own structure 
does not imply any reality – it is empty of content; in turn, the homogeneous 
material world does not, and cannot be the ground of the formal domain. 
The difference between these two domains implies a connection of a unique 
kind: human activity. The latter must be such that it can apply the subjective 
formal structures to the homogeneous world. This activity was designated 
to be labour, work, leading to the ideology that man is homo laborans, and 
even to the value theory of labour, accepted by the capitalists and Marxists. 
This position is one aspect of a much broader theoretical stance: the material 
nature has no value, no beauty, no meaning, no rationality; all these aspects 
flow from the subject and how it imposes these features on nature. 
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At this philosophical level a precise composition appears. The formal 
domain is subjective and is a construct of the subject. Since the subject has 
no specific essence, then it has no given standards as to the structure of 
formal inventions. To say it again, they are arbitrary constructs. In turn, 
since the homogeneous material nature is directly unknowable, then it does 
not offer any standards how it should be treated; at best it is contingent. 
It means that their conjunction through labour does not need follow any 
rules  – thus the formal rules are imposed by the subject’s activity to ar-
range the indifferent matter in terms of subjectively invented rules. This 
is precisely how the modern West resolved the problem of a priori formal 
understanding that does not seem to have any empirical content – the for-
mal structures are empty, but they can be projected as the possibilities to be 
realised by active intervention in the material environment, and thus a con-
struction of reality that would fulfil the projected structures. The end result: 
a material product which is the synthesis of formal and material. In other 
words, the formally designed possibilities are also in the position to align 
the transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfilment by human intervention 
into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given per-
ceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying ho-
mogeneous matter in an accord with the formal designs. This suggests that 
the modern world has two intentional histories: one, which is completely 
unstructured world of autonomous individuals, and the second, a complete 
redesign of the world in accordance with the formal designs we ourselves 
posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is assumed and the intentionality of 
the will that swings between the formal and the transcendent is the decisive 
arbiter – without precedents. 
This intentionality as will is not identical with the Kantian autonomous 
will and with the Nietzsche’s will to power. This means that the traditional 
mode of will as making the choice between two things is no longer 
relevant. After all, the choice is between what is given  – say honey and 
bread; but the modern will projects what is not there at present and not 
yet there in the future. Both will have to be made as a fulfilment of this 
will. Its engagement is with possibilitising constituents both at the formal 
and at the material levels. The possibilitising allows for formal variations 
and differentiations of processes into systems and sub-systems, until the 
sub-systems can become distinct sciences, carving out their own fields and 
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accessing the environment in accordance with their formal requirements. 
This simply means an increased refinement of the application and 
realisation of the formal constructs in the material sphere. This is the 
technological process. Technologisation posits formal operations with 
a total disregard or indifference to the meaning and the truth of nature 
in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with the homogeneous and 
“indifferent” reality, result in two structural processes when introduced in 
the lived world. First, a complete disregard of the perceptual phenomena 
and their horizons, including their enactments in the lived world, leading to 
increased contingency of the environment and second, the detachment of 
the formal and technological structures and processes from intentionalities 
that connect the subject to the morphologies and the phenomena of the 
experienced environment. These points constitute to the problematic of the 
relationship between contingency, detachment and nature, so well exhibited 
in the social battles over environmental damages. 
Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material 
nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary 
correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point 
of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions 
with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent and 
disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal division and increased 
formalisation of the language in such a way that there emerges an increased 
formal differentiations of formal systems by themselves. Correlatively, the 
material world can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along 
more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of 
the transcendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexities 
and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the 
material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent 
material nature. Every refined and produced material process offers 
possibilities for further formal refinements and material rearrangements. 
The lateral differentiation of formal systems and their correlative material 
structuration, provide the basis for disciplinary differentiations, each having 
its own formal approaches and each capable of possible construction of 
material realisations.
A brief note should be inserted to point out the reasons why the de-
limited constitution is the condition for the possibility of discursive power. 
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The very languages, the formal systems and their differentiations, can ac-
cess the transcendent world only by remaking it, by subjecting the mate-
rial to formal and technical transformations. Thus the more one subdivides 
the formal domain into increasingly refined concepts, the more one is able 
to crisscross the material by technical procedures in terms of the formal 
definitions. In this sense, the very language of the disciplines is coextensive 
with the power of shaping the indifferent material to fit the formal require-
ments. One could argue, furthermore, that this continuous division and 
formalisation of discourses is coextensive with the militarisation of lan-
guage and society. Each increasing refinement is correlatively a restriction 
of signs to signals followed by an attendant restriction of human functions 
to being a reaction to precise and efficient codes. In this sense the discur-
sive power leads in two directions: the making of the environment, and 
the control of the human. In general terms, this process of militarisation 
is one of the bases for the emergent language of “war”. We are at war with 
each other, with the environment, with poverty, with affluence, and with 
our own divided selves. 
While this process requires the adherence to its principles of formal 
and material detachments, it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion 
of all events, both “natural” and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally 
differentiated world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-
independent functions and “work”. What is relevant in human life depends 
and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal constructs divide the 
human “material”: the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, 
psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated “behaviours”, each semi-
independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyse the obvious: 
the “power” of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social 
functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of 
“expertise”. Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no 
necessary connection with the other spheres. Hence the results of “research” 
in a specific domain can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts 
of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning 
the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities in 
another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced 
forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as 
politics for possible “application”. The lateral differentiation decentralises 
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responsibility thus increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the 
latter is increasingly unchained from any constraints. Every formal rule, 
and every material result made to fulfil the formal design, becomes totally 
arbitrary, offering possibilitising formal and material combinations without 
end. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, 
each an “expert” in its own sphere, no need to relate to any other sphere; 
each can claim that there is no such thing as “conclusive” evidence precisely 
because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are 
arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and 
with the making they produce their “reality” and hence increment power 
and “prove” their momentary success.
The underlying linear cosmos is also shifting towards pre-eminence 
of the future, since all the calculations of possibilities are future projects. 
Whether it is pure capitalism or its correlate the communism, the aim is to 
construct the future world in which the mastery of the material world and 
the materialised human will be achieved. Capitalist systems calculate and 
trade “futures” and communism insists on establishing material conditions 
to yield a “new man”. The classical question of “what is a man” received an 
answer as to a total, whole being with its essence. But having fragmented 
the universe into parts, including man, we can only tinker with the making 
and remaking him out of all the fragments into all sorts of caricatures. If 
a man is a sum of all the discourses that intersect to define a man, then 
we are an aggregate of incompatible parts. Our genes “want” to propagate 
themselves, our economic gains are deemed valuable because we can “go 
places for fun”, our feelings care chemical imbalances, our ethics is counter 
to our feelings, our rights are to kill others, our religions are good for 
therapy and business. All this with a backdrop: our reality depends on the 
“conditions for possibility”. If we change some of the conditions, then we 
shall become different – at least in some part. 
We are in a thick of the constant transformations and it would be 
redundant to speak of the “needs” since the latter are part and parcel of 
the possibilitising procedures and become needs and fulfilment at the same 
time. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we wanted therefore we can 
make it. What this suggests is that the process of increased contingency and 
arbitrariness as the sources of power comprises a self-referential domain. 
This means that there are no restrictions for the “search for the truth”. 
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After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between 
knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, the relationships 
between the formal and material processes are determined by “science”, i.e. 
the very self-articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-
scientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built in 
reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. 
There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments 
and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic “growth”, 
no biological reasons to stop remoulding the living processes along new 
combinations, etc. Limitation would be regarded as an infringement on 
the “autonomy of research”. Any science, which would proclaim that it has 
become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above. 
Self-maintaining Purpose
Given the key intentionality which swings without any essential 
necessitation between the theoretical methodological and the transcendent 
homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is 
permanent: progress. It must be without regression, without death, and all 
formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively 
remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent struc-
ture. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that would 
progress. It must be recalled that for modern philosophy, despite various 
surface claims concerning human nature, the sole objective reality is 
basically a sum of material parts and humans are no exception; at this level 
humans cannot claim to be essentially different from all other material 
events. In this sense, humans are also a function to be calculated within 
the context of various formal systems and their ability to redesign man. All 
formal systems as rational are instrumental where a positing of a specific 
aim requires calculation of material means for the attainment of such an 
aim. Yet the attained aim will become material means for other aims, while 
the latter will also become means for further aims – but without any final 
aim. In terms of instrumental rationality, progress cannot have a final aim 
and hence it cannot have a direction. Its aim and its subject is itself and 
thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own 
increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and “perfectabilities” without, 
of course, attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without 
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possibilitising and hence “improvement”. In this sense one could say 
semiotically, and yet on philosophical basis, that the signifier and signified 
are one. A brief note aside: this is the reason why Soviet Union, which also 
attempted to be progressive, could never say that it has reached communist 
society; the latter had to be forever deferred. 
The question that arises in this kind of progress, and as pointed out, its 
proliferation of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all phenomena, is 
the appearance of crisis. What is immediately notable is the disproportion 
between the sub-system called science and the rest of the culture. The efforts 
by the theoretically-methodologically designed systems to “master” the 
“material” nature have become exponential. Let us be clear about this: there 
can be only one domain of progress, and this is the coded and formalised 
transmission of practices or “techniques”. A culture can increase its mastery 
and practical control through the increase of formal differentiations and 
physical interventions in the environment, yet it cannot increase what the 
environment as a whole has to offer. There is no “progress” in nature. We 
cannot increase material resources, but only the efficiency of their uses. 
Only the latter can progress. And this is precisely the point of crisis: the 
sciences are entering human life on the basis of this “use” i.e. making 
humans function in accordance with the very prescripts that are imposed 
on the presumed physical world. Thus the question: is this the progress 
for human life, or is this the arbitrary treatment of the human and hence 
the subsumption of the human under arbitrariness and its opening up of 
power over the human? Obviously, the “use” and interference is inherent 
in the processes of modern science, requiring the intentionality which can 
connect the formal and the material. The human then is submitted to and 
subsumed under an arbitrariness which includes her own operations. That 
is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or 
at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. 
Arbitrariness is a “power” which opens an initial experience of violation. 
But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of the modern 
understanding of theory and method and their “application”. It is to be 
recalled that the methods and theories are not given objectively but are 
constructed as instruments to reshape the environment, and as instruments 
they are at the service of autonomous will. The latter sets its own criteria 
for increased mastery and therefore increased power to master. We have 
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reached a position of the metaphysics of the will that, while generating 
itself, it generates the very rules by which the world is to be constructed. 
This self-generation of itself and rules is the ground of modern 
anarchy and “human divine complex”. After all, only divinities create 
themselves and the laws by which the world is constructed. Abolishing 
all the experienced limits, this will is an arbitrary source and power that 
abolishes all limits by its reductive and homogenising metaphysics.
The first problem that arises for this modern subject consists of a 
contradiction. The measurable material reality is posited to be objective, 
homogenous, and yet the method as formal mathematical is not an aspect 
or part of this homogenous material reality. Since the latter is posited as 
the only existence and everything else is designated to be subjective, then 
the scientific formal and quantitative methods must be equally subjective. 
In this sense, we come to a clash between objective, material, homogenous 
reality, and a method of science that has no objective validity. The sole 
solution to this problem is to take on the following structure: the subject 
constructs theories and methods to be tested in material reality. But the 
subject has no criteria by which to judge which constructed method is 
the correct one. Being subjective, they have to be adjudicated on the basis 
of objectivity which is perceptually inaccessible. Since the imperceptible 
objectivity depends on the constructed methodology which is inevitably 
subjective, then the only way to deal with this objectivity is in terms of 
subjective constructs. Our point here is that there is no way to demonstrate 
at this level how the subjectively constructed methods connect to the 
posited objectivity, i.e. the material reality. While the latter is posited as 
objective, it is also regarded as incapable of implying formal quantitative 
methodologies. In turn, these methodologies do not imply any empirical 
perception of this material reality directly, since by definition our direct 
perceptions are qualitative and therefore subjective. 
The task then is to expound the results and implications following 
modern ontology and self-reflecting subject as the grounds of the universa-
listic  – objective  – logic of globalization, its modes of constructing self-
generation and self-validation, and its metaphysical methodology and, 
in the final analysis, valuative and voluntaristic groundlessness. We have 
seen how this universalistic trend fragments itself into multiple logics and 
discourses as arbitrary constructs and thus abolishes its own univocal 
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position in favour of what current writers superficially call “power”. We can 
show other grounds for the claim of power, at least in the sense of being 
groundless and arbitrary. This is to say we can show that the very exercise 
of power in globalising modernity has no other rules or criteria apart from 
its own self-reflective generation. The basis of universalising globalization 
is subtended and pervaded by conceptions that claim to explain power, 
whether social, economic, political, technocratic, while at the same time 
these very conceptions presuppose the self-generation of power within 
which they are included. This means that these conceptions are in principle 
the ways of demonstrating the inevitability of arbitrariness and its resultant 
expression as globalising power. In this sense, power is not something that is 
intended, but to the contrary all intentional awareness articulated in various 
modern disciplines and domains are constitutive of power that contains 
the logic of the transformation of the world. We hope that at this level we 
shall avoid any kind of psychological, valuative, genealogical, moralising 
explanations, since even the latter are equally at the service of power. All 
explanations without exception can be demonstrated to be participants 
in the very proliferation of power which such explanations may claim 
to challenge. Hence, the universality of globalization and its subsequent 
critiques make it impossible in principle to escape this universalisation in 
terms of its own logic.
Every rationality that will challenge this universalisation will accept 
its power logic, and hence will become inevitably part of that logic. As we 
shall show, even the breakdown of this universal logic into modern multiple 
logics, called scientific disciplines and discourses, are the means by which 
this universalisation proliferates itself and survives. In this sense, the claims 
by postmodernists to multiple discursivity and therefore multiple discursive 
powers is a continuation of the maintenance of modern universalisation. 
Thus, first it is the case that postmodernity is a continuation of modernity 
and has in fact globalised itself under the claim that it can save the other 
cultures from Western modernisation. It is no wonder that various regions 
of the world that want to acquire identity in the pretended context of modern 
globalization are constantly appealing to being postmodern. Second, the 
various claims to cultural self-identity, in contrast to modern universal 
individualism, is a variant of individualism at the cultural level. We know from 
philology that in the modern West the challenge to individual universalism 
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came from Herder who claimed that there is a cultural individualism with 
equal global rights. The notion of individuality at whatever level and its 
identity remains intact. Third, modern universalisation and postmodern 
challenge to it follow the same logic and therefore impose individuality and 
the rights to it on the basis of a rationality which, as we noted, is already 
power laden. 
In this sense the language that postmodern theses propose for multi-
cultural logic, allowing each culture to have its own identity, at the same 
time talk about empowering the other and thus assume the logic of power. 
This is an assumption that includes the others as equally engaged in power 
and all that they need is to be granted power from us. This is obvious in 
American and European feminist movements which wants to empower 
the Arab women to have their rights to be individuals. What is at issue 
here is not whether these movements are right or wrong but whether they 
already assume and therefore impose the modern universal individualism 
whether singular or cultural in the name of power. A more basic issue 
involved in globalization is one of mediation. The just mentioned example 
of empowering the others is to the point. We tell the others that their way 
of life is inadequate and must be mediated through our modern global 
individualism which, in turn, will be mediated by becoming a function 
in a proliferation of the mastery of the environment, mediated by formal 
systems and homogenised nature. In this sense. The others will have to 
evaluate their cultural practices and life worlds through media that are 
no longer their own. Let us look at the mediating phenomena for deeper 
understanding of this level of globalization.
While western modern scientific logic has been proclaimed to be 
universal globalising logic, it has not confronted its own fundamental 
issue of mediation. At one level it offered the notion that the connection 
between the subjective formal quantitative and the pure homogeneous 
material domain can be connected through application of method to 
“objective reality”. The rhetoric of application is regarded as experimental 
testing of hypothesis in correlation to reality. Yet the very testing means 
intervention. There is no notion of direct method that looks at the way 
things are present in experience; rather applying and testing means that 
somehow we must intervene in order to avoid our perceptual awareness 
and therefore to construct the so-called imperceptible material reality in 
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terms of our methodological, that is subjective, structures. The latter are 
the first medium, the prism, through which the world will be seen. Yet there 
is an inevitable second mediation: the primary methodological mediation 
is not yet adequate to grasp the nature of this homogeneous world. To be 
able to conceive how it “works” we must intervene and construct the so-
called material reality in accordance with our own subjective methods. 
The construct is also a medium and not some sort of direct access to 
the theoretically posited reality. It is no doubt that Kant drew the right 
conclusion: objectivity is synthesised by subjective a priori conditions. This 
means that we have modern science that connects different domains by 
a mediation which is our activity of applying the subjectively constituted 
logics and methods on the indifferent homogenous materiality, such 
that the very application constructs another medium. Third, at this level 
emerges a mediation that is neither the methodological, so-called formal 
quantitative rational, nor the so-called material homogenous sum of parts, 
but a dimension that ranges between the two of them and has no criteria 
how to apply the formal to the material. This is the first intimation of a 
constructive process that emerges as the modern will. It becomes a selective 
process that has not posited anything apart from its own self generation.
This point of mediation, even if not recognised for what it is, has been 
called by modern philosophers “autonomy” suggesting that every formal 
and quantitative rule is constructed without any conditions, that is has 
no cause. In this sense, the material world subjected to those rules can be 
transformed without any question concerning the traditionally known 
categorical differences among experienced limits of things – still present 
in the arguments concerning the priority of the whole over the parts. 
In fact, the formal and quantitative rules do not have within their own 
compositions any criteria for making such distinctions, thus they can be 
applied on everything indifferently. At the same time, the material world, 
the extended substance, must be regarded as homogenous and, therefore, 
constructible in accordance with the invented rules. What is at issue at 
this level is the choice of formal and quantitative rules over qualitative 
categorical distinctions. Since both are by modern definitions subjective, 
then there is no inherent criterion why one would be more objective than 
the other. We must look for an account within the very composition of 
those invented rules. First, it can be argued that it is impossible to gain any 
62
LITHUANIA AND GLOBALIZATION
advantage over the environment on the grounds of categorical, qualitative 
distinctions. Second, it is also the case that formal and quantitative rules 
comprise within their own structures techniques for transforming the 
material environment. This way the choice of formal quantitative rules 
already implies the choice of instrumentality and the possibility for 
application. The modern sciences whose theories and methods are framed 
within formal and quantitative structures are in principle technical. This is 
the reason why any scientific discipline that cannot be technically tested is 
not regarded to be scientific. Technical testing need not be through some 
laboratory experiment; what is needed is technical mediation – such as a 
formal construct, in order to be “scientific”. In this sense, sociology, political 
science, psychology, education, can become scientific if they are mediated 
through a quantitative structure. If one were to say that in Kaunas there are 
hungry people, such a claim would be “anecdotal”. Objective claim would 
require “numbers”. This is another reason that all modern scientific and 
philosophical theories are premised on arbitrary power.
It will not do to argue that we have direct empirical evidence of the 
hungry, the poor, the incapacitated; such evidence, to be credible, cannot 
depend on surveys of such people, since even they might not know what is 
hunger, poverty, or capacity. After all, hunger means a quantity of calories 
per day, ounces of protein, chemical supplements and the weight, size and 
gender of the person in question and, after such analyses, the social and 
racial background of the person in question and, finally, statistical average 
of a group to which this individual can be assigned. Numbers do not lie. The 
counting is very interesting, since anything can be counted and presented 
as scientific and significant. Of course the research performed is selective 
on the basis of horizons of valuation, but there is no prescribed criterion 
to say what is more significant or valuable or not. Criteria, after all, suggest 
some sort of standard that might imply such outdated presumptions 
as “essentialism” and thus discrimination, interfering with freedom of 
scientific research. If one says that counting how many people coughed 
during a two hour movie, no one can say that such scientific research is 
insignificant, specifically given the background presumption that meaning 
is subjective and therefore cannot be judged by any objective standard. 
If material events are counted in this purposive history, they are not 
ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make of the indifferent, 
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mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims and presumed needs. We 
articulated the rest of the modern story as a progress of technology and human 
mastery of the material environment (including the material human as part 
of the environment). We also disclosed the story of the metaphysics of the 
will pervading all modern philosophies in such guises as power, autonomy, 
arbitrariness, and fierce adherence to personality cults (such as Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam). We also know the story of the efforts to impute into 
consciously constructed events some sort of causal connections and thus 
make history into science. Moreover, we have been told that historical writing 
is based on research and therefore is scientific. There is also a plethora of 
proposals to ontologize history by presuming that it is explainable in terms 
of some basic biochemical components, specifically genetic and evolutionary 
biology. Finally, there are even voices proclaiming the end of history. Such 
efforts are premised on a specific confusion between theoretical, continuous 
time, and historical time, wherein the latter, as phenomenon of human 
awareness, has no necessary continuous connections. 
And then there is History
We began with the question concerning the nature of modern 
Western history, but it could not be understood without the ontology and 
metaphysics forming the foundation of the conception of the world. The 
notion that history is human and not natural phenomenon leads to the 
way that the modern Western thought had to account for time. All events, 
depicted mechanically, follow a causal sequence. What is given now can 
be explained by previous causes. Yet at present the previous causes are no 
longer available; they require an introduction of awareness of the past, called 
memory. The future not being at present also requires an awareness which is 
called projection of temporal possibilities. Both are, of course, phenomena of 
awareness. The latter must provide temporal connections, so well recognised 
by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and finally Sartre. Some, such as Hegel, 
realised that human memory and projection are inadequate to account for 
past events which are beyond human memory. Hence an introduction of 
an absolute consciousness, a sort of all encompassing, eternity, manifesting 
itself in a continuous historical time. Such an eternity is incompatible with 
temporality to the extent that eternity, as an infinite position, cannot be 
divided into historical, temporal periods, without ceasing to be infinite. 
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Kierkegaard made sport of Hegel on this point. Once the infinite collapses, 
what remains are contingent, historical events, having no necessary 
connections, apart from human memory and projected future. To save the 
day, scientific reason introduces the method of quantification and the ability 
to measure mathematically (presumed to be objective operation) of events 
of the past and expected events of the future. All is well, but the problem is 
not solved – only postponed. First, how can a subject, living in the present, 
extend its measures on the past if the latter is no longer and the future is 
not yet? What does one measure? Second, mathematical devices are not 
temporal and do not provide any clues whether what is being measured is 
in the past or in the future. Hence, one has to assume awareness of the past 
and of the future which, as was seen, are not given except in the present 
awareness. Space is no mystery; all spatial events are present now, deployed 
one next to the other but, as material, do not signify their past or their future. 
Hence, once again, the signification of both is conscious phenomenon.
Having said this, it is necessary to connect our discussion to the 
modern ontology and metaphysics. The modern world we live in, including 
the way we understand it, is “made”, and in this sense belongs in the context 
of the modern subject as a maker, builder, such that its objectivity can 
only be deciphered on the basis of the subject’s aims and purposes. At the 
same time it follows that human practical activity does not belong to, and 
cannot be explained in terms of the homogeneous world of matter and its 
mathematically designated space-time positions. To understand history as 
made, we must explicate what sort of maker – as a subject that translates 
the formal constructs into material, technical reality – is at the foundation 
of historical making.
Physiologically speaking, the body appears to be symmetrical and 
given in a location of a homogeneous space, yet functionally the body 
is asymmetrical and sets up differentiations that lend a structure to 
human situation. This is to say, homogeneous world cannot account for 
orientations, directions, places, leeways, and open horizons; it consists of 
an indifferent system of points. Anybody in such a world must be reduced 
to occupying an indifferent and ideal mathematical location. In contrast, 
the functional body is a condition for the possibility of practical structures 
and activities. Its asymmetry disrupts homogeneity and opens diverse 
directions: up-down, left-right, forward-backward. What must be noted is 
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that such directions are not exchangeable, but function as a situation in 
which the practical activities are deployed. What is up front, reachable by a 
forward movement, is distinct from what is in the back, and the latter can 
best be reached by a directional reversal. The same can be said of left-right. 
It is to be noted that the traditionally conceived structure of practical 
activity concerned with ends-means relationship has to be subtended by the 
more fundamental composition of the bodily field of functions. The field of 
functions has a centre and the centre is a condition for an oriented space of 
activity; the latter always stems from “here” and is related to “there”; while 
one “there” can be exchanged for “another there”, they cannot be equivalent 
to a “here”. The here is always a bodily-kinaesthetic point of orientation. Now 
it is to be understood that orientation is prior to any stimuli and reactions, 
since the latter do not reveal directional functions, although directional 
functions are assumed in any discourse about stimulation, such as coming 
from the front, the right, etc. Orientation is not simply a structure of the 
physiological body or of objective world; rather it is a relationship of a lived 
body to the things of practical comportment. What is on the left and what 
is on the right belong to the domains of functions of reaching, grasping, 
appropriating, and even resisting. Irrespective of bodily position, it always 
maintains the right-left polarity, and indeed an asymmetrical polarity. The 
reaching for something with one hand does not demand a symmetrical 
reaching for the same thing with another hand. In fact the functioning of 
the two hands is differentiated in mutual support in face of a given task. 
Yet in this mutuality their differences of function are discovered prior to 
any thetic position of body as “mine”. In turn, the practically oriented body 
allows things to acquire functional deployment: some are on the right, 
others on the left. 
While the right-left differentiation depends upon movement, its 
functioning does not involve the entire bodily organisation, except in 
cases when shifting the entire body lends efficiency in the fulfilment of 
a task. A more pronounced movement of the entire body in function is 
structured by the difference of front and back. The forward orientation of 
the body and bodily motion are unequally favoured. The practical activity 
is fundamentally a frontal activity, although minimal backward movements 
are called upon as compensations for frontal and lateral activities. The 
backward movement has a circumspection that can be utilised in reaching, 
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and above all in Yielding and retreat. In any prolonged backward activity, 
there occurs its transposition into a frontal movement and activity. The 
practical body does not contend with objects behind it as it does with 
lateral and frontal domains. Of course the back activity is still “there” and 
the active subject is not set at the periphery of the world, yet it could be said 
that it is a most passive activity. 
The preeminent frontal activity constitutes a basis for a language of 
goals and means. It is an activity that continuously discovers and interrelates 
various functions and opens new “frontiers”. This activity is circumspective, 
planning, taking into account, leaving behind, and forward looking. In the 
context of frontal activity, the language of history and of goals is situated. The 
human looks ahead to better days, participates in the forward movement of 
history, faces the tasks and goals of today and tomorrow, and leaves the past 
and the troubles behind. The very language of overcoming, of surpassing, 
even transcending is a frontal language. What this suggests is that at this 
level the conceptions of history, interpretation, situation and context require 
a functional corporeity with its asymmetrical activities for the setting of 
laws, rules, and conceptions. The passively accepted corporeal activities 
are incorporated into, and provide a context for, the understanding even 
of our “highest” theories of history, development, purposes, and “ideals”. 
Functioning corporeity is the “situation”. The front-back structure includes 
not only directions of activity, but also temporal orientations of “already” 
and “not yet”, the “gone” and the “yet to come”. In this sense the functional 
body is a spatio-temporal situation for the deployment of objects and events. 
As a situation, the functioning body is both singular and at this level 
contains a generality that is capable of mediating between the transcendental 
universality, historically transmitted intersubjective generalities, and the 
objects of the homogeneous world of space and time. This is to say, the 
application of laws, linguistic rules, prescriptions, and prejudgments, make 
sense in a situation because the situation itself is not a brute fact, but traces a 
corporeal generality which is not quite in accord with the “purity” or universal 
rules, but which is not quite idiosyncratically singular. The functional body 
can be both loosened up or tightened, can approximate although never reach 
the “ideal” and can relax to open up the ideal to variations. Thus for example 
an activity toward the goal can limit itself to very select means and a narrow 
interpretation of the goal, or it can relax and regard the means as fluctuating 
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and the goal as open to various directions. Functional body as a situation 
allows for tightening and loosening by virtue of its correlation to and being 
in a place. Practical objects and functions, inclusive of bodily activities, have 
oriented places. If something practical has its place, the latter depends on 
the customary convenience for the acting subject. Something is usually 
found or placed “there” and is accessible to activities. A particular object of 
practical use is not located in a point of a homogeneous space, but in a place 
with a slack that allows shifts without the object leaving its place. It is on the 
table, on a work bench, in front and a little to the right, and it is accessible to 
correlations with other objects in the vicinity. This variability of the object 
or an instrument with respect to its place allows both for leeway and for 
tightening of the place, although the latter cannot reach a geometric point. 
The reason for this impossibility lies in the very composition of 
functional body and the practical objects with which it is concerned. Places 
with their slack are constitutive not only of the objects of use, but also of 
bodily functions with respect to use. The objects must not only have a place 
with a slack, but they must also be accessible, must be handy, cannot be 
too far, out of reach, or too close, too imposing, obtrusive, and hence a 
hindrance to activity. The functional body, constitutive of the oriented 
situation of praxis, is equally irreducible to a geometric point of a “here” and 
must be rather understood as a total situation with opening and tightening 
variations and parameters, constantly correlating to the variations of the 
place of an object of use. Indeed, the useful object’s place is very much 
indicated in Heidegger’s delimitation of “absence” of an implement. 
It is revealed as not being here, in its accustomed place, in its accessible 
handiness and is somewhere else, in some other place to be sought and 
hence having become a problem for the active body faced with a task of 
immediate concern. What this reveals is not only a place in correlation to 
the functional body, but also the practical world as a manifold of oriented 
places, comprising a shifting field of activities with leeways and functional 
adjustments. This does not mean that the practical world structured by the 
functional body is identical with the total lived world; rather it comprises 
one level of this lived world, although an important level whose language 
extends and contextualises the sense of various other levels. 
Every place of practical objects, as suggested above, can be compre-
hen ded as an oriented structure in correlation to other places, thus offering 
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an oriented system of play-space with various options of non-arbitrary, 
although not precise, loosening and tightening of leeways and slacks. This 
oriented structure as a whole is also correlative to the functional body as 
a situation allowing the depiction of the structure of places in terms of 
whereto and wherefrom. One leaves some places “behind” to get to other 
places “ahead”, and to avoid any deviations to the “sides”. The structuration 
of the entire field of oriented places can be comprehended on the concrete 
activities of the practical body as it establishes functional orientations. 
Obviously, we should not confuse functional orientations with some sort of 
inherent bodily characteristics. Functional orientations are enmeshed in the 
world of praxis and correlate to the places and practical objectivities without 
which orientations could not make sense. To use the language of Waldenfels, 
the bodily orientations comprise an “in between” region, such that they are 
not reducible either to the subject’s body or to the pre-given objects. 
At this juncture of our discussion we should point out that the in-
terconnection of oriented places in a field of practical activities does not 
guarantee the presumption of a historical continuity and intersubjective 
homogeneous field. Differentiated field of places and orientations at the 
same time contain a slack of practical time maintaining openness without 
a convergence into a singular future point or a progressive line that pre-
sumably would connect the historical events. Such a line is not given as 
phenomenon of practical activity; rather it is constituted at the theoretical 
level, as Landgrebe so aptly noted. In this sense the “application” of histori-
cally transmitted laws, rules, and prejudgments, requires contextualisation 
and situatedness that transform the theoretical presumption of continu-
ity into a practical contingency which is not arbitrary, and yet which does 
not guarantee unity. Given the level of practical activity, constitutive of the 
open situation and of oriented places, the next level capable of situating and 
concretising the intersubjectively transmitted composition, idealities, and 
universal norms, could be called the “morphological” level of phenomena. 
The following is the issue, at least for scientifically sophisticated mo-
dernity: the numerous ideal scientific designs, coded in geometric, logical, 
and mathematical languages, do not resemble, picture, or suggest anything 
in the lived world of practical activities. Resultantly their situatedness must 
take for granted not the experience and language of objects and their prop-
erties, but an experience that allows an approximation of the historically 
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transmitted language of sciences. The language would have to be of shapes, 
sketches, sizes, and in general morphologies that lend themselves to rough 
delimitations without assuming a complete precision. Thus we can speak of 
“oblong” table, “round” pot, “egg-shaped” balloon, “flat” and “wavy” sur-
face, “smooth” or “rough” edges, without offering any precise delimitations. 
Yet what is peculiar about these characterisations is that they are corpo-
really accessible and can be either tightened up or loosened, without the 
loss of their morphological generality and at the same time specificity. They 
lend themselves to degrees of situational specification and at the same time 
intersubjective generalisation. Indeed, such morphological characteristics 
are within the range of situated visualisation and linguistic designation that 
is fulfillable in the process of activity. 
At the same time the morphological compositions can be purified and 
lend themselves to geometric precision and logical articulations, open to 
historical and intersubjective continuity. Their application is a process of 
their contextualisation along corporeal orientations and leeways that never 
yield geometrical precision, and thus retain the possible morphological 
variations and extension. It is sufficient to claim that the practical activity 
is confronted by morphologically structured objects that lend themselves 
to what Husserl called “ideations” which, seems to me, are distinct from 
“generalisations”. In this sense, it is possible to regard the morphological 
features of objects as a closer look at the ideationally acquired suggestions, 
i.e. their morphological looseness in the situated domain of practical func-
tions. The egg-shaped object can vary and offer options that retain their 
ideality and nonetheless are situation-specific. It would be appropriate to 
say that these characteristics are the “in between” the ideational, lawful, 
precise, ideal, and purely factual, material, empirical. Within this level it 
is possible to have the intersubjectively accessible ideational identity and 
individual variations, required for historical transmission of a tradition and 
its application to a situated understanding. The application is possible if 
there are some features that can coincide without necessary collapsing into 
an oneness. It seems that the morphological domain is the hinge in this 
relationship. 
The analysis of the functional body as the general situation of practi-
cal activities and a practical world as one condition for the possibility of 
application of historically transmitted knowledge, laws, prejudgments and 
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operations, and the opening up of the comprehension of the intermediary 
domain of morphological composition of phenomena opens another area 
of passive functions. This area is the practical body, constituting one level 
for the acquisition of personal identity and recognition of the others. The 
following analyses are designed to avoid the reduction of the person either 
to a body in space and time, or to a mind controlling the body; we will 
presume neither a materiality of the body nor an inherent facticity of its 
functions. The task is to discover the genesis of the practical body prior to 
fact and mind. 
Body and Techne
The discussion of the practical side of the body assumed two major 
directions, termed the “I can” and the “lived body”. No doubt, the 
contributions of these directions were ground breaking and opened fruitful 
avenues for phenomenological researches. The present task is to outline 
the important features of the “I can” and to develop them toward another 
level of practical functions that would delimit briefly the intertwining 
of such activities with the practical world and show the constitution of 
technical processes. The latter are not yet to be regarded as technologies, 
but rather as the activities that are capable of ranging across various 
functionally transposable environmental facticities. The claims of historical 
overdetermination of the individual by intersubjectivity are overhasty, 
since they have not answered the question of the differentiation of the 
intersubjective into individuals. At the historical intersubjective level there 
are no signs that could offer any clue as to the differentiation of individuals. 
Our task is to decipher in the practical domain of the “I can” a mode of 
intersubjective unity and individuality without fragmenting the human 
world. It must be noted that despite the numerous efforts to find an adequate 
exposition of the individual’s self-recognition as an individual, there were 
no satisfactory results. We submit that the failures emerged from the lack of 
attention to the practical domain of human phenomena. The constitution 
of the “I can” rests on the more basic emergence of abilities in a very unique 
intersubjective and individuating process. 
We are aware of the fundamental confrontation between the notions of 
individual and community, requiring a resolution that neither the community 
nor the individual would be given priority. The resolution of the issue can 
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be found in the practical domain and the way in which individuation and 
communalisation comprise one process. First, it is a phenomenological 
axiom that practical activities require corporeal base, and that the latter is 
not a brute fact but a system of kinesthetic events. Kinesthetic events are, in 
turn, functionally oriented, and correlated to the concrete field of objects to 
be handled. The latter are also not brute facts transmitting blind data, but 
are explorable systems with indices and horizons which preclude reduction 
to an object that would be a simple example of an applied rule or norm. 
Second, the kinesthetic constitution of abilities opens a multi-layered system 
of interactions not only with the field but also with others. A child does 
not learn to apply rules, but in a first instance acquires oriented abilities in 
relationship to others. The first moves are already exploratory, testing, and 
worldly, and constitutive of a double reflexivity. The simple effort to reach 
something reveals the possibility of misreaching and the latter is a direct 
reflection of “failure” and repeated effort. At the same time, while one cannot 
reach something, cannot lift or move something, the other can. This is the 
second reflexivity from the directly evident abilities of the other. Yet this 
reflexivity is composed of two important processes. First, the coextensive 
intercorporeal process shared by two active subjects: both are performing 
the same function, e.g. reaching, and yet this function is differentiated: one 
can reach something while the other cannot. The reaching is a commonality 
that is at the same time differentiated into singular abilities. 
The constitution of intercorporeal individuality appears to be possible 
on the basis of activities comprising the first self-recognition of the 
individual and his/her coextensivity with the abilities of the others. The 
abilities are variations of two inseparable processes: first, a variation of a 
general ability shared by basic kinaesthetically functioning corporeity, and 
second, the individual variation of the ability, such as repeated efforts and 
retrials to accomplish a task. Here the first line of intersubjective recognition 
consists of pre-thetic enactments which are mimetic and continuous with 
activities of the other, and a mimicking that differs from what it enacts. It is 
a generality, which continues an intercorporeal function and a singularity 
that establishes variations of a function. Constituted abilities have a 
concretely enacted universality, accessible to all, and a concrete singularity 
that allows for variations. The universality is not an exemplified eidos in 
a single individual act, but the very activity that can proliferate across 
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variations. Because of this universality and singularisation “all at once” that 
both, what one can and cannot do are recognizable. The awareness that you 
can, but I cannot reach some specific object, already gives the generality 
of the reaching and its various articulations. In principle, each ability is 
a general and a singular variations without, of course, the loss of unity 
between individuals and individuation. 
The generality is the precondition for practical activities and the 
use of technical implements. If human activity were a pure conjunction 
of sense data and physiological relays, it could never constitute practical 
implements. The latter are not based on reactions to a datum but require the 
transference of functions from one object to another. This transference is 
called by Husserl “analogisation”. The form of analogisation in the practical 
domain is somewhat different than the one articulated in languages and 
even in relation to the constitution of the alter ego. Practical analogisation 
functions along the following interrelationships: first, the generality and 
specificity of an ability comprise a dimension that can range across diverse 
objects and constitute them as “analogous” to one another with respect 
to “what they can do”. Second, “what they can do” calls for bracketing of 
pure “objective gaze” and a reduction of the given object to a factor in a 
corporeally functional system of orientations. Third, the analogisation 
is constituted ‘on the basis of the task to be performed. The task sets the 
limit of analogical extension of “fitting” objects. One’s ability can range 
over various functionally equivalent objects, e.g. a stick, a stone, a hammer, 
because each object is analogate of the other objects in face of the peg that 
has to be pounded into the ground. But one cannot pick a handful of sand 
to perform the same function. The task and the “means” are correlated, 
and the latter can be varied analogously up to a functional limit. At any 
rate, the dimensionality of an oriented activity is basic to the process of 
analogisation. Fourth, the dimensioned ability is extended “through” the 
instrument, and the latter becomes both a limitation and a specification of 
an ability. The range of an ability pervades the implement and is an extension 
of the power of the ability. No doubt, this principle is hardly recognisable 
in various complex technologies, be it transportation or computer, yet even 
these are pervaded by functional oriented bodily activities. 
Apart from the constitution of abilities and their gradual sedimentation, 
the relationship between abilities-implements and the tasks dissolves the 
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distinction between what is “objective” and “subjective”. It could be well 
argued that the abilities themselves are neither “inner” nor “outer”, but are 
primarily effective. In the performance of a task, the abilities appear in the 
structure of the task and are transmitted through the various implements 
and material composition of the task. The substance of the task calls for and 
reveals the different abilities of the participants. In lifting, reaching, moving, 
using implements, we not only reveal what we can do, but also what others 
must do in order to “take up the slack” and “fill in” with their abilities the 
functions called upon by the given task. The “filling in” is called for and is 
both coextensive with and differentiated from the activities of others. The 
point of principle is that the mutual and at the same time differentiated 
abilities communicate directly through the task. 
The communication here dissolves the brute materiality of the sub-
stance in a performance of a task and allows it to become a system of 
corporeal shifts and transmissions of requirements of the members 
engaged in a task. I “ought” to brace myself more firmly in order to pivot 
the load that the other is attempting to set into place. My “ought” is not 
read from my mind or from the others wishes but is transmitted through 
the load. Here I do not primarily observe his bodily moves, but sense 
the requirements of my activity directly through the load. This would be 
analogous to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the blind man’s ability to see the 
composition of the surfaces at the end of the stick. If there are judgments, 
here, they are corporeal without being identical with brute facticity. The 
suggestions offered in this context and at this level of analyses are not 
designed to reject other functions of awareness, such as projects, rational 
deliberations, setting up of goals and plans; rather they fill a gap left by the 
over-intellectualised historicisms and sociologisms treating the bodily and 
the concrete world as instances of the pre-given rules, concepts and even 
linguistic generalities. Such historicisms are not wrong, yet they presuppose 
the concrete understanding of the functional corporeity and its sedimented 
abilities providing both intersubjectively general and at the same time 
individual context of activities. Without the practical domain, constituted 
by the acquisition of abilities within the parameters of the functional 
body, the historically transmitted understanding would be unsituated, two 
dimensional, and bodiless. The practical-functional body and its acquired 
abilities are not blind facts requiring mental illumination; they comprise 
74
LITHUANIA AND GLOBALIZATION
their own domain (knowledge that could be termed practognostic). No 
doubt intellectual activities can extend our practical knowledge, yet such an 
extension will have to take recourse to the acquired abilities, their generic 
dimensions. Individuated variations, intercorporeity, and analogical 
transpositions of implements and correlations to tasks. 
The historical understanding suggested in terms of practognosis, is 
assumed even if not explicated by all theories of history, including pragma-
tism, Marxism, constructivism and even hermeneutics. Thus, historical 
reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is a continuous 
historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose that is posited as 
a necessary condition for necessary connections between temporal events, 
the assumption results in a positing of historical rules, be they dialectics of 
Hegelian or Marxian brands, or some presumed evolution. In brief, future 
final purpose is posited as a condition for the invention of necessary rules 
of historical development. It is significant that the final purpose is in and 
part of history and hence one aspect of history and thus defies the very 
notion of a final purpose. After all, one historical event cannot be the aim 
of the whole. After this “final event” is reached, history does not cease and 
thus abolishes such an event as final. This outcome forces the thinkers of 
historical reason to posit a transcendent historical aim above or beyond 
history. Such transcendence cannot be historical and properly must be 
designated to be eternal. The results of this transcendent view are as follows: 
first, the best that can be obtained from it is a changeless dialectical structure 
or system and hence in principle static, yielding no historical development; 
second, transcendent, infinite being is unknowable by contingent historical 
actors (well noted by Kierkegaard) and thus cannot be a source of claims as 
to whither of human destiny; third, infinity has no temporal orientation and 
would not be an indice of a purposive direction of history; fourth, historical 
consciousness cannot escape self-destruction in terms of its claim to be 
universal and all inclusive, because, one, if all consciousness is historical 
(expressed pedagogically as an accumulation of knowledge) and must be 
historically contextualised, then such a conscious claim is equally historical 
and must be understood within its historical context; and two, the very 
ontology, which gave rise to the conception of mechanical world, is equally 
historical. Hence, if the mechanical universe were to be reinterpreted as one 
of having open meaning, i.e. signitive, then historical consciousness would 
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cease to be relevant. These aspects place current historical consciousness 
at a complete loss and a crisis. No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led 
numerous philosophical and scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical 
postulates of infinity, and cosmic order, all attempting to find some 
permanent component, even an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. 
Theories are proposed and discarded like spring fashions, continuously 
disclosing our confusion. 
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The phenomenological and existential discovery in the twentieth 
century of what became known as “life world” is based on an effort to show 
that all sorts of modern western attempts to explain human life, its different 
customs, social arrangements, cults, scientific explanations, and even layers 
of interpretation, belong in a life world. Even the most novel event that might 
shock us to the roots of our being makes sense because it appears as alien 
to our life world. The alien event reflects back on the familiarity of our life 
world and the impossibility to doubt its presence. It can be argued that the 
famous method of doubt of Descartes did not encompass the life world as a 
whole. While doubting whether this or that thing exists, he did not suddenly 
see a hole in the world in such a way that doubting one thing after another 
we would be lefts with a sum of holes. To the contrary, no matter which thing 
might appear to be doubtful, the world we live in is never in doubt. The only 
way that the world for us can disappear, is if we disappear – but that is for us. 
Whether one is a farmer or a scientist, one has to contend with daily events, 
things, others, stars, their function in our nocturnal orientations and diurnal 
tasks which, in some civilizations are marked by time instruments – so to 
speak making us prisoners of our own inventions.
A cursory survey of works in a variety of disciplines shows a trend that 
tends to use the phrase life world or lived world as a basis from which to 
critique such cultural phenomena as literatures and positive sciences. It is 
common to treat the life world as everyday world, taken for granted prior to 
any cultural, literary or scientific engagements. It would seem then that life 
world is distinct from various human activities, such as sciences, literatures, 
rituals, and that the latter are founded upon a life-world. Thus, the forgetting 
of the basis in the life-world lend various cultures, and the current language 
of culturalism, an unwarranted pre-eminence. In the modern West, such 
pre-eminence is granted to sciences, as a cultural mode that wants to explain 
all life worlds. In order both to critique and limit such explanations, it is 
essential to show their basis in a specific life world. It is generally understood 
that a life world is an interconnection of meanings, where each thing is not 
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only categorised, but also “means” other things. A cup, as an implement, 
points to other implements, points to water, rain, rivers and clouds, places 
of pottery production, employment, wages, property rights and legal 
systems. Such “signitive” connections can be multi-layered, with meanings 
“overlaying” other meanings, forming not only horizontal connections, 
but also “vertical” obscurities. Thus a simple implement such as a cup has 
horizontal connections – as seen above – but can also have vertical overlays. 
The material from which the cup is made can have scientific, chemical 
meanings, atomic and sub-atomic codes, each forming its own set of 
horizontal interconnections. Why we say “obscurities” because each overlay 
tends to intersect other layers and interpret them in ways that were not a 
part of the initial meaning of the level that is being interpreted from another 
level. For example, to speak in terms of physical sciences, one tends to use 
such language as “atoms” or “building blocks” and create a perception that 
everything is “atomic” and unrelated to anything else. In this sense we obtain 
a perception that the cup is simply one individual thing among others, or 
a human is an individual and society is a sum of “worldless” individuals, 
each having its own characteristics. Here we may, in fact, acquire two 
distinct modes of perception as to what a life world is: sum of individuals 
each with private interests  – capitalism, and each individual, defined by 
social relationships  – socialism. Then it would mean, that cultures, such 
as literatures, would make sense and have meaningful interconnections 
proper to their life worlds. Indeed, limiting cases can be used to show the 
veracity of such relationship between a life world and literary culture. In 
Christian, Marxian, fascist, Islamic life worlds, literatures that go counter to 
the requirements of their life worlds are banned and the writers punished. 
In turn, that the modern western life world has an overlay of scientific and 
above all technical cultures, does not mean that stripping away such an 
overlay would disclose the ontologically “primordial” and “pure” life world 
as a ground of meaning and sense..
Even if there were such a world, the disclosure of its sense is not a self-
evident venture but depends on a specific phenomenological orientation. 
Such concepts as ground of sense, origin of sense, sense overlay and sense 
transformation, do not have a mundane meaning. They appear as traces of 
constitutive subjectivity; as a transcendental activity, the latter has a task of 
explicating both the life world and the transcendental genesis of sense of such 
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components as sciences, literatures within a life-world, and the very sense 
of a life world. Let us use an example of modern sciences: if we trace their 
genesis, we must “relive” the constitution of.specific sense configurations 
of sciences in order to trace them through various sedimentations all the 
way to the reconstitution of the originary scientific sense. This might be 
seen, initially, to be the historical task of the specific constitution of specific 
scientific structures during a given historical period. This historically 
transcendental approach may offer an access to the transformation of a life-
world toward a scientifically reconstituted world. Of course, this does not 
yet demonstrate that there is the life world apart from the one now being 
globalised by the sciences and the one that the sciences left behind as, for 
example, the Medieval life world. This is to say, the extension of sense by 
the scientific constructions and their overlay of the prior life world does not 
imply that the previous life world was and is the originary, while the scientific 
is an overlay over the originary. If this were the case, then one would have 
to show why the Medieval life world, which was there before scientific life 
world, is the ground, and the modern activities are an overlay over such a 
ground. If this position fails to reveal the life world, then we are left again 
with a multiplicity of such worlds. The problem can be phrased in other 
terms: is there a pure life-world that is not intertwined with layers of cultural 
sense? The Medieval peasant as well as the Taoist perform minimal rituals 
that are totally coextensive with the formation of their sense awareness. 
We can state that neither science nor other cultural constitutions of 
sense would comprise an overlay of an originary life world. Given this 
possibility, one is barred from finding an access to some originary life world. 
Thus if the modern life world is scientifically and technologically laden, 
then the constitution of modern life world is the very sense embodiments 
that comprise scientific-technological praxis. The functioning of 
transcendental subjectivity, as the genesis of sense is increasingly a complex 
and unencompassable process of those very sense constitutions that have 
assumed an embodied life of their own. In a manner of speaking, to trace 
the functioning of these embodied sense constitutions is to discover the 
ways they were intended initially. This is important in light of the possible 
claim that the embodied sense not only covers over the presumed originary 
life world, but that it has assumed a life of its own. This case is most obvious 
in the modern Western scientific/technical creations, and, in other cases, in 
79
Chapter III. Life World
modes of comportment, rituals, all the way to “proper” emotional attitudes. 
All such givens are deemed to be “out there” requiring no legitimation; 
indeed, the very legitimation is deemed to be equally “out there” in the form 
of “higher beings” or scientific verities.
The composition of life world is “semiotic” in a sense that things are 
not just there in a homogeneous space and sequential time, but form a 
system of “signitive” interconnections. The moss on a tree points north, the 
morning star points to dawn, the bell in a school yard points to events such 
as danger, time for class, or departure. While such things are empirical, they 
also bear a meaning or several meanings, forming lateral and depth layers 
of signitive connections. In the main, such connections are social, cultural 
and purposive, and define what connections are relevant in a specific 
situation. An implement such as a cup has a purpose, but in addition has 
layers of meaning: thirst, liquid, such as water, coffee, juice, and also broader 
connections: rain, lakes, oceans, rivers, materials from which it is made, 
craftsmen, commerce, and even economy. A hammer signifies a nail, a nail 
signifies a board, a board points to a wall being built and the latter is a wall 
of a house, in a specific neighbourhood, etc. Road signs, such as 120 mean 
legal speed limit, required time to get from place to place, and legal system. 
Thus, while driving, one may suddenly see flashing light in the mirror. 
One does not react to such light as stimuli and simply blink one’s eyes. The 
flashes mean police, signalling to stop, the signalling also means a violation 
of the speed limit, and the violation means possible fines, perhaps even an 
appearance before a judge; the flashing light discloses the connections in a 
lived world which includes us who are also activities which interconnect 
in such a world. The flashing light means that one has violated the law, will 
have to stop, be late for an appointment and miss a career opportunity.
Not all life worlds are alike; cultural anthropology has disclosed a 
great variety of them, each having its own set of signitive interconnections. 
While such a variety is interesting, our concern is with Lithuania and its 
life world which, in various ways, still contains traces of the Soviet Union 
and its imperial morphology. In that life world one had no such illusions 
as being born in an open society with duties to participate in public 
affairs and the right to challenge authorities. The latter could set signitive 
interconnections at will and thus change the meaning of social environment 
and all that belongs there and the meaning of a person. In that life world 
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Lithuanian language was secondary, while Russian was the official and 
counted as superior. In stores, the “attendants”, many of whom were ethnic 
Russians, did not respond to Lithuanian language and, in many cases, told 
a Lithuanian person to “speak like a human”. All events, from production 
to education, sciences and arts were signified as the best in the world. All 
“citizens” were living happiest lives and could not travel to see the misery 
of the rest of the world. Officials, i.e. the “immortals”, were infallible, and 
the elite, due to its burdens, had to have luxurious lives. One knew that she 
could not worship her traditional saints, but had to adore the saints, such 
as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, who had brought equality and prosperity. 
Living in such a life world became “normal” and indeed, after Lithuanians 
declared and gained independence, many of them longed for a return of the 
Soviet “order”. In this order one did not have to think of what to do – the 
officials did the thinking; one did not have to look for work, the officials 
assigned one to a “brigade”, and one did not have to think what to write – 
that too was a decision handed down from the officials. The future is clearly 
outlined and need not be of concern for the member of this society. In the 
new life world, suddenly one had to survive on one’s own efforts and wits, 
and had to be responsible for his life, decisions and destiny. 
Yet there was and continues to be another Lithuanian life world 
which was allowed in part by Soviet officials. It was a traditional “peoples” 
world, bereft of history in the sense of great figures, heroes, monumental 
victories, of an empire that once ruled Russia; it consisted of “peoples” arts 
and crafts, simple songs of nature, village, happy seasonal holidays (without 
saints or even pagan divinities), but full of chores and above all “communal 
sharing”. Everyone was part of a community, full of warmth and joy, 
performing their common tasks without questions concerning the matters 
of the empire. Peasant, village life, attuned to the rhythm of nature and 
its seasons, although somewhat disrupted by “scientific socialism”. Official 
literatures sanctioned and extolled this life world and in it the modern 
notion of “progress” did not play a role, even if the official language spoke 
of “production races” among collective farms. While this was a residuum 
of a capitalist competition, it was couched in joyous terms of the happiness 
to produce more than others “for the people”. In this “peoples” life world, 
traditional Lithuanian customs could be maintained. A minor, but a telling 
point shows up if one pays attention to the simple names given to children 
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under the Soviet rule. The communist elite banned its rivals, Christianity 
with its correlates – Judaism and Islam – and thus the ritual baptisms. The 
latter sanctioned the names of the Middle Eastern famous figures, such as 
Mary, Joseph, Paul, David, Sarah, Peter, and so on; after this rivalry was 
abolished by the party, there appeared Lithuanian names, Rūta, Gytis, 
Birutė, Auridas, Daiva, Linas, and so on. This “peoples” life world is being 
purified of the Soviet rhetoric and is regarded as one of the fundamental 
cultural treasures of a tradition. It will be our task to note how it fares in 
the life world of globalization. But before that it would be beneficial to 
extend the composition of globalization in order to make clear the way that 
this little country rushes to enter “world history” and voices dismay at the 
prospects of vanishing as qualitatively distinct culture. To say “qualitative” 
is important insofar as the main metaphysical trust of globalization and 
its success is quantitative. This problematic was explicated at the level of 
modern ontology, and is relevant at the level of culture.
Modern Western Life World
Although by multi-cultural contemporary western logic, the modern 
western life world counts as one among many such worlds, yet it seems to be 
spreading its impact and “logic” globally, thus creating a global civilization 
without national borders. The task of this chapter is to extend the previously 
discussed ontology and metaphysics, including the making of history, 
toward another dimension of understanding suggested by the analyses of 
a signitive life world. This “logic” which is usually unnoticed is implicitly 
assumed as a ground of all global engagements. We know that throughout 
the course of the Twentieth Century scientific thought was in a quandary 
concerning its own basis: science with its theories and methods wanted to 
be logical, precise and rational; on the other hand, it also wanted to make 
ontological claims concerning the structure of the world. As was discussed 
in the last chapter, the world is deemed to be physical-empirical, regarded 
as the sole possessor of the honourable name “reality” and “objectivity” 
on which everything rests, by which everything must be explained, and 
from which all other modes of presence are derived. Resultantly, all else 
is subjective and to be excluded from scientific considerations. Moreover, 
science is value free and any valuation belongs to the subjective realm. It is 
our contention that the case is not only more complex but science assumes 
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the objectivity of something that is not derivable from any empirical facts. 
This is to say, the first condition of science – being logical or, in broader 
terms, formal – is not accessible from any empirical position; second, the 
notion that science, and indeed logic, as value free, is equally mistaken; 
given that there are various logical and self-consistent systems, the 
selectivity of one system over another is a matter of valuation and, above 
all, cultural valuation. Cultural valuation belongs to a life world that 
consists of intersections and overlapping of events, each pointing one to 
the other in complex ways, and each bearing various social meanings. In 
this context, science is one set of such meanings that must be located in its 
function in terms of its practical, cultural, and technical significance. This 
suggests that even technical inventions are not just entities, but comprise 
a complex system of life world interconnections, such as values, economy, 
education, productivity, politics, and even ideologies. This, of course, will 
have to be shown in a detailed and precise manner. We shall devote a more 
extensive analysis of values in subsequent discussions. Yet it is also essential 
to point out that the linear, mechanical time, as a basis for scientific causal 
explanations is surpassed and absorbed into the historical time which is 
more complex than the time of activity discussed in the previous chapter.
If social life is based on human experience and activity, then it is 
essential to understand the structures of such activity. Moreover, if activity 
and experience are temporal, then their temporal structures must also be 
delimited. There is a long tradition of thought proclaiming that time is linear 
flow of events in a causal succession. Although this tradition is still habitually 
assumed in many areas of human endeavour, it has been challenged by the 
best thinkers of the twentieth century. The problem of time, at least with 
respect to human experience and activity, is the following: if activity time is 
linear, then all past activities are no longer present and the future activities 
are not yet present and hence they can have no influence on our present 
activities. After all, past is no more and future is not yet. Of course it could be 
replied that the past is in our memory and the future is in our expectations; 
but if memory and expectation are functions of a subject living here and 
now, then such functions are here and now and cannot “go beyond” their 
temporal location. Real functions, be they mental or physical, are locked 
in their temporal moment. A theory of action, based on such a linear time 
conception is incomprehensible. The current action is all that is present, the 
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previous actions are remembered actions, i.e. in memory and the future 
actions are in expectation; hence any understanding of action’s orientation 
would consist of memories and expectations. But since such memories and 
expectations are also present functions, then the temporal orientation of 
activity is reduced to a presently occurring subjective functions. The linear 
theory of time is thus totally inadequate for the understanding of human 
activity since such an activity is oriented temporally and assumes both 
present and future as field of that orientation.
It must be insisted that the objections to linear time conception do 
not invalidate its utility for sciences; they simply point out that linear time 
must be understood in a broader context. Such a context has been delimited 
by elucidations of the temporal structures of experience and action, and 
Luhmann’s works complement and deepen these elucidations at the level of 
social theory. An analysis of human action and experience shows that they 
occur within a specific time-context. Whatever is experienced now sinks 
into a horizon which is not yet in the past but belongs to the present activity 
and experience. For example in the activity of speaking and listening, the 
entire statement or the entire speech is present. What has been said is a 
horizon of what is being said; the horizon is part of the understanding of 
the presently spoken words and sentences. Hence the present is not a point 
on a geometrical line but a presence comprised of horizons. It is still the 
same speech which is being spoken and heard. The past as such arises only 
when the present and its horizons are interrupted. Then we ask: “What did 
the person just say?” and orient ourselves deliberately to the past. In brief, 
memory-consciousness is distinct from horizon-consciousness.
The present also includes a future horizon of expectations of relevant 
possibilities providing an orientation for experience and activity. The 
relevant possibilities, belonging to the present speaking, are part of the 
speech in the mode of future horizon. The past horizon does not vanish 
into oblivion since it is required and retained for the comprehension of the 
future horizon. The present is thus a temporal field consisting of active past 
and future horizons constituting a field of orientations of human action 
and experience. Hence each activity occurs within a temporal field where 
the coming future and retained past are co-present and are manifest in the 
activity. What has been said in the speech continues to be present for the 
understanding of what is being said and is about to be said. Moreover, what 
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is about to be said is a condition for the understanding of what is and was 
said. Time of action and experience is a field. If human actions are based 
on temporal field then humans are not only temporal but also historical 
beings. This means that through actions humans make their history and 
since history arises through human action, then the very being of human 
is the history which she makes. But such a history is understandable only 
on the grounds of temporal field of action. This suggests that human 
conception of nature and its orientation plays differing roles at different 
historical times. But this means that what we call nature, and its assumed 
linear time, arises only as one class of phenomena within the temporal field 
of action. Before we can raise the theoretical question of natural time, we 
have already assumed the temporal field of action. Hence the orientation of 
the theoretical, linear time, if it is to make any sense as oriented time, must 
function within the understanding of temporal field of action.
This means furthermore that although we may analyse natural facts, 
their properties and temporal orientations, we shall discover that facts 
function and assume orientation within a context of significations. This 
suggests that each natural and historical event functions within the temporal 
field whose horizons are specified by signitive implications of such events. 
Thus historical events are not connected causally but signitively. Past events 
appear for what they are in terms of their signitive implications for the 
present and future. What is significant for human action continues not in 
some random heap of facts stored in some memory but in folklore, stories, 
monuments, architecture and myths which reveal the significance of past 
events and orient humans toward future possibilities. In this sense, history 
is the horizon of human memory implicit in the present temporal field 
and its horizons. Such horizons of memory do not reveal the entire past 
but make leaps connecting only the events functioning significantly in the 
present temporal field. This suggests that history cannot be understood as a 
succession of causal events but as events primarily connected significatively. 
In fact the understanding of causality arose within a temporal field. The 
notion of an uninterrupted stream of events, in the form of efficient cause, 
was developed in the Stoic reflections on nature. Before that “aitia” was not 
an efficient cause but responsibility. In brief, the temporal field of action 
and history did not arise from experience of uninterrupted events, but was 
developed from responsible activity and its time.
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The signitive connection of historical events, coupled with the 
differentiation between the theoretical-linear and field time, account for 
the fact that there is no constant causal correlation between the changes 
in the natural and the historical spheres. Although natural events may 
change in accordance with linear causality, their significance and horizons 
of possibilities may remain constant within the temporal field of action. 
A tornado might uproot one section of a forest without changing the 
significance and horizon of possibilities of the trees: wood for the paper 
mills. The so-called material conditions may be similar, yet the structure 
of human action within a temporal field allows the conditions to assume 
an entirely different significance, function and horizon of possibilities. This 
thesis is admitted even by dogmatic Marxists, although they still wish to 
maintain, at least in principle, that the structure of human action must 
be derived from the material conditions. The same remarks apply to the 
technologically based notions of human progress.
Not all events play a role in human activity; they are selected and 
interpreted in accordance with the significance they have in the context 
of a particular activity and its horizons. Conversely, the horizons are also 
present selectively: significant possibilities are selected and insignificant 
rejected. The selectivity of events and horizons suggests a way to account 
for historical unity and continuity without the assumption of linear, causal 
succession. Although our process of selectivity may leap over events, their 
historical continuity consists of their significance within the temporal field. 
Even if the events are past and causally no longer efficient, their significance 
is still present. This does not mean that the significance of events follows a 
linear succession; rather the significance of the past event belongs to the 
present temporal field and its horizons of possibilities. It either expands or 
contracts the horizons by permitting the selectivity of more or less remote 
events as relevant within the present temporal field of action. It is also clear 
that the present field is multi-layered and thus replete with options such 
that certain options are taken up while others remain present in a tacit 
mode to be activated if the horizon discloses their relevance.
The expansion of the past horizon does not imply that the entire 
significance of history may be captured. There may be events whose 
significance and truth will manifest itself only in the future. Truth itself is 
historical and reveals itself in historical time. The social scientist and the 
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historian who know how to read events not as facts but significatively, may 
see the relevance of some past events reflected on the future horizon. In 
brief, the significance of an event transcends its present toward the past and 
future and the mere factual description of the event. The same holds true 
of past and future events. Moreover, the future horizon may reveal hitherto 
unnoticed significance of past or present events and add to the constitution 
of continuity and unity of social events and their historical development. 
Life World and Limits of Selectivity
An in-depth investigation of the temporal field of activity is by itself 
inadequate without an extensive study of social structures as limitations 
to selectivity of significant and relevant events and possibilities. In the 
context delimited above, Luhmann has contributed extensively toward the 
understanding of the relationship between the temporal field and social 
structures. His suggestions are crucial for any progress in this area. Luhmann 
accepts the differentiation between temporal field and the theoretical-linear 
time and adds a qualification with respect to the selectivity of events. The 
past, present and future events assume significance and orientation not 
only within the temporal field of action but also within the horizons, views, 
aims and the prescribed selectivity by a social structure. Consequently, the 
structure of the temporal field of activity is limited by the social structure 
and its selected-selectable possibilities. At the same time the social structure 
functions within the temporal field which contains open horizons of history 
and its significance for the selectivity of future possibilities. Moreover, 
the open horizons constitute the region of possibilities outside the ken of 
the social structure: in terms of the social structure they are impossible. 
Yet precisely such “impossible-possibilities” define the limit of the social 
structure and its horizons and predelineates the orientation for fundamental 
social changes and revolutions. An awareness of the limits of a social 
structure and its possibilities is required for any fundamental social change. 
Yet the awareness of such a limit assumes a presence of a possibility by which 
to judge the limit and toward which to orient the fundamental social change.
Within a social context not all the possibilities are equal; some are 
more remote than others and thus not all are equally significant. It could 
be said that the socially impossible is the socially unrealisable; socially it 
is an “impossible possibility” and reveals the limits of social structure. Of 
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course the interrelationships between the socially possible and impossible 
are quite complex. What may be possible politically may be only remotely 
possible or even impossible economically; what is possible economically 
may not be possible technologically. Thus certain events may be excluded 
for the time being and become past for the social system. (Religions had 
become a private matter and no longer mixed into political-public affairs.) 
Yet they may be reinstated as significant for the social future provided a shift 
in social signification of events and temporal horizons has occurred. (Thus, 
more recently the same religions have assumed political meaning and shifted 
the interpretation of events thus transforming what is significant for today 
and the future). Of course, such a shift requires an understanding of “time-
reflex” as a means of relating the social system to its possibilities and these in 
turn to the temporal field of action. The required complexities of time reflex 
cannot be here developed and will be reserved for the next section. 
Although there are two major aspects constituting time reflex, their 
structures are similar. Hence we shall deal with one and refer to the other 
when necessary. The limits of the socially possible constitute a temporal 
horizon for the particular society which reflects the process of current 
events. Such events are temporal and their orientation, selectivity and 
significance are reflected from the future and past horizons. This is the first 
time-reflex. Since events are temporal, then the time reflex is also temporal 
with constantly shifting possibilities at the limit of the socially possible. The 
limits of the socially possible are manifest only with respect to the socially 
impossible possibilities. These constitute the open horizon of the temporal 
field of activity which is the basis for the historical development and 
orientation of social process. This is the second time reflex. It reflects the 
limits of the socially possible. Since the social selectivity process of events 
requires temporal horizons of the socially possible, then the temporal field 
constitutes a prerequisite for the understanding of the social processes, 
their limits and historical transformations. Were we limited to the current 
social conditions and socially predelineated possibilities, as sociologists 
claim we are, then no fundamental social transformation could occur. This 
is not to deny the limitations constantly imposed by the social structure and 
its possibilities; nevertheless such limitations are not absolute. We remain 
open within the temporal field of activity which manifests the limits of 
the social structure and the possibilities of its transformation. Hence the 
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temporal field is fundamental both for social transformation and for the 
relationship between social structure and its temporal development and 
orientation. This relationship can now be described as “time-reflex”.
Any activity functions within society and time and consequently 
assumes the temporal field. In fact, as already noted, such an activity is 
totally correlated to the temporal field and its horizons. Hence, let us take as 
an example of an activity of investigating society and its temporal process. 
The investigation is correlated to the selected events and possibilities of 
a given social structure; yet the investigation requires a limit from which 
the social structure may be seen. As Luhmann would argue, a system 
reproduces its own memory of the history of selectivity .. of experience of 
the environment. (This is to say, a social system limits of what experiences 
will count as relevant and valid, what the factors of the environment will 
mean and which among them will be relevant for the social system) Yet 
beyond this it reconstructs a world-history of unaccomplished selectivity 
required to grasp the limit of its selectivity. (This is to say, a social system 
also reveals that certain things are not available, not allowable, and beyond 
the horizon of current possibilities) The limit is the socially “impossible 
possibilities” constituting an extension of the temporal field of activity of 
the investigator. Such a horizon of the temporal field reflects the limits of 
the social structure and its possibilities. Since both the social possibilities, 
as a temporal horizon of society, and the temporal field horizons are equally 
temporal, then the reflection of the social horizon of possibilities and their 
limit from the temporal field horizon constitutes a time reflex in time. 
In brief, the temporal field horizon has an indefinite depth of temporal 
possibilities which reflect the temporal horizons of social possibilities and 
their limits. Hence the time reflex, while relating the social structure to the 
temporal field of action, provides a fundamental context for the activity of 
socio-temporal investigations.
It is now possible to sketch briefly the role of the time reflex. Since 
the activity of investigation of socio-temporal processes relates the social 
structure to the temporal field horizons, then such an activity is totally 
correlated to the time reflex and, as noted above, to the temporal field 
horizons. Such an activity constitutes the “last interpreter” who, while dealing 
with socio-temporal processes, is herself temporal. The “last interpreter” 
does not have to assume an extra-social and/or extra-temporal stance in 
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order to investigate society and herself within it. This means at the same 
time that the changing, expanding or narrowing of the temporal horizons 
during the process or investigation also shifts the selectivity and significance 
of events and the continuation of social process by way of the time-reflex. Of 
course this occurs not only with the investigator of socio-temporal processes 
but with every member of society. Each understands events within the 
temporal horizons of possibilities co-present in the selectivity, orientation 
and definition of such events. Hence each member of society constitutes a 
time-reflex and hence the continuation of the social process.
It is ought to be obvious that the future horizon selects not only the 
current events and their temporal orientation and limits but also the relevant 
past horizon. In turn an investigation of past events and their possibilities 
may constitute an opening to the future horizon. Thus the influence of the 
past on the present and future is not causal but selective and significative. 
While moving toward the future, the investigative activity also selects and 
establishes the orientation and interrelationships of past-present-future 
events. Since activity is correlative to the time reflex, then the time reflex 
is the ground for the understanding of all temporal interrelationships 
compri sing the temporal movement of society. It accounts for the distinc-
tion and interconnection between the present of the past, present of the 
present, and the present of the future. Each such present is given with its 
temporal horizons which intersect and are co-continuous with those of 
other presents. In brief, it accounts for the understanding of socio-historic 
presents as temporal fields with overlapping and co-continuing temporal 
horizons constituting the selectivity, significance, temporal location and 
orientation of events.
During the investigative activity the present shifts from one event to 
another that include shifts not only in the horizons of the present but also 
in those of the present of the past and the present of the future. Shifts in the 
present of the present include shifts in its horizons and correlatively call for 
the shifts in the horizons of the presents of past and future. Yet such a call is 
possible on the basis of the time reflex. The present temporal field, due to its 
time reflex, extends and overlaps with past and future temporal fields. What 
were still future possibilities and even impossibilities for the present of the 
past, may be realised in the present and even establish our future horizon 
of not yet realized possibilities and limiting impossibilities. (This appears in 
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various ways. In a legal domain of a social system, the constitution, written 
in the past, may be articulated at present for its possible reinterpretation 
as to what it might have meant in the past and what such reinterpretation 
might mean for future cases.) In all the cases the time reflex allows us to 
stay open within society and its limits and grasp such limits without leaving 
society or its temporal process.
If it is also the case that the current life world is interlaced by multiple 
scientific and technical discourses and practices, then they too must 
have meaning, and defy the modern claim that the world we encounter 
is meaningless. One cannot buy a cereal box without being exposed to 
multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, nutritional, caloric, etc. 
codes. All this also implicates productive, normative, and even legalistic 
interconnections as aspects of a life world. This is to say, the scientific 
and technical discourses and practices do not overlay some primordial 
life world, but comprise our understanding of the way our world and 
we are, live and relate. Our mass media are equally replete with reports 
of scientific “studies” and reports of inventions and progress, and even of 
protests against some scientific inventions and technical innovations – all 
being understood as aspects of our life world. No wonder, then, that our 
technologies are regarded equally as “objective” as trees and cucumbers. 
We already argued that the scientific practice translates into empirically 
constructed system through modes of praxis that gives us the common, 
everyday world of implements, nutrition, health systems, all of which are 
technical. There is an interpretation of the entire environment as accessible 
to technical management. In this sense, there is a pre-understanding that 
allows a given population to regard science as “value free” i.e. that all the 
things of our modern environment are “facts”. 
Signitive Life World
There are theoretical notions that something is either given as a fact or 
a proposition that is derived from a number of facts – a general proposition. 
Assuming that the move from facts to general propositions is even possible, 
such a move will not account for our disregard of the meaning of general 
propositions and their use in a context of formal demonstrations. This is to 
say that general propositions will turn out to be inadequate to demonstrate 
formal conditions. Hence, there is no connection between generalisation 
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and formalisation. Formal operations employ rules that need not respect 
the truth or falsity of general propositions. In this sense, formalisation is 
a signitive process that correlates to rules such as addition, subtraction, 
multiplication, and division in arithmetic; or rules of implication, inference, 
deduction in logic, which do not reflect anything that is available in 
generalised propositions. Thus we can operate by excluding both empirical 
facts and general propositions derived from them, and construct in turn 
empirical facts based on formal requirements. In brief, we can formulate 
mathematical rules and use any empirical fact to instantiate such rules. 
Moreover, using such rules, we can transform empirical facts by our practical 
activities in a way that the facts will be directly constructed on the basis of 
the formal rules. This is one level at which material technology arises. 
Technology, at this level, is in principle a transformation of the 
environmental factors into signitive life world. This suggests that the very 
factual objectivity, transformed in this way, is a system of formal signitive 
relationships. Given that the modern conception of the environment 
is regarded to be the sum of material parts that are qualitatively and 
essentially indifferent, then such materiality can be used as a condition for 
any possible reconstruction on the grounds of formal systems. This state 
of affairs implies that our technical life world is more basically a system of 
signitive interconnections. In principle the formal systems already have a 
subtext: they themselves are technologies of reconstruction of the material 
environment. Thus despite scientific claims to be based on empirical facts, 
the practice of science that assumes the objectivity of formal systems as a 
condition for doing science is a process of application that treats the formal 
sciences as techniques requiring the reconstruction of the environment, in 
ways that the formal techniques imply. 
While we granted the technical side of formal systems, which has 
been also granted by the modern sciences, we have not yet shown the 
connections between these formal systems and the material facts. Science 
takes this connection for granted without explicating how formal systems 
that science uses and the facts from which the formal systems cannot be 
derived are connected. One constantly talks about applying sciences to 
reality in order to test whether the application is warranted or not. In a 
superficial way, this is known as testing of hypotheses. Obviously, testing 
the hypothesis does not simply mean opening your eyes and looking, 
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but using highly sophisticated technical means. The latter are already 
constructed on the basis of formal requirements as a mediation between the 
so-called physical material world and the logic of science. In this sense, the 
very testing of hypothesis presupposes the background of formal systems 
that are imbedded in material techniques. Regardless how far we extend 
the notion of scientific testing, we should have to include the technological 
background as a condition both for the testing of hypotheses and as a 
scientific praxis that must translate every formal requirement into material 
conditions. Perhaps to our surprise, although it may not be at all surprising, 
there emerge phenomena that are self-generating and are beyond anyone’s 
control: 1) formal systems that have no cause and no empirical base and 
disregard any empirical generalisation, and, therefore, can be used at will; 
2) the empirical environment reduced to indifferent material substance that 
does not imply any qualitative differences; 3) any qualitative generalisations 
do not imply the formal systems; and 4) the view of the formal systems as 
hypotheses to be tested in the factual world implies that the factual world 
will have to be drawn into the signitive process of the formal systems. But 
as we said before this is technology – the formal systems are reified into 
sundry instrumentalities which, as mentioned above, compose the modern 
Western life world or, at least, intertwine with such world.
This logic of “self-generating” formal systems that get directly trans-
lated into material implements implies that even the material facts are co-
extensive with the signitive domain of formal constructions. The latter, 
having no empirical ground and, therefore, not being caused by any psycho-
logical, social, evolutionary, or metaphysical components, may be regarded 
as a self-constituted and, thus, autonomous processes. After all, what is 
causally explained will have to have one to one correlation: given a specific 
cause, a specific effect will follow. But in signitive processes a specific formal 
condition will imply its consequences irrespective of causal requirements. 
This is to say that varying causal conditions will not correspond to the 
variation of formal conditions, and conversely. Formal-signitive implications 
are not of the same order as causal connections. 
The transformation of materiality into signitive conditions implies 
that the social environment is a life world structure, consisting of a system 
of multiple implications. To speak in a limited traditional sense, all social 
factual phenomena are not merely factual, but already signitive. In this 
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sense, the world we live in is social, historical, scientific, and technical world 
of multiple signitive vectors, all comprising a modern life world. At this 
juncture, we no longer have to be worried about the mind-body problem 
where signification is somehow subjective, and what is not signitive is 
objective. The very practice of science has abolished this dichotomy, 
despite scientific metaphysics. Our argument so far grants that signification 
as meaning and/or sense making is already available at the formal level 
that is understood by anyone engaged in scientific venture and engaged 
in applying this venture to environmental material conditions. Once those 
conditions are “realised” and, therefore, science is “verified”, we acquire a 
construct that purports to be explanatory and self-explanatory. 
The reason for this self-explanation is the valuation which is in a 
background that grants certain formal systems the practical value to 
transform the environment in favour of the so-called “human needs”. Once 
again, what is theoretically at issue is that human needs as empirical, be 
they psychological, sociological, nutritional, or economic, do not imply 
formal-signitive systems. Therefore, the latter will have to be constructed 
and selected as values to correspond to those needs. We must note that the 
selection of the formal systems as valuable to fulfil the needs has no direct 
connection with such needs. The latter are psychological, biological, social, 
economic, while the former are signitive. In other words, one is premised 
on empirical generalisations as various needs, the other is formal systems 
that must be connected to such needs by way of technical implementation. 
Therefore, the selection of the formal systems that would be relevant will 
have a criterion that has to be translated into formal systems. This means that 
the criterion will be some valuative principle that will facilitate the decision 
as to which formal system will be adequate to apply for the fulfilment of 
which needs. In this sense, there is again a way of saying that the formal 
systems have to become techniques to fulfil the criteria of empirical needs. 
Yet the process is still more complex: the needs themselves are also selected 
in terms of their significance in a given life world, and hence are not a 
mere observation and generalisation of empirical phenomena. In principle 
formal systems as signitive open a field for valuation to the extent that 
they can fulfil the desires that are equally articulated in terms of socially, 
psychologically, and economically signified needs. In other words, the very 
needs are significant by social and not by empirical definition. Not every 
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psychological wish, biological drive will be regarded as socially significant. 
In this sense only the significant needs will be granted value. What emerges 
here is a question of multiple valuations. What kind of valuations there 
are, and what kind of formal systems must be constituted to translate the 
material environment in order to fulfil the valuation of needs depends on 
the complex intersignification of the given life world. 
The signitive logics that pervade the life world, with the latter’s 
valuative selectivities, is also at the background of cybernetic revolution. 
This is to say, while the cybernetic revolution brought in computer science, 
it has at the same time included as a background of the self-generating 
process of formal systems that are translated and reified into the technical 
environment. The computerised logic as formal has no regard to anything 
that is environmentally, qualitatively differentiated. Its own logic does not 
need to respect the so-called “natural-qualitative” differentiations. Any 
living, working, suffering being in this logic of indifference that transcends 
such a being, can regard all events in terms of mutually replaceable 
variants. Social, economic, pedagogical, cultic, cultural givens are, in this 
logic, equivalences in normative exchanges. Whether something is labour 
power, art work, mysticism must subject itself to the requirements of 
formal rules of quantification. The latter, the quantification, must become 
the information to be transmitted globally. While previously tele-visual 
globalization was available and this globalization depended on valuative 
selectivity of large media organisations, the computerised globalization 
offers any arbitrary access to any selectivity. This means that rhetorical 
propositions as translatable into practices will be equivalent to other 
propositions. No external judgment is possible apart from an appeal to 
other computerised information whose credibility is simply the appearance 
in the global network. Computerisation opens up a domain of any space and 
any time accessed without history, without places and without times. It is 
a synchronic instrument premised on signification that is everywhere and 
yet not localisable. The age of the computer is a world of signification where 
there is no place and time and, conversely, where all places and all times 
are equivalently accessible. Our task is therefore to explore the domain of 
all places and all times. But before entering this domain, it is advisable to 
present another dimension of modern globalization which, in many cases, is 
seen as purely “objective” and value free. It is like saying that if we introduce 
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a technical means, the latter is simply a mechanical fact the use of which 
depends on a given community. The problem with such a claim should be 
obvious. The mechanism, such as a tractor, is built because of its value for 
agricultural production. Hence, its introduction in another region of the 
world, brings with it the value factor and adds another value: the tractor will 
enhance local “development” assuming the value of development and thus 
of bringing the local community closer to “world history”. Thus, let us note 
what is at issue with fact and value in the modern west.
To understand more adequately the issue of value, we cannot rely 
on the initial modern notion that reality has no value and that value is a 
subjective imposition on an indifferent world of facts. The various major 
critiques of enlightenment, from Adorno through Heidegger, Habermas, 
Derrida, Levinas, to Deleuze fall within the parameters of one or another 
variant of this modern division, whether it is expressed as rationalism, 
psychologism, sociologism, economism, and even biologism. Valuations 
that are available, such as utilitarianism, deontologism, and voluntarism are 
equally variants of the modern West, accepted by its critics. Hence the brief 
task is to extricate the modern life world from such variants at its very limit 
in order to reveal its essence. The first is the well-known dualism of subject 
and object, the former is mind, the latter is matter, allowing the talk of values 
and value free facts. The subject is the unconditional source of all theories 
and values while the material world is an irrational and valueless sum of 
homogeneous matter to be constructed in terms of the subject’s theories 
and values. Second, the subject is unconditionally autonomous source of 
all laws in both social and material realms. Since there is no other criterion 
concerning the material and social worlds, then all subjects are equal 
concerning the way that the material and social worlds are to be constructed. 
Third, construction is unconditional to the extent that no causes can be 
assigned to the structures and procedures by which the subject interprets 
and shapes itself, social relationships, and the material environment. In 
the language of the modern West, all are projections of human autonomy. 
Various terms have been used for projection: objectification, alienation, 
humanisation, and even self-realisation. 
It is important to note that the term “projection” is basic to political 
and scientific enlightenments. Political enlightenment posits the subject 
as an autonomous centre of the public domain and all public rules and 
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appointments of governing entities. Moreover, the public domain of 
autonomous subjects is strictly distinguished from the private-social domain 
of needs, wants, desires and their fulfilment. If the latter entered the public 
domain, it would abolish autonomy and equality. Scientific enlightenment 
posits the subject as a rational bearer of theoretical and methodological 
constructs by which to manage the material environment in terms of 
projected human “needs”. The latter are to be understood either biologically 
or psychologically and thus can be satisfied by scientific invention of 
“techniques” of fulfilment leading, to what is known, the reduction of 
scientific reason to instrumentality. The principle of “construction” inherent 
in the modern West, is the tacit basis of all post-modern and deconstructive 
“theories”, extending the notion of constructivism to encompass all other 
cultures as equally constructed. In brief, such theories are another aspect of 
western globalization Fourth, invention of history and its progress toward 
a utopian society; the latter assumed various interpretations, yet common 
to all is the notion that humans can construct a material and psychological 
setting wherein all previous ills would be abolished. It is obvious that this 
utopian notion, as “the aim and end of history” is a mixture of political 
and scientific enlightenments. Fifth, the reason that this mixture had to be 
posited as a future aim is that political and scientific enlightenments became 
incompatible; the scientific enlightenment, and its promise to fulfil material 
and psychological wants, had to abolish the interpretation of human life 
as autonomous, unconditional and self-creative. The first requirement and 
interpretation of human life became material and psychological sum of 
wants and their immediate gratification. As we know, current reading of 
life and experience is regarded as a multiplicity of intensive pleasure nodes, 
each clamouring to be tickled, gratified, in order that new pleasure nodes 
could pop up for more gratification. Utilitarianism is the general ethical 
position wherein all things and humans have a value to the extent that they 
produce pleasure. Second requirement is the massive technology and its 
progress, designed for the constant fulfilment and constant invention of 
needs. The conjunction of these factors results in the abolition of historical 
aim and its replacement by progress for the sake of progress. This is obvious 
from the essence of instrumental rationality. 
A brief mention of Lithuanian leap into the arms of the modern West 
appears at the level of hoped fulfilment of all sorts of “needs” previously not 
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even imagined as possibilities. This valuative ethos of expanding gratification 
has become a point of contention, framing Lithuanian debate between 
freedom and equality. The notion of autonomy, the view of the subject as 
self-creative had to be postponed and forever deferred, and also regarded as 
scientifically irrelevant and contradictory. It is impossible to claim that once 
the material and psychological conditions are fully established, then they 
will cause the human subject to be autonomous. As we know at the outset, 
autonomy cannot be caused. As just noted, this is equally problematic due to 
progress that can never reach any end and hence establish all the necessary 
conditions for emergence of autonomy. Every new condition, as a result of 
instrumental reason, becomes means for new conditions and new needs, 
and the latter split up into more novel needs. In this sense it is impossible to 
fulfil all human needs and then establish autonomy. Seventh, we are left with 
a democracy whose principle of human autonomy and the public domain 
wherein such autonomy is maintained and exercised is no longer available. 
It has been completely pervaded by instrumental rationality and the 
proliferation of needs and their fulfilment. Hence, the members of a political 
and democratic community are reduced to material life, psychological 
titillations, and chemical prolongation of boredom. 
It is now possible to turn to the essence of the life world of the 
modern West is a process of valuation. Everything in the universe assumes 
a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that 
the world has no value, the world constructed by the modern West is 
full of values: labour theory of value values for sale, values produced and 
to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of education, family 
values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, the changing 
and the new values, value of life and even calculated death, social values 
and persons are judged as to their value in all of these settings. Indeed, 
the basic mode of awareness is valuative selectivity. It should be clear also 
that awareness and perception are no longer given in some pure empirical 
sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is 
given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. 
What is perceived depends on its specific value. Indeed, there are social 
mechanisms that not only consist of values, but evaluation of values that 
select specific ones deemed relevant in terms of future value projects. It 
has been argued that all these values are human and hence the primacy 
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is placed on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would 
hold if the human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other 
categories and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer 
the case, since other values, such as technologies of various sorts, from 
electronic media to genetic biochemistry compel the understanding of the 
human to be equivalent to the rest of the values. This means that genetic 
biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but will have 
to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus the environment, 
that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed 
to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally objectively in 
terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the 
human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such 
constructed technical values could be applied and thus useful and valuable. 
We are now in a position to extricate the fundamental intentionality 
that constitutes this life world in its essence. To have some sense of this 
intentionality it is necessary to explicate the directly lived awareness that 
could not be posited as an object by the thinkers of the modern West. It 
ought to be understood that such a lived awareness is transcendental 
and hence accessible only reflectively from the meant objects that such a 
lived awareness intends. What then are these objects? While the process 
of valuation of events in favour of human “needs” was briefly indicated, 
i.e. various reductionisms of the human to biochemistry, genetics, 
and mechanics, the lived awareness subtending this process intends 
an objectivity which is unique to the modern West. One level of this 
objectivity is designed to be accessible to quantification and hence it has 
to be measurable homogeneous matter. This design, of course, is meant 
by a specific exclusion of the entire perceived world and hence in no wise 
accessible to experience. Yet covered by this homogeneous materiality as 
an intentional object is another intended objectivity: temporal possibility
The live awareness that intends such an objectivity is an empty will, 
prior to the question of its being free or determined. Phenomenologically 
speaking, there can be eternal possibilities, as Plato and Husserl have noted, 
but such possibilities have been already enacted theologically and in part 
metaphysically. The Modern West rejects eternal possibilities and is left 
with temporal, although in the first lived intentionality, empty temporal 
possibilities. It is to be noted that the term “temporal” does not suggest 
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“being in time”, but an open horizon without any specific ontological 
locus. Hence any temporal location would have to be established within 
such a horizon. If we attend to the language of the modern West up to 
date, we shall note that subtending the question of “reality” there is a prior 
discourse concerning the “conditions for the possibility of reality”. Such 
discourses are premised on the first lived intentionality of empty temporal 
possibility. It opens a horizon of possible intentions and their fulfilment, 
requiring a second constitution of objectivities: possible valuations of what 
the will intends as valuable for us, but recalling that at this level all value 
possibilities are open as temporal. In principle, it is possible for us to be all 
that we will as valuable in time. This is the alpha and omega of the modern 
West: empty temporal possibility and its temporal fulfilment by all that we 
value as our mode of final being. Both Marxism and capitalism offer the 
same intentionality. The intentionality of fulfilment of possible valuations 
as temporal does not lead to perceptual awareness, since the latter, in 
its naturalistic mode, is quite limited and merely qualitative. Hence the 
fulfilment requires a constructive intentionality that can establish possible 
conditions for possible reality. One minor aspect for this establishment is 
the shift of reason to instrumental rationality whose task is to calculate 
what reality is valuable for us and then calculate the conditions how such 
reality shall be achieved. Values, in this sense, are calculations of possible 
results realised solely as material. To achieve any value, the human has to 
be reduced to a system of interests, needs, desires, power and all must act 
aggressively against others to fulfil such wants. Indeed, language itself is 
split into numerous technical discourses. 
The issue of temporal value possibilities is the driving force of the 
modern West at this level. Temporality is the pressure that demands a 
prolongation of our temporal existence. There is no other option; being 
temporal, we want to live as long as possible and hence the frantic rush for 
the latest technologies that promise to protract our lives. Such technologies 
have become equivalent to the value of life and death. The public domain is 
an arena for the struggle for life itself, and any means can be used, whether 
lying, killing, wars, all will do as well, as long as they promise to keep 
us safe, to insure our continuity at any price. All the changing technical 
inventions promote other inventions as values of life: we want to go on. 
The transcendental rule of the Modern West, at this level, is ceaseless progress 
100
LITHUANIA AND GLOBALIZATION
for the enhancement of the permanence of life. Thus the political shift to 
dramatic conservativism. The latter is a promise, by whatever means, to 
guarantee our security, safety, protection and continuity, as long as we 
surrender our freedoms to participate in the public domain and to engage 
in public dialogue. In other words, the public domain, as the condition 
for other democratic institutions, is no longer maintained, despite all the 
rhetoric about democracy and its “values”. We are closer to the Hobbesian 
world than to that of Locke and above all Kant. The intentionality of the 
modern West has worked itself out to reveal its truth two centuries later. 
Indeed, we are living this intentionality as an awareness of our life world in 
such a way that while speaking of democracy, rights, equality and freedoms, 
we intend such a world as a struggle for temporal and technical continuity. 
Thus all is valuable that enhances this continuity – and purely materially – 
of course in complex formations that can be adapted for human life. We 
shall expound on the “ethics” of such adaptation in the next chapter. 
The Meaning of Instrumental Progress
The ideology of science has been all along that there is a difference 
between value and fact, and that science is value free. We have argued 
that the required connection between logic and fact introduces a 
third component which at base is valuative. This is to say that the very 
understanding of application of logically framed theories or hypotheses 
introduces selectivity among various hypotheses and a selectivity what 
domains in the environment are relevant for application and hence techno-
logical reconstruction. The reconstruction is an activity premised on 
human purposes and resultantly on various levels of valuation interpreted 
in various ways, such as sociological, psychological, economic, ideological, 
and even mythological. Since scientifically speaking values do not belong 
to objectivity, then they are part of the world either of subjective or 
intersubjective proposals. We are not contending that such proposals are 
totally arbitrary, based on individualistic desires, but we are contending 
that even when they are interpreted socially, they still are primarily values. 
Even if we quantify values and claim to have gained objective data, we have 
not, therefore, abolished their value function. 
This leads us to the understanding of cyber rationality as purposive, 
value laden, and, therefore, premised on individual or social purposes. We 
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shall argue that the computer rationality consist of layers of value systems 
and in final analysis valuations that both promote autonomous selectivity 
and invention, and in turn place demands on individuals and groups. To 
engage in continuous proliferation of increasing efficiency and circular 
creativity requires that any logic that is translated into material implements 
becomes, in turn, the means to create more novel, encompassing, and 
efficient cyber logics. This is the subjecting process wherein one is compelled 
to constantly engage in research that is not designed only to discover new 
facts, but to invent new ways to establish logics that would become factually 
efficient. This is a magic circle. The more we constitute new logics that are 
translated into material implements, such ascyber systems, the more we 
are capable to use the same systems to open up new logics for their own 
material implementation. But the point of this magic circle is an increase in 
possibilities of valuative selectivity. The latest cyber machines can perform 
calculations that previous logics were incapable of performing. In this sense, 
the very latest machines can instruct us about the possibilities of new logics. 
There is an available dogma that cybernetic science is objective and has 
no need for any values; after all, anyone can learn the latest computer programs 
and the required use of this technology. No doubt. Whether in China or 
Guatemala, the cyber mechanisms will be regarded as means to process and 
transmit information. Thus, the view is that computers are purely technical 
and indifferent means, usable by anyone, and therefore its only value is what 
particular groups or individuals want to give them. It is like saying that 
there are trees and whatever people want to make of them will give those 
tress their value. But this is a wrong analogy, because the computer systems 
are themselves information, and indeed selected information. First, the 
imbedded information is a particular logic of the computer (the software); 
second, its specific material design (the hardware); third, its economic 
system of values and the modes of production; and finally, the options that 
it suggests. In this sense, the objectivity of the computer embodies various 
levels of valuations. Those who acquire the latest machinery do not acquire 
means of processing and transmitting messages but also the messages of 
computer logic, embodiment, economy, and basically an entire life world 
and its social systems. Moreover, the logic of the programs is designed to 
process information in specific ways. While the user is told that he or she is 
free to access information, the information is mediated by the logic of the 
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program, the economy of affordability by specific group, in a specific part 
of the world, and its purposive rationality that would dictate the programs 
and the messages that the given population will access. In brief, the objective 
claim that computer rationality is merely a means for anyone dealing with 
messages is too restrictive to what computer logic is all about.
The point of our concern is this: first, the objectivity of computer logic 
is selective; second, the selectivity is imbedded in the production of the 
software; third, the software is restrictive to the extent that it prescribes 
and, we suggest, interprets the messages to be received; fourth, it constructs 
socio-economic parameters for the usability and affordability of this so-
called value free instrument; fifth, the logic of the latest software demands 
the reproduction of hardware, leading to a constant rush for the latest 
technology. Otherwise the latest software will be in the hands only of 
those who can afford the latest hardware. In this sense, vast populations 
of the world may be able to afford the outdated hardware, and those so-
called objective systems are split into the populations that can match the 
latest hardware with the latest software, and those who depend on the 
outdated hardware, and therefore cannot engage in receiving, producing, 
or processing the messages provided by the latest software. This is the 
paradox: as we have mentioned before, one requires a constant subjection 
to the efficiency and reconstruction both of the logics and the hardware 
that imply socio-economic valuation and the capacity, therefore, to acquire 
what would become, or for some has become, the latest.
The implication is obvious: vast populations of the world would be 
called upon equally to engage in valuation. Do we want the latest hardware 
to match the latest software? Or, do we want to protect the environment, 
to educate next generations, to afford decent housing or medical care? It is 
the case that all things cannot be accomplished at once, and to buy latest 
hardware may have to be postponed in favour of other human purposes 
and, therefore, to forego the receiving of messages that are deemed to be 
objectively accessible for everyone. We are suggesting that the introduction 
of the computerised systems around the globe is not an innocent presence 
of means to acquire information, but valuational requirements of peoples 
and their governments to deal with what is of greater value in a given 
society. In short, we are not rejecting the computer logic and its objectivity, 
yet we wish to show that it belongs in various value contexts. At the centre 
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of this valuative complexity, there is also the understanding that currently 
the valuations are computer mediated. They are systems of significations 
that are accessible to anyone and anywhere. Valuation here is part of the 
global selectivity, and the question is what type of value significations are 
currently prevailing?
While discussing time reflections in terms of horizons of possibilities, 
their calculations and reflections of possibilities within possibilities, we 
disclosed another level of meaning – temporal. This is to say that time (and 
space) wherein we locate empirical events is accessible only as a signitive 
framework of sense making to which everyone has access. Moreover, 
temporal possibilities turn out to be dramatically meaningful, since the 
technical (bio-technical, chemical, genetic, dietary) fulfilment means the 
prolonging of our lives, improving health, and even reversing the process 
of aging – being rejuvenated. Perhaps this is the basic reason that progress 
cannot cease: we want to live eternally – not in some other world but in 
this world. At this temporal-meaningful level, we find that the previously 
mentioned progress for the sake of progress, becomes instrumental. Given 
this shift of progress, it becomes clear that technologies are not only novel 
facts, laden with values, but also signitive in a different sense than discussed 
so far. Each technology bears a meaning prior to its being experienced as an 
implement. The researcher, dealing with some bio-chemical components, 
sees not only such components but primarily what they mean for future 
health, longevity, genetic engineering, for intelligence of future generations, 
and even excising certain human traits, such as “crime”, abolishing some 
currently incurable disease. Although at one level, technical functions can 
be regarded as mechanical, to be fixed when broken, but at the signitive 
level they mean temporal possibilities to be fulfilled by the novel inventions. 
To confirm this level of globalised logic, all one needs to recognise is 
the way biological research is discussed. Dealing with genetics, one literally 
calls the discovered genome in terms of alphabet. Thus, the genome is 
written in an alphabet of four letters – i.e. in human language which can be 
traced in DNA sequences. The real revelation appears in current research 
that promises to make it possible to edit genetic information quickly and 
cheaply. It is instructive that the research is not couched in the discovery of 
things as they are, but what they mean as a horizon of future possibilities 
which mediate the discoveries toward rearranging the “alphabet” in order 
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to improve its functioning. Thus, the research material is crisscrossed by 
signitive vectors as to what is to be done with the alphabetised materials. 
While the language of the “experts” might be mystical, their modern 
discourses are understandable. Thus there are bacteria can now make 
components that recognise viruses and can target them for destruction and 
prevent infections. Having this procedure at ones disposal, bio-engineers 
can make such bacteria that can target any sequence of genes stored in DNA, 
leading to a replacement of a defective gene with a new one. The process is 
regarded mechanically, where a defective part is found and replaced by a 
new part. If one were to use this biological technology in cells that make up 
sperm and eggs, the changes made would become inherited by subsequent 
generations. In short, we are entering a domain of “germ-line” editing, 
which is coextensive with the modern technical multi-discursive practices: 
if we can define it, we can make it. The attendant rhetoric is “world making” 
wherein any invention becomes part of our life world and thus changes 
this world. While popular rhetoric could be excused, since it is coextensive 
with all sorts of wondrous promises by political hacks, but this rhetoric has 
entered philosophy which speaks of “world making”.
Going back to “eternal life” in this world, appears with the indication 
of the possibilities, such as curing genetically appearing “diseases” or 
defects, and rearranging the alphabet in ways that such defects would 
never occur again. And more to the point, the research heralds the distant 
prospects of parents building their children to order, i.e. selecting child’s 
gender, intelligence, hair and eye colour, height, never failing vision and 
hearing, and emotional tonality. If consumerism continues, one could 
go “baby shopping” to a genetics outlet and order the desired product. 
To reach this stage, the rhetoric of progress is invoked. But the temporal 
reflections are also involved, since reflecting from the more remote future 
of baby shopping, such a future reflects other possibilities, such as enhanced 
chemistry, novel research facilities, such that these novelties reflect the 
technical work at present. It might seem that all this is “natural”, unless one 
notes the “unnatural” language. In nature, there are no defects or diseases. 
If a specific gene functions differently, then it is natural for it to function the 
way it does. To assign to it a meaning of “defective” is a way of saying that it 
must be changed to have a “value” in terms of its meaning as being possibly 
what we want it to be. 
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And what we want is the promise of improved lives not only 
qualitatively, but above all quantitatively in terms of modern temporal 
measure – longevity. One prevalent aspect of quality is “things made easy,’ 
less effort, struggle, more leisure time “to enjoy” life, improved diet, lesser 
impairments and greater security at old age, and access to the latest health 
technologies to keep everyone young. Of course, economic “success” counts 
as one of the prerequisites, but no longer a guarantee of “happiness”. These 
measures for western globalization provide a reflective contrast between 
the past “progress” and future “revolutions” with respect to longevity. In 
less than one century, more years were added to life expectancy than all 
previous thousands of years of human development combined. Indeed, the 
societies with extended individual lives appeared so suddenly that cultures, 
as a symbolic fabric that holds societies together are lacking behind. While 
this is a preeminent phenomenon in the West, it will be more visible with 
respect to cultures such as Lithuanian which, in its traditional sense, placed 
no emphasis on longevity, and during Soviet occupation, could not demand 
to be treated through technology, even including nutritional technology, 
to enhance the chances for longer life. Add to that other technologies, 
such as electricity, allowing for safe keeping of food; pasteurisation, water 
purification, disposal of waste diminished the spread of communicative 
diseases, and vaccination programs diminished premature deaths. While 
there was no genetic change for 10.00 years, the capacity of human organs 
improved dramatically. All these gains are at the macro level, even if they are 
results of technically enhanced life world. Indeed, the production machinery 
made our labours easier, all the way to the contemporary inventions of 
“The Internet of Things”. They are household devices to relieve humans 
from a variety of “labours”, from driving cars to cooking meals. They are 
“smart” devices that respond to sensory input without human commands. 
Example: the refrigerator can “read” the contents inside it, make a shopping 
list, and order right produce. Of course, the side effects of this “easier life” 
are also evident: obesity. Even this lack of activity and self-control is now 
regarded as a disease to be cured by new bio-engineering. While the already 
globalised world is rushing headlong into novelties, it fails to protect itself 
from its own inventions. The smart cars, for example, can be hacked and 
controlled by unknown intruders; the home gadgets can become an access 
to bedrooms and food dispensers, and the security devices can be hacked 
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to enter homes. This is a warning for those, such as Lithuanians, about the 
negative prospects of the rush to enter “world history”.
The leap in time reflexivity, with its projection of possibilities within 
possibilities, leads to two mutually intertwined promises of longevity. 
First reflection from the future is the articulation of aging at the cellular 
and even genetic levels. Efforts are well underway to examine the various 
mechanisms of aging in order to slow it down stop it, or reverse it. The 
technical rhetoric is shifting from aging as inevitable decline of most 
functions, to aging as a disease that can and must be cured. The metaphors 
used are the likening of heart disease, liver problems, cancer, diabetes, to 
being seventy years old. The latter is just another condition to be treated 
by latest bio-engineering. No need to go into technical details, since our 
discussion aims at principles that play transforming roles of ourselves and 
our life world. After all, the varieties of research into the prevention of 
aging presume the same possibility: prevention and “curing”. The second 
guarantee of longevity is “cure aging” before it begins. And this is the 
genetic engineering that will code the genetic alphabet to dispense with 
aging cells before they accumulate. Only the young cells will remain and 
keep a person young – at least postpone the aging into a longer future. As 
“scientific journalism” tells us, the baby born today in the West can expect 
to live up to 142 years. These excursions into the logic of globalization and 
its constant progress that promises virtual eternity, is relevant to Lithuania 
as it struggles to make sense of its position in the new life world.
Even if the linear cosmos is transgressed, the modern prejudgments 
remain: the world is a sum of discrete factors that can be analysed and 
rearranged at will. The rearrangements must be monitored carefully with 
respect to the possible negative side-affects – so prevalent in advertisements 
of latest “cures” of all sorts of illnesses and disease. But even these negative 
results are calculated as if they consisted of sums of discrete chemical 
or biological parts. Obviously, the researchers are not interested in the 
ontological questions as to the nature of such parts – they rely on the way 
that their arrangement works such that their rearrangement is equally 
tested for the way the latter works. This means that the rearrangement of 
genetic “letters” will result in higher intelligence, without understanding 
how a leap is made from genes to the presumed intelligence. Perhaps the 
latter will be tested quantitatively by requiring answers to specifically 
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proposed questions. At issue would be a question how the new quality – 
intelligence – is derived from the singular genetic parts which have no such 
characteristics as intelligence. Yet, when combined, they suddenly pop up 
with a qualitative characteristic not possessed by the discrete parts and thus 
form the mysterious thesis of “emergent properties”. Such philosophical 
issues are significant to the ways that Lithuania is making a qualitative leap 
into globalization not realising that it might be exposed to the loss of what 
is qualitatively unique about Lithuanian culture.
The technical device, whatever it might be, does not appear as technical 
until it becomes misfunctional; otherwise it “disappears” in favour of its 
signitive aspects. The technological invention “joins” the life world and 
becomes coextensive with its system of interconnected meanings and is 
regarded by the makers of technology and the public as a “fact”, forgetting 
that it is, more basically, a horizon of temporal possibilities, selected for its 
value in terms of its preeminent meaning for life. Of late there is much talk 
about “virtual reality”, preceded by claims that all awareness and all images 
are simulacra. The post-modern crowd jumped for joy also proclaiming 
the discovery of virtual reality. They are too late because such a reality is 
the construct of the entire modern West with its progress that signifies 
never ending inventions which mediate our encounter of one another and 
nature – fully knowing that the latter, as it is experienced, is not reality; 
reality is the constructed, shaped, fabricated and constantly transformed 
“matter”. But even the latter is mediated by the “presence” of future options 
for its reconstruction along novel and “improved” implements, such that 
the latter comprise an increased virtuality of our life world. We shall 
extend the notion of virtuality in the context of Lithuania and its shift to 
globalization. It is no secret that young intellectuals and academicians are 
enthralled by post-modern rhetoric and “virtual reality” constructs as 
surpassing modernity.
Meanwhile, the much lauded globalising process of cybernetic 
revolution is based on our ability to communicate irrespective of place 
and time on the globe, because we are not attuned to the instrument as 
a material entity, but to it as a bearer of meaning; indeed we know or 
understand what we and the others mean. This suggests that dealing with 
the computer technology we are presented with immediate access to the 
entire world, not because of our capacity to be empirically everywhere, but 
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because of the technical capacity to make present signitively constituted 
events no matter how far or near in the so-called measurable real space and 
time. It must be made clear that the modern life world, being globalised, is 
signitive, forming indefinite meaning interconnections, accessible anytime 
and anywhere. This ought not to suggest that signification is something 
eternal given beyond space and time; rather it is contingent to the extent that 
sense making systems are embodied in and maintained through the various 
technical means as carriers of such systems. When we speak of systems, we 
are in the same domain as logical or mathematical systems, assumed as given 
by any modern science. In this sense, when someone reads the computer 
messages, that someone does not question the presence of such messages, 
despite the empirical fact that those messages originated ten thousand 
miles away. One reads significations as temporally and spatially indifferent. 
In brief, prior to the question of where and when, there is an awareness 
what the message means and what sense does it make. Cyber space and 
time do not mean some “miraculous” world; rather it is the modern life 
world of realisation of embodied significations, with their indefinitely open 
horizons of possibilities. Yet it is also clear, that the notions of cyber space 
and time are metaphors which deviate from what was the ground of the 
linear construct of time, and the deployment of material components next 
to the other in a presumed homogeneous space. This is relevant at least at 
the level of production of novelties.
If the metaphors of modern construction of space and time will not 
do, then another ways must be offered to understand the global life world 
of signitive awareness. Mass media is replete with reports of events around 
the globe that are local and yet globally present through most varied means, 
each lending support or at least acknowledgment of such events. The so-
called Arab Spring depended on instant communication and attraction of 
peoples globally, such that an event in one location signified similar events 
in other locations> Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, etc. all interconnected 
signitively with the meaning “revolution”. Other examples are equally 
available. This suggests that the signitive connections are not sequential, 
but integrative in a sense that they are co-present “atemporally” and 
“aperspectively”. We are aware of such events not only from our temporal 
point, but from other temporal points simultaneously, just as we are aware 
from our spatial perspective with the perspectives of others. At the outset, 
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we have left the fragmented modern temporal sequence and discrete points 
of space of modern cosmos. The logic of integration has very little to do 
with the forming a global unity; to the contrary, integration constitutes 
a field of differences in such a way that an understanding of a meaning 
demands the presence of different meanings. The simple term “high” means 
only because it is different from the term “low” and conversely. This logic of 
“difference” is as old as philosophy, but today it has become preeminent in 
dealing with cultures, to the extent that a recognition of globalization and 
its results is required to understand the difference between globalization 
and Lithuanian cultural identity.
In our argument, we note that the reading of a message is prior to 
and pervades the empirical means that transmit the message. Computer, as 
technological means, is in modern space and time, but it is designed to carry 
the presence of significations that have no specific space-time positions. 
This would be analogous to the construction of the non-Euclidean space. 
The latter has no empirically given intuitive component. It is a pure system 
of formal constructs that does not point to any material, mental, or other 
“realistic factors”. Yet non-Euclidean geometry is regarded as an important 
way of articulating (if not actually constructing) other dimensions capable 
of transforming life world environment. This kind of non-positional 
objectivity is a condition for computerised communication to the extent 
that it does not require either the senders or the receivers of messages 
to have the same mental-physical experience. As we suggested above, 
there is a variation between the empirical and the signitive such that it is 
possible to have different empirical factors making the same sense and one 
empirical factor having diverse senses. Since the major level of computer 
signification is logic, then there is a constructive connection between this 
logic and various life world facts, and in turn such facts can be articulated 
and reconstructed by different computer logics. 
Given the cyber technologies as bearers of non-positional logics, and 
given that they can be proliferated by other appropriate technologies, then 
in principle it is possible to select and to transmit the sense of any event as 
if it were immediately present to anyone. What is at issue is the process of 
selectivity that is not implied by the constructed logics and by the empirical 
events such logics frame. Here we encounter the question of selectivity 
as valuation. Among numerous events signified in a life world, some are 
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regarded as important and valuable. At this level, valuation does not have 
any rules that could be derived from either domain, the formal-logical or 
the technically constructed events of the life world. What is required by our 
analysis are the value conditions that connect signification and such events. 
We have reached the previously mentioned requirement of connecting 
logic with fact, mathematics with data, and sense making with events. Since 
the systems of signification are made at will, they themselves do not imply 
which of them are relevant to the social, economic, pedagogical, cultural 
aspects of a life world. Resultantly, the very constitution of signitive systems 
requires a value criteria which would say: 1) what formal systems among all 
possibilities should be applied to what aspects and events; and, 2) the criteria 
for the constitution of specific formal systems must be part of a society, 
a political society, political economy, political economical ideology, that 
would provide a clue concerning what is relevant among possible formal 
systems. In fact, we would argue that the very construction of computer 
technology based on logical signification is a technology that embodies 
valuation. This is to say, we elect to build this instead of other technology. 
This is simply to remind us that technology embodies valuative conditions 
and therefore it cannot be regarded as a mere empirical fact. Lithuania must 
also involve value selectivities of what is meaningful.
What is appropriate to the theme of space and time is that the technical 
means that embody the formal logic and its valuative subtext can be 
produced and set up anywhere and anytime around the world. Yet it is to 
be noted that such a set up carries with it the social-cultural, economic, 
and signitive life world. Thus, first world imports and transfers of the 
latest technologies to the third world in order to help “develop” the local 
populations, to make them aware of the rest of the world, in brief in order 
for them to be signitively accessible and accessing events no matter where 
and when. This globalising transference of technology brings with it non-
positional space-time to all who can afford the technological means. We 
must remind ourselves that those very global means are not mere empirical 
data or facts, but carry with them valuative conditions and a signitive 
lofe world that is inserted into a local world. . For the modern Western 
understanding, values are deemed to be subjective, in contrast to the 
objectivity of the empirical, and as we have argued, to the logical-signitive 
domain. Yet the very selectivity of certain logics over others, and of their 
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connection to the events is valuative. Exporting cyber technologies also 
includes the export of values imbedded in technologies.
With regard to Lithuania, the cyber life world brings a great variety of 
means, from smart phones, through birth control to biological engineering – 
and all value laden in terms of their utility. But Lithuania, at one level, was, 
and continues to be, a colony of Middle Eastern symbolic design with its 
life world composed of values and signitive connections. Thus, certain 
technologies and their open availability would clash with Middle Eastern 
symbolic designs, ad do so absolutely. There are complaints that by joining 
European Union, Lithuania is forced to accept values incompatible and 
unacceptable to “Lithuanian tradition”, i.e. Catholicism. This is not just the 
controversy over homosexual rights, but reproductive rights of women, 
chemistry for birth control, technical means to change one’s gender, and 
educational programs. The strife is between two universal claims, one 
symbolic that is structured by value selectivity, the other secular, with the 
promise of longevity and pleasant, easy access to ever improved means 
of satisfaction. This is an indication of the global ethic that is a part of 
selectivity of what is relevant or significant from the future horizon. There 
is no need to enter the grand philosophical debates concerning the ultimate 
good, true and beautiful. Such debates have long since been discarded in 
favour of a modern quest for “happiness” as pleasure.
So far so good. But a question remains: why the rush for the newest 
computer logics, newest and fastest materialisation of such logics, and the very 
transformation of the materials into previously unheard of combinations: 
chips, conductive systems, miniaturisations, and massification that lead to 
increasing compacting of functions? Certainly not for the sake of scientific 
discovery of “objectivity”, since the interests and valuations do not aim at 
objectivity but at its transformation. The more plausible conclusion is this: 
the entire process of metaphysical signitive constructions that are directly 
shifted to application and productivity, imply – strange as it may seem – 
signitive power. To understand the latter, we want to argue against the 
notion of causal power of classical tradition: all events in nature have their 
specific causes. Yet for modern understanding, signification, comprising at 
one level logical and quantitative interconnections, has no causal power. 
The logical connection “If P then Q” (if it rains then the ground will be wet) 
cannot cause rain, since it is an empty formulation that can be applied to 
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anything. Yet what modern understanding of constructing of logic implies 
is this: if we want rain, what logico-mathematical formulations must we 
invent and how such an invention can signify the production of the material 
conditions for rain. In this sense, valuation implies a selection of logics 
that are materially signitive and hence are “empowered” to transform the 
environment. Signitive power, in this sense, becomes the metaphysically 
preeminent regard toward the world. It appears in socio-economic currency 
as “power of ideas”, or “clash of views”, or “progress comes from ideas”, or “we 
need people with creative ideas”, etc. In the classical regard, creative ideas 
belonged to poetry, theatre, and rhetoric, but currently, they are the very 
power to elicit transformation of the environment, including the human as 
an aspect of the environment (e.g. genetic reconstruction of the human). 
Indeed, the battle for signitive power has intensified to such an extent that 
even some main stream journals are talking about “who owns your ideas?” 
In short, signification has to be adjudicated socio-economically and even 
legally. (Mann, 1998) Once again, one is no longer concerned with “pure 
metaphysics”, but with metaphysics as power.
Here our argument becomes quite obvious; computer systems are 
embodied metaphysics of signification and hence have the power to 
increase the complexity and efficiency both of signitive creations and also of 
their applications for transformation of the so-called physical environment. 
Thus the talk of the new generation of “more powerful computers” is not 
an idle speculation, but must be taken literally. As signitive constructs, they 
are in the position to rearticulate and, through application, to transform 
events in a given life world, and, in many cases, to rearticulate the life world 
itself. Indeed, they are part of the events that they transform to the extent 
that they are interconnected laterally with all other events, from economic, 
through political to cultural. They are the very fabric of current “culture of 
information”, and information is in principle signification.
The very formulation of logic as purposive and applicable implies that 
this logic is the basis of power. What we are suggesting is that the ground 
of various current theories, advocating the primacy of discursive power, 
are premised on the notion of application. Discourse as discourse would 
have no power unless its significations not only define but also prescribe 
the rules of transformation of events in a life world. What is at issue here 
is the radical arbitrariness and contingency of the notion of logic. While 
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initially logic was regarded as the bearer of necessary rules, capable of 
deciphering the rational structure of nature, now it is seen as a construct 
that follows unfounded purposes. In this sense, there can be many logics 
wherein each is designed to perform a task and hence to be the source 
of power. As we mention above, the age of information, or what some 
people call post-industrial society, is totally premised on transmission, 
appropriation, creation, and combination of signitive processes. Even the 
traditional notion of capitalism as producing and selling of material values 
has become redundant. What the material values embody is a level of 
information that is more important than the material value. In this sense, 
the information imbedded in computer logic is more valuable than the 
material production of the computer. This value is of course extended to 
all social domains. As Boudillard has pointed out, the social positioning 
of persons is not economical, but signitive (Boudrillard, 1981). People buy 
signs of importance, even if such signs are simulacra. I am not rich, but I 
post signs of wealth. This phenomenon of signitive importance is paraded 
in the mass media when people of the so-called third world exhibit their 
computer knowledge and indeed a possession of the latest hardware, despite 
the fact that the primary needs such as shelter, clothing and food are quite 
inadequate. In short, we are up to date, and therefore we are significant.
The computer logic is at the same time the logic of contemporary 
political economy and social self-understanding. In principle, the instru-
men ta lisation of logic on the basis of valuative requirements is also 
instrumentalisation of all signitive domains that are deemed to be of value 
because of the power that signification opens. Computers are coextensive 
with the fabric of the globalising processes that are engaged in transmission 
of information about and through everything. It is of note that even the 
previously exempt areas of imaginatory signification, such as film and video 
production, have now become a prerogative of computer information. This 
is to say, there is a digital translation of material products such as tapes 
into pure signitive processes that can be access through computer logic 
everywhere, anytime, without any need to transport things materially. All 
one needs is a logic to deal with any materiality, and therefore, translate any 
materiality into signitive power.
What appears here as a conclusion of the Western modern modernity 
with its metaphysics and ontology is, at one level, a reversal of explanation: 
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the usual ploy was that we can explain everything materially, in terms of 
cause and effect. But our argument had already suggested that the primacy 
should be placed on the metaphysical side. In this sense, at another level, 
the current digitalization of signification and proliferation of information 
systems reveals that modern science and technology are basically meta-
physical, that is signitive. To speak with historical hermeneutics, we can 
claim that the truth of modern sciences as metaphysical, appears in the 
globalised computer logic under the guide of the age of information. In 
other words, the truth of a particular position, even if not recognised by 
those who proposed this position may appear centuries later. Our argu-
ment can be supported by the following consideration: the transportation 
of material things that may depend on cause and effect is being replaced by 
processes that defy any kind of space time continuum. The metaphysical 
signitive processes are non-temporal and non-spacial since their meaning 
is transmitted directly. Yet this process is also immediately translated into 
materialisation and realisation of how to change material events in any part 
of the world, and therefore, to acquire material power. Not to be comical, 
nonetheless, we would suggest that this is Plato gone mad. At any rate, our 
argument that modernity consist of specific metaphysics and its correlate 
ontology is borne out by the current phenomena of signitive logics at all 
levels, although centred in the computer logic, that have become global 
preoccupation of peoples who had never heard about western political and 
scientific enlightenments.
Postscript
While current literatures are still talking about economic and material 
interests, psychological securities and insecurities, and desires of populations 
to become part of modern history, we contend that these designations are 
surface appearances of the Western modernisation with is metaphysical 
and ontological grounds that have been unrecognised so far. While we are 
not the first ones to suggest that formal and mathematical processes are 
involved in articulating the world, our claim is that there has not been a 
recognition that the formal-quantitative procedures are at base metaphysical 
and therefore free from the constrains of space and time, and that they 
have assumed priority over the material. We contend that the conditions 
for the possibility of globalization are not economic, psychological, even 
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ideological, but signitive. The reason for this claim is that before a particular 
people in global economy will acquire the economic conditions to better 
their lives they have been already informed signitively of what is the better 
life. And the better life is the possession of modern technology, specifically 
information technology such as computers and their logic, and above all 
the value preferences imbedded in this logic. This logic, in turn, is the end 
of temporality, end of history; it is all encompassing logic that can transmit 
its values to any village with promises of the production of anything that 
the logic signifies in global economy. Of course, the villages would be able 
to access the information once they have accepted the latest computer--to 
access this information. The latter is laden with value offers, specifically with 
images of the “good life” that will require the materialisation of this signitive 
power. We see the images, then we buy into the global economy to materialise 
those images in the forms of beauty, sun glasses, jeans, Kellogg’s cereal, and 
sundry overproduced and overpriced cheap commodities. Computer is the 
metaphysical logic that has the power to accomplish this task. Of course, 
we shall not make a judgment whether this accomplishment destroys or 
saves the multiple ways people have lived or want to continue to live. This 
is to say, will they be absorbed into the metaphysics of transformation of 
their environments in order to join the global nexus? Or will they be able 
to maintain by virtue of the mass means provided by the acquisition of 
computers and their logic to maintain their own difference? This subtends 
the entire discussion of multiculturism, environmental protection, and even 
the rights of peoples to self-determination.
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The story of the demise of the Soviet Union and the preeminent role 
played by Lithuania in its demise is loud and clear. Equally, the transition 
from the Soviet life world to the European life world has been articulated. 
What is missing in this transition is the difference between the Soviet empire 
and Western globalization. In the first chapter the discussion focused on 
various tendencies to expand the symbolic designs of a particular dogma by 
power or deviousness, offered as some sort of benefit for indigenous groups. 
This level of empire building is global and involves military excursions and 
clashes, and a struggle for acquiring converts in each other’s territory, but no 
other benefits. Lithuania found itself in this context twice. First, the Middle 
Eastern symbolic invasion in one of its variants – Catholicism (which had to 
compete with the appearance of another variant – Protestantism) the benefits 
of which were rhetorical. The pagan life world was recoded in terms of the 
Middle Eastern texts. Actions became moral or immoral, couched in the 
language of sin and forgiveness; class hierarchy was established with highest 
authority coming from another land, although exercised by “legitimate” 
clan of shamans. The fruits of human labour became a gift from a supreme 
patriarch, such that the people were his children. Meanwhile, there is the 
representative of this ultimate patriarch, and he is called “holy father” 
and his lesser functionaries equally called “father”. While this symbolic 
design colonised the Lithuanian population, it did not add anything novel 
for understanding nature and the way that the population regarded its 
environment. Life still moved in season, even under a different rhetorical 
images such that the rebirth of nature in spring became a ritual of a sacrifice 
and the rising of a Rabbi from the dead, and the annual season at the end 
of a cycle, celebrated with a tree to signify the coming of the green spring, 
was replaced by the birth of Middle Eastern fable of a child; no new crops, 
no “divinely” enhanced and improved children came to populate the region. 
The transformation is ritualistic with an introduction of external autocracy.
Meanwhile, the emergence of another symbolic design which, in fact 
did not deviate from the first one, was brought in from Russia – a patriarchy 
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that reflects the absolute consciousness of historical materialism. The 
arguments in the first chapter demonstrate that “materialism” is not an 
expression of some given reality, but a modern acceptance of an ontology 
for the sake of mastering of the environment. Thus, it is already a position 
that cannot be taken as absolute and must be regarded as hypothetical, 
specifically in light of the fact that it cannot account for the many layers of 
signitive connections of any life world. Indeed, it could not account for the 
absoluteness of such consciousness, since the latter must also be a result 
of specifically devised material conditions, such that with the change of 
the latter, this “historical materialism” would have to change. In addition, 
the arguments in the second chapter indicate that not all traditions are 
historical, and that the history of materialism is of a very narrow scope: 
modern subject. With these remarks, we can return to this symbolic design 
of “materialism” and note that after the Russian change of the heads of the 
empire, nothing else has changed  – except an increase in mass murder. 
All the nations that were conquered by Russian empire were incorporated 
into Soviet empire  – not for some grand improvement or progress, but 
for maintaining the same patriarchy of a Czar; he is the head of state and 
the legitimate representative of divine plan – of course now in the guise of 
materialism. Occupied territories were reorganised under feudal agrarian 
system wherein the masses would be strictly controlled and monitored. The 
same secret police, invented to maintain the Czar’s power, continued to 
maintain the new Czar’s power. 
Before the complete reincorporation of Lithuania into the Russian 
empire after World War II, the country was beginning to prosper and gain 
a modicum of creative independence  – and that despite the tendencies 
of Lithuanian elected officials, such as a president, to be autocratic – and 
establish thriving agriculture and commerce with the West. Had Lithuania 
retained its new independence, it would have grown with the rest of the West; 
but the empire extinguished what progress had been made and returned 
the nation to traditional Russian serfdom  – dramatically unproductive, 
backward looking and constructed to serve the needs of the less productive 
Russia. The latter, with its vast natural resources, fertile lands, could not even 
feed itself, not to speak of extending any productive and above all, technical 
capacity across the globe. In brief, Russia was not engaged in globalization 
and prevented any vassal nation under its rule to become part of the modern 
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global venture. Of course, there was the Potemkin sites of advertisement, 
such as Olympics, sending Bolshoi ballet to bring culture to the “sister” 
republics, and, above all, show its military gear. The rest – a drab life, long 
lines for daily staples, and crammed living spaces. After all, the “working 
class” has rejected the luxuries of the bourgeois. Who needs such luxuries as 
bread when potatoes will do – provided the serfs produced enough of them. 
It can be said that the reach of Russian empire by military and missionary 
means, was an extension of power without any significant addition to the 
lives of other nations. Russian country side was a residuum of 18th century, 
as became the case with Lithuanian agriculture when it was pushed back 
into serfdom (under the guise of collective production.) After Lithuanian 
winning of independence, the visitors from abroad were astounded that 
the level of innovation, present in simple food stores – even in major urban 
centres – has sunk below the pre-war level: calculation of customer purchase 
charges were done by abacus. Some visitors even suggested that this was the 
Russian way to demonstrate Russian authenticity. To be blunt, any significant 
novelty in technology that would serve the population was minus zero, 
although some propaganda innovations, such as Sputnik, were produced. 
Certainly the population was not globalised in the sense of seeing the rest 
of the world, either by traveling or at least through mass media. The world 
of patriarchy in which “father knows best”, could not allow the children 
to be corrupted by decadence, even when the patriarchs and their retinue 
could “suffer” the luxuries of the decadent West. Brezhnev enjoyed a fleet 
of sports cars just for the sake of looking at them. Meanwhile, mass media 
was extolling the great achievements of the Russian empire (for rhetorical 
purposes renamed “The Soviet Union”), and the good news of the collapse of 
the “Western imperialism”, which kept collapsing but never fell down. 
A note concerning the claim that the Russian mass media during Soviet 
period, engaged in manipulation of public opinion, to the point of telling lies, 
presenting false data, and thus leading the public astray. This claim cannot 
hold for the following reasons. The Czar (head of the party during Soviet 
period), and the hierarchy of officials did not have to justify themselves, 
since there was no public which could play a critical role in questioning 
mass media statements. In brief, the patriarchs could say anything without 
fear of being contradicted. Manipulation of public opinion requires an 
open public domain in which an independent investigation could show 
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that the autocrats lie, and thus attempt to manipulate public opinion. That 
was not the case in Soviet times; no contestation was possible and checking 
of the media reports were not permitted. Those who dared raise a voice of 
concern, were immediately silenced. Manipulation makes sense only in a 
political society where a reflective domain is given: I can see otherwise on 
the basis of other information. Of course, reflection was available to the 
autocratic elite and its hierarchy of functionaries. The latter had to collect 
the data from all areas of productivity such that the latter had to correspond 
or surpass the five year plan. Hence, if a functionary submitted a report 
to a regional committee, and the report was not up to the five year plan, 
he was asked to “correct” the report such that at the final accounting the 
five year plan was surpassed by 10. 20, even 30 percent. This is to say, the 
functionaries and the elite were in a position to reflect what is there from 
a postulated plan “what must be there” and the latter was paraded in mass 
media as a fact. Perhaps “the people” suspected that not all is at it seems. 
Five years plan has been fulfilled and with surplus, but the lines for bread 
and potatoes are stretching around the block. 
Another aspect of mass media pronouncements had to be counter-
productive. If the West is so impoverished, if the people there are hungry 
and live on the streets, while the rich enjoy all the luxuries, then, first, why 
not let us see those places and tell the people how good we have and, second, 
why do the elites slip up once a while and proclaim that “we shall catch up 
to the West and even surpass it”. Such rhetoric suggested that the West has 
become the dreamland: America. Even Russians, who came to Lithuania 
as visitors or were allowed to come on vacation, were awed: Lithuania has 
bread and meat, and vegetables and milk, and cheese – it is like America. 
Even under the conditions of serfdom, Lithuanians survived better and 
even fully supported the major Russian city Leningrad. Lithuanians had 
no question that they could do immensely better if the system would 
vanish. Moreover, while many intellectuals had to survive by adhering to 
the rhetoric of the empire, they were also cognisant of western literatures, 
philosophies, important intellectuals in the west and were ready for a 
radical change. As one colleague stated: “We were tired of being afraid”. 
Sąjūdis, “the movement”, was organised by thinking persons and not the 
technically trained functionaries. Philosophers, writers, artists, historians 




While still present in numerous forms and institutions, all that was 
part of the Russian/Soviet Empire, suddenly became the past, to be left 
and hopefully forgotten. All the safety, protection, familiarity of that life 
world ceased to have any meaning. This is not to say that vast numbers of 
Lithuanians suddenly acquired a new consciousness and became Western. 
Apart from what the Soviet press, education, culture told them about the 
West, their understanding came from rumours and stories. Yet in principle, 
the shedding of the past had to be absolute – revolutionary. Above, there 
was a brief discussion that the term “revolution” does not define changes 
of heads of empires; one autocrat is cast out, shot, hanged, poisoned, and 
is replaced by another who continues the traditional power policies. Young 
Catherine gets her husband Peter snuffed out and becomes acclaimed the 
ruler of Russia. Lenin deposes the Czar, and later Stalin deposes Lenin – 
in short, a traditional practice continues. For the population the only 
difference is the name of the autocrat occupying the throne and, some hope 
that the latest might be more lenient than the previous autocrat: Lenin had 
only 10 million killed, while Stalin was more “severe” and was successful of 
killing not only millions more, but also got rid permanently of his closest 
and more remote associates. In this context Lithuania was revolutionary, 
since it did not depose, shot, hanged, or poisoned the autocrat in Moscow, 
but formed a political society where the final arbiter in all public affairs 
would have to be the population, with no “leader” with power. 
In this chapter we shall examine what sort of technological 
globalization is sweeping across Central Europe and what sort of means 
the national/ethnic groups are promoting to counter globalization and the 
creation of nomadic civilization. Some even go so far as to enlist diaspora 
and promote “ethnic pride” abroad, while others argue that those who have 
left for “better life” abroad, should no longer be admitted to claim their 
national birth right. While such debates are significant, it is also significant 
to understand what sort of power and attraction globalization offers that 
cannot be easily escaped. This is specifically problematic in the absence of 
any clear philosophy – if there is still a philosophy – capable of articulating 
fundamental principles not only of globalization, but also of what in essence 
is Europe and, within its parameters, what are the ethnic groups that must 
preserve their uniqueness as an enrichment of diversity and hence Europe 
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and humanity. After all, Lithuania is boasting that its culture is the main 
preserver of an ancient, Indo European and even Aryan tradition in its 
language, matriarchal customs, and attunement to nature. Whether this 
is true or not is left in the hands of scholars. For our purposes, the very 
notion that Lithuania has a distinct culture raises a question whether it can 
be preserved in the flood of globalization.
In principle, Lithuania is leaving a long tradition behind, discarding 
all of its familiar rhetoric and submission to arbitrary edicts, and standing 
alone, stripped of all ritualistic garb, its built in psychological factors, and 
simply pointing to a totally unfamiliar future. This is a revolution for “here 
we stand” at the inception of a new life world whose principles and contours 
we have to create by ourselves. It is a point of terror: what to do, how to live, 
whence and whither is our destiny, what or who await us: the shocking 
answer is equally strange. You decide and what you decide will be your 
responsibility without an appeal to authority, to prescriptions, not even 
to some standard of who you are. Even the latter has to be surrendered, 
because what up to know you knew of yourself belongs to the past. In face 
of this “terror” you will have to decide who you are. And yet, Lithuanians 
stood alone as if to say: here we stand and cannot do otherwise. 
Meanwhile, an appeal to Lithuanian culture, as a stabilising cushion, 
was precluded by the lack of cultural information. The education in the 
empire had a curriculum where history was designed to suit Russian 
interests and the primacy of Russia in the entire Soviet Union. Russian 
language was a requirement, all great achievements throughout history 
were assigned to Russia, Lithuanian tradition literatures – apart from those 
that were favourable to Russia – were not available and if available, only to 
select and trusted persons who were charged with writing reports, showing 
the erroneous ways of such literatures. This meant that even Lithuanian 
culture was part of the future, to be either discovered or invented. It will 
be interesting to discuss some issues concerning the difference between 
discovery and invention, since the modern thinkers and their postmodern 
followers, take for granted that cultural dimensions are invented and that 
even the study of the past is an invention. Good examples are hermeneutics 
and deconstruction. For the former, any text is an interpretation and the 
language in which we live as an interpretation, cannot be surpassed: we live 
in that language. Any attempt to reclaim the real past as a culture, would be 
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an interpretation of an interpretation. Deconstruction makes a fundamental 
claim that there are no texts which could be regarded as belonging to a 
culture, and therefore there is no way to appeal to one’s past culture that 
could be reclaimed and utilised for countries emerging from the Soviet 
Empire – even that Empire is questionable as to its identity. In this sense, 
the newly independent Lithuania is destined to invent itself as a unique 
culture – most likely from various vectors of diverse traditions, above all of 
the future which is pervaded by Europe and finally by globalization.
It is noteworthy that Russia also took a step toward the future and 
globalization. Initially it recognised the independence of the Baltic States 
and established mutual relationships. But this shift toward the future could 
not be maintained and Russia returned to its past and autocratic tradition, 
attended, of course, by all efforts to re-establish a traditional empire. 
The mythology that it espouses is one of a difference between “Atlantic” 
civilization with universal human rights, freedoms, responsibilities and 
a rule of law, and “Eurasian Civilization” where autocracy and military 
rule is the basis of social order. This means that by using any means, an 
autocratic ruler emerges, sanctioned by Middle Eastern tradition in the 
form of the Orthodox theocracy, representing a will of divinity. Here we 
have the traditional syndrome of “divine right of kings” with a resultant 
arbitrary activity by the ruler and the proclamation that any opposition 
or questioning of such an arrangement is anti-Russian. While mentioning 
that Lithuania is facing an intersection of many cultural vectors, one of 
them is an acceptance of Russian autocracy – return to the past. Here the 
tension between past and future is clearly demarcated. As we shall see, such 
a demarcation creates a dual consciousness not only for the post-Soviet 
countries, but also globally, providing a broader comparative context. 
At this point, a specific conception of the world of time is divided into 
closed past and open future. This conception subtends or underlies Western 
modern globalization: anything in the past can no longer be changed and 
therefore to return to it would mean to return to something changeless 
and thus conservative, while the escape from it would require an open and 
undetermined future projected by the will as an amorphous horizon, and 
subsequently limited by social temporal reflective mediations. This is the 
confrontation between any given tradition as a determined history and its 
rejection in favour of constructed and undetermined future. It is of note that 
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the modern Western globalization is characterised by the shift of temporal 
awareness from the rejection of the “irrelevant” past to possibilising future. 
The Western globalization is premised on an implicit construction of time 
awareness that leads to the rejection of anything that is permanent or with 
set limits. Indeed, this tension includes theological concerns, still having a 
presence in Lithuania.
This is where a contrasting morphology appears that usually remains 
if not hidden, at least unexpressed: the very way that the modern human 
thinks first appears not as its own thinking and understanding, but as 
something cosmic and encompassing – traditional theology. For the latter, 
the world is a result of a divine will which creates the world from its own 
thoughts. The same could be said of the modern Western human who 
posits his own reflection as more fundamental than the logos of nature: 
the primacy of reflective thought is first attributed to a thought of a cosmic 
being and only subsequently is there an admittance of the thought that turns 
back upon itself as human. Thus the discovery by modernity of the ego that 
thinks its own thoughts, and knowledge as identical to power, is a discovery 
of a composition that was already invented and, so to speak, waiting in 
the wings to be recognised and appropriated. The structure of the priority 
of reflective thought and the power of the creative will was accomplished 
before the human would accept and recognise this structure as his own. 
The priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought as the 
creative power also permits the priority of will as that which can choose 
what sort of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, with its own 
logos, has to be subsumed under a power that is in principle capable of 
dominating and altering nature and in principle making nature contingent. 
This is to say, the necessity shifts to the will and its creative power 
leaving nature exposed to arbitrary rule. Indeed, for all modern Western 
understanding, without an imposition of an order by the will nature would 
be without reason and form, without value and goodness. The composition 
here permits a direct translation into the domain where thought and 
will can have a direct influence and control; by now it is well known that 
practical-technical transformation of the environment is the sole interest 
of modern philosophies, sciences, and moralities. Knowledge and will are 
taken to be prior and transcendent to nature and hence capable of imposing 
an order on an otherwise irrational material nature. What comes along with 
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this structure from the cosmic assumption of the absolute power and its 
creation of nature is the shift of power toward thought and will over nature. 
Thought and will, logic and valuation become the necessary conditions for 
the being of the world for man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, 
blind phenomena.
This composition has an unavoidable consequence for theology. First, 
while accepting the world as a result of a cosmic will,, it must also regard 
the things of the world as having limits determined by some divinity. 
Hence, such limits cannot be transgressed or violated by human beings. 
Yet to allow human will priority over the created nature, some modern.
theologians had to proclaim the remoteness of the divinity to such a degree 
that it becomes completely other and inaccessible. One could make a 
good case that it is no accident that by the nineteenth century claims were 
advanced that either the divinity is dead or it is so transcendent that for 
us it is completely incomprehensible: we neither know what it thinks, nor 
what it wants, hence we are left to ourselves to shift the best way we know 
how, i.e. to do anything we like with our environment and world, since no 
theological appeal can offer us any valid guidance. Any theological appeal 
could count as another wilful effort by the human to establish another order 
for the sake of power – and plausibly so. After all, the appeals that are made 
by theologians rest on the will of a divinity. It means that we are too late to 
appeal for any other criteria apart from those we ourselves invent and either 
impose on others through material power or submit ourselves to the very 
inventions we posit as objective. It will not do to argue, as do the Marxists, 
that the reason for the elevation of the divinity to unreachable heights is an 
ideological ploy by the ruling class, capable of keeping the lower classes in 
fear of the “unknown” and infinite power. Such an argument presumes that 
only some select elite can see through the facade of the ruling class, while 
the population is subsumed under its spell. If it is a facade that dominates 
a particular age, then no one can escape its spell, since there is no recourse, 
no vantage point from which to regard such a facade. But if someone can 
escape such a domination, then it would seem that the very system offers 
some recourse from which anyone can survey the system and be capable to 
be a wilful master of it. This is to say, the latter option suggests a reflexive 
domain capable of surveying the determinant factors of any system. But 
this is modernity open to all. 
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In this context, the leap of Lithuania into the global life world can begin 
to make sense, specifically with respect to what phenomena began to flood 
the “empty shelves” of discarded Soviet system. The first popular level is 
the universal proclamation that “we are free” and freedom was interpreted 
in its diffused form as “we can do whatever we want to”. If an anecdote 
can help, then the author of this text can offer one from experience. While 
visiting Nida, where the most fabulous dunes are found, dotted with shrubs 
to hold the sand from sliding, and with marked paths for visitors, I saw two 
groups of school children, each with a teacher in charge, slide down the 
dunes, then climb back by holding onto the shrubs and pulling them out 
with the roots; they also had all sorts of new western things, such as candy 
bars and Pepsi cans and were discarding the wrappers and empty cans in 
the dunes. Being somewhat concerned, I asked the teachers whether they 
should control the children and instruct them about proper behaviour in 
such an environment. The answer I received was unaccustomed even for an 
American: “we are now free and we can do whatever we like”. The question 
of responsibility was not even remotely present. The second dimension 
of the flood consisted of two aspects: all the novel things, coupled with 
advertisements promising a joyous life. Easy access to everything, and 
the “everything” flooded television images and all mass media means  – 
newspapers, journals, and empty walls. 
As if on cue, all sorts of “entrepreneurs” appeared who offered all sorts 
of services and were in competition with their rivals. This phenomenon 
is a combination of the former Soviet mass media depiction of the West 
and the conception of the new freedom. The former system depicted the 
West as “capitalist” where unrestricted and brutal competition ruled the 
day. One can do anything for profit, and create a society of “Wild West”. 
Thus, the new acquired freedom was coupled with the Soviet images of 
what this freedom means: acquisition of all the “good” things in life by 
any means, including eliminating the competition. Lithuanians can recall 
this flood as the times of “Mafia” period. Attending this period was the 
mania of “privatisation” in a unique form. The ruling elite, the ”immortals” 
of Soviet system, were suddenly “democratic” and kept their government 
positions, allowing them to privatise the properties that once belonged to 
the state. Meanwhile, being in the government they dispensed favours for 
new entrepreneurs for a price, leading to a continuing Soviet tradition of 
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“blat” or bribes. The emerging business became a predominant social force 
with direct access to elected public servants – also for a price. 
Meanwhile, the flood of material commodities and their novelties 
increased and is increasing to such an extent that the Lithuanian citizen not 
only wants more and more, but is led by the mass propaganda to “want” more. 
In brief, the attractively packaged tinsel not only offer what you want, but 
insists that “you must want” the “latest”, whatever the latest must be – and you 
must want it now. Coextensive with this flood, came the new styles of looking 
and behaving. The young ladies had to become western in dress as well as 
in body comportment. This is to say, the personal “look” became mediated 
and reflected from modelled attire, and the body look was copied from the 
advertisements which also guaranteed that the “look” is possible only with the 
latest chemical techniques: creams, powders, paint, hair curling technologies, 
and chemical codes in diet. The global bodies included specific mannerisms 
in walking – the way of swaying the hips, the protruding pelvis enhanced 
by extra high heels, the “chilly” look and frozen face expression – all to be 
practiced, technically enhanced by new exercises and implants. To be western 
did not mean just to accept the philosophical principles which form western 
life world, but more concretely, to “embody” the images, techniques, shapes, 
styles, that make one westerner. Thus the struggle for the latest technologies 
that promise a close approximation to the look of the West – i.e. a global look.
One could argue that the Russian/Soviet imposition of its symbolic 
design also required a specific mode of behaviour, a drab attire and a dour 
look. No doubt, the attire could not be stylish, because the “working class” 
does not need such irrelevant, useless, wasteful capitalist luxuries. Grey 
atmosphere, reflected in the clothing and one’s look, one’s heavy walk, sullen 
gaze, was part of the life world. “Individual” flair was not tolerated, since it 
might be an expression of one’s psychological “abnormality”, and the latter is 
part of the Russian life world where envy and jealousy ruled popular attitude. 
One could not be “better” than anyone else, and even the ruling elite looked 
grim and “serious”. Laughter and enjoyment do not belong in such a life 
world. But such features were part of the oppression and did not have to be 
imitated. After all, the artistic images, advertising the happy future and the 
forward look of statues, were a clear contrast to daily reality. Meanwhile, 
the flood of plenitude streaming from the West, plastered everywhere, was 
not only a promise of a future, but filled every shop window and pervaded 
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the new and glossy journals full of styles worn by glamorous models. The 
novelties were media that contrasted to the Russian tradition, and thus 
had to be put on and worn. This is evident in the ideological conception of 
who one is, and one is how one “wears a body”. Strange as this may sound, 
one’s body was an acquisition to be put on and exhibited, signifying that the 
wearer has become global and joined world history. 
Not to be one sided, the men had an equal share of imitation: they wore 
their new suits and jeans just as much as they suddenly sported a mobile 
telephone  – each talking loudly to show the public their arrival on the 
global scene. Add to these phenomena the arrival of westerners, many of 
whom were American Lithuanians of a World War Two refugee generation, 
bringing their American manners and demanding unheard of services, and 
the shift toward the West and globalization went viral. Moreover, the mass 
media, in the form of television and cinema, came with serials such as soap 
operas, loose morals, portraying public scandals, mocking high authorities, 
and images of children and young people having a “blast”, and above all new 
musical styles with gyrating and sexed bodies, and the wall is clear between 
past and future. But as noted, great numbers of Lithuanian population could 
not reorient themselves toward such a future and longed for the old days of 
“normal” life. The noises of the future were deafening and the “immorality” 
of the West, sweeping across the younger generations was shocking. By mid-
nineties the new venturers, called “mafia” were sporting black leather jackets 
and mobile phones, indicating their sudden wealth and significance, and 
the youngsters, whether boys or girls, were imitating them by buying plastic 
mobile toy phones and pretended to talk on such phones while walking down 
the street. These phenomena are not only part of the new Lithuania – they 
are global. To be clear about the presence of these phenomena everywhere, 
one must become cognisant of the “others” residing on other continents.
Let us shift briefly to entirely different civilizations – Asian – and note 
the “globalising logic” that is clearly distinct from colonial empire building 
for exploitation of “the other”. While western, this logic spreads in every 
direction across continents through standardised images and aspirations 
to catch up and join “human history”. To joint this history one has to look 
western, to imitate the images of numerous advertisements that present the 
standards and criteria for all facets of life. The advertisements are designed 
to make everyone think that success and beauty are brand names, with 
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distinctly white look. There are World Wide beauty hints as to how Clairol-
Markets Glamour can be had in any language. Such advertisements are 
products of India. Japanese do the same, where products must be “world 
branded” which must disregard national and cultural borders  – but with 
white models. After all, they are the trend setters and consumers in Asia 
must aspire to look like such models. To join the future one must “join 
the club”, smell, speak, dress and walk in style. The standardised success 
and beauty is a global image. For example, despite the magnetic beauty of 
Indian girls and young ladies, Indian advertisers of their product tend to 
use western models – movie stars or sports figures, and, if they will use an 
Indian girl, she will have to comb her hair in “latest” fashion from New York 
and bleach her skin to look whiter – with a look that says “she has joined 
human history”. Of course this is a great global advantage to Lithuanian 
girls, with golden hair and blue eyes, and above all with the embodied image 
of the latest model from Paris, New York, or Los Angeles. Any depiction of 
success and well-being is presented in western images as global. In India, 
the so-called “sultans of cyberspace” must regard themselves as global and 
to show their standardisation they must live in a designed Florida Paradise 
Village built outside of New Delhi. Their products and programs are equally 
global and have no regard for nationality. This is to say, they are not builders 
of empires based on symbolic designs, but participants in a global venture 
with offices on every continent. They are no different from the Silicon Valley 
“geeks” in California who have global reach. Indian, Chinese, American, 
European and Japanese – they have joined human history as progress which 
cannot be stopped. As a saying in India goes: “If you mount a tiger, you 
will not get off ”. Lithuania is no different; it too imports and exports global 
figures in the form of beauties, technical experts, and global – basically Afro-
American music. It is ironic that despite racism in American tradition, the 
only art form that is global comes from African slaves and their descendants. 
As comical as it looks, even Lithuanian “artists” attempt to be “rappers”. 
Lithuania as the Other
It would be helpful if a more precise logic of globalization were 
disclosed. The notion of the basic ontological status of the universe, as a 
sum of homogeneous parts, can and did result in the ability not only to 
treat everything as made of parts, but also to address any entity as amenable 
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to be treated in fragments, such that each part has a distinct function and 
can be changed, improved, modified, and connected to other parts. While 
this process requires the adherence to its principles of formal and material 
detachments, it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, 
both “natural” and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated 
world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-independent functions 
and “work”. What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon 
the manner in which the formal constructs divide the human “material:” 
the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, psychological, 
biological, etc. set of differentiated “behaviours”, each semi-independent 
of the others. It would be redundant to analyse the obvious: the “power” 
of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social functions 
and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of “expertise”. 
Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary 
connection with other spheres. Hence the results of “research” in a specific 
domain, can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each 
domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning which 
would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to 
say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces, can be selected at will, 
arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics for possible “application”. 
The lateral differentiation decentralises responsibility thus increasing the 
contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is increasingly unchained from 
any constraints. Every formal rule, and every material result made to fulfil 
a formal design, becomes totally arbitrary, offering possibilising formal 
and material combinations without end. Each domain is released from the 
concrete lived world implications, each an “expert” in its own sphere, need 
not relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as 
“conclusive” evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled 
material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, 
insofar as they make, and with the making they produce their “reality” and 
hence increment power and “prove” their momentary success.
It would be redundant to speak of “needs” since the latter are part and 
parcel of the possibilising procedures and become at the same time needs and 
fulfilment. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we wanted therefore we 
can make it. Thus the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness, 
as sources of power, comprises a self-referential domain. This means that 
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there are no restrictions for the “search for truth”. After all, such a search has 
lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even 
in social understanding, the relationship between the formal and material 
processes are determined by “science”, i.e. it’s very self-articulation and 
production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this 
process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of 
its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease 
making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons 
to stop the economic “growth”, no biological reasons to stop remoulding the 
living processes along new combinations through genetics, etc. Limitation 
would be regarded as an infringement on the “autonomy of research”. Any 
science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to 
be a science in the context depicted above. The same thing with needs, the 
more our technology invents and produces, the more we need what we have 
invented. In this sense, while economy might fund this process, the latter 
makes economy possible. In brief, we cannot stop progress.
At this juncture a debate that appears in social research and mass media 
must be addressed in order to avoid misunderstanding what Lithuania is 
acquiring with globalization. We have argued that the constantly “improved” 
latest technologies, including medicines, foods, foot wear, and of course, 
means of communications, from television through computers and “smart 
phones”, are embodiments of values and presumed needs. Yet there is a 
counter argument that these global implements are “neutral” and their use 
and value depends on humans who can “take them or leave them”, and thus 
depend on choices. It would be like telling a farmer where horses are no 
longer available and competition requires faster and larger production of 
grain, that a tractor is indifferent technology. The farmer’s life world, his 
activities are coextensive with this technology. After all, if we make any kind 
of an instrument that extends our abilities and/or conveniences, then such 
an instrument is a value laden signitive system within our life world. Again 
if people move to follow their herds, and thus leave the shelter of caves, they 
build shacks. To tell them that shacks are there as indifferent means makes no 
sense, since the shacks have become a set of signitive vectors where humans 
seek shelter and from where their life world is oriented and correlated. The 
same must be said of every invention, since the latter will abolish what went 
before. Once huts are built, caves become “obsolete” and once tractors are 
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introduced, the work horse becomes redundant. I would like to type this 
monograph on an old typewriter, but no one will accept it for publication 
because the means are very different which signify that my romantic wish 
to use an old typewriter no longer belongs to the contemporary publishing 
world. If I write a text, my writing is coextensive with the novel technologies, 
and even my older computer disks have become redundant. 
This state of affairs should not be regarded as some kind of metaphysical 
determinism, where one is forced to live on the basis of causes. This “causal” 
view is paraded by postmodern writers claiming that we are victims of our own 
inventions. The latter have become an independent “objective” environment 
that rules over human life as some sort of “cultural unconscious”. This is 
not a novel claim; from classical times every posited objectivity of some 
ultimate reality was also regarded as our invention. Classical notion was “if 
horses had gods, gods would look like horses”. Indeed, we define ourselves in 
terms of our own inventions, whether it is divinities in whose image we are 
made, or more recent inventions. Thus when we began to invent mechanical 
implements, we defined ourselves as mechanical beings, when humans 
invented communication through a system of wires, they defined themselves 
as a web of interconnected nerves, and when we invented computers, we 
became possessors of “hard wiring” and “soft programs”. All this points to 
our argument that technologies of whatever kind are not separate from our 
life world and we interact with them as an extension of who we are and 
what we can do. In this sense, our daily activities are intertwined with the 
functional meaning of our inventions.
The modern life world of high-tech is unavoidably “cultural” comprising 
the way we live globally. This means that creative innovations no longer 
belong to the artistic geniuses but are creating and recreating us as we 
constitute and trace their novel significations – as we become co-creators of 
novel meanings and thus extend the process of globalization. This process 
can be called “global/local” insofar as it can be constituted anywhere and 
anytime and in a flash become available globally. Such a process is very 
different from the colonising globalization of symbolic designs, still 
prevalent at a rhetorical level – equally around the globe. Thus there is the 
rhetoric of “free market” and even “capitalism”, or democratisation through 
global communication, where people can show the horrors of oppression 
for everyone to see, or even the rhetoric of empowering the impoverished 
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through latest technologies; but all such rhetoric means very little if the 
novelties and creative capacities are not present in the life world of the 
impoverished – the latter are equally a local/global phenomena, appearing in 
every continent, nation and tribe. Indeed, everyone can see these symbolic 
designs that claim to be the “best” solution of global problems at local levels, 
but the solutions come from a ready established global life world which 
surpasses nationalities, tribes, and civilizations. Once a group, no matter its 
size, joins the global logic, it becomes enculturated by it and its life world 
becomes resignified. One can just marvel at the rhetoric of a symbolic 
design paraded by European Union: A New Global Partnership: Eradicate 
Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development. 
What is uniquely modern about this symbolic design is its time reflexivity 
discussed in our last chapter. Thus we have calculations, addressing the 
“Global Impact by 2030” implying the technical approach which states that 
if we want to have the mentioned impact, then, reflecting from it, what 
significative and valuative dimensions must we build into present technical 
systems. In this setting, as a member of European Union, Lithuania retains 
its status as being the other – not yet quite globalised, and participates in 
the European Partnership which regards the world to be saved as the other. 
Once again, it should be emphasised, that the modern Western 
globalization is the global culture. The proliferation of cultural phenomena 
by new technologies, such as film, television, internet, bearing their new 
styles and music, new modes of creativity and behaviour, are not external 
to the modern life world, but coextensive with it. Technology, art, life 
styles, dress codes, even speech manners, vocalisation, phonetics become 
intertwined. All these domains are the media of global awareness that 
mediate other media, without disclosing any other dimensions. In short, 
when watching the media, one does not say “Did you see the images on 
television, of what is happening in Japan”? One simply says “Did you see 
what is happening in Japan”. The media disappear, and yet there is nothing 
but the media. This phenomenon is now being presented to the public 
globally in the form of “virtual reality” technology where one puts on a 
gadget in front of the eyes and lives in a world of images, but in such a way 
that the images are not mediating anything. They are the reality. While this 
is the “latest” creation, in principle it is a variation of the signitive world of 
human creation. 
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The outcome has been depicted in a form of the flood of novelties in 
Lithuania. Each novelty, whether a “beauty cream” or a diet, or exercise, or 
a mannerism in movement must be regarded as parts each of which can be 
“improved” by the “latest” means. Her sex appeal can be improved by breast 
implants, his virility can be improved by Viagra – and there is no end of 
improvements of all other parts. It is a unique logic requiring, on the one 
hand, homogenising of all inventions such that any technical product can 
have its parts replaced anywhere and at any time, and meanwhile, every part 
can be changed “for the better” which means more efficient, faster, more 
compact ,healthier, and even more attractive. We get scientific journalism 
that informs us how to live longer – recall that the entire senseless progress 
has found a purpose as means for longevity. The information is, nonetheless, 
modern and global: how to maintain your parts healthy: eyes, skin, muscles, 
bones, lungs, brain, ears, heart, kidneys, gut – and each addressed by different 
biochemically devised parts. As the technical disciplines get fragmented into 
even increasing proliferation of “specialists”, the latter fragment the human 
into an ever increasing parts, each to be treated by a “specialist”. 
At this level, we reach once again the principle on the basis of which the 
others of other parts of the world, who are cognisant of this globalising logic, 
such as Lithuanians, are to judge themselves whether they have established 
the conditions that would allow them to be free from all the blind material 
natural forces and be in a position not only to master such forces, but to 
create those forces in order to allow the human to use them for remaking 
himself to look modern, up to date, in fact be the latest. This is the subject as 
sui generis and the final reason for human history. In this sense, the efforts to 
deconstruct this kind of self-generating subject may fail because the subject 
at the outset does not have any identity. It promises the unconditional 
condition for everyone to acquire self-identity, to become any identity 
you choose. This way, the postmodern logic is premised on the modern 
autonomous subject. The postmodern logic in principle claims that all 
cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, natural, supernatural 
necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. This means that they still 
accept the self-creation of the modern subject that invents its own logic for 
mastery of its own world and for self-definition. The egological self-definition 
is only one among such options. The postmodern globalization assumes this 
universal self-generating subject that invents different cultures without any 
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natural, material, psychological conditions. After all, postmodernity claims 
that everything is a construct. The very notion of a construct is premised on 
modern autonomous unconditional subject. This subject is universalised as 
the possibility of identity for anyone. That is anyone can create of himself 
or herself whatever they want. To judge themselves, Lithuanians, as many 
others, have to live a double consciousness: their tradition, and what they 
must become, and what they must become is overwhelmingly present in 
advertisements, television image, careers, and happiness.
Autonomy, of which we shall speak extensively in the next chapter is the 
point of mediation of modern philosophers, suggesting that every formal and 
quantitative rule is constructed without any conditions, that is has no cause. 
In this sense, the material world subjected to those rules can be transformed 
without any question concerning the traditionally known categorical 
differences among experienced things. In fact, the formal and quantitative 
rules do not have within their own compositions any criteria for making 
such distinctions, thus they can be applied on everything indifferently. 
At the same time, the material world, the extended substance, must be 
regarded as homogenous and, therefore, constructible in accordance with 
the invented rules. What is at issue at this level is the choice of formal and 
quantitative rules over qualitative categorical distinctions. Since both are by 
modern definitions subjective, then there is no inherent criterion why one 
would be more objective than the other. We must look for an account within 
the very composition of those invented rules. First, it can be argued that it 
is impossible to gain any advantage over the environment on the grounds 
of categorical, qualitative distinctions. Second, it is also the case that formal 
and quantitative rules comprise within their own structures techniques 
for transforming the material environment. This way the choice of formal 
quantitative rules already implies the choice of instrumentality and the 
possibility for application. What we are pointing out is that modern science 
whose theories and methods are framed within formal and quantitative 
structures is in principle technical. This is the reason why any scientific 
discipline that cannot be technically tested is not regarded to be scientific. 
This seems to us to be also the ground for modern scientific power.
The globalising process that promises to improve everyone’s life and 
to bring liberation to all peoples from want and oppression is premised on 
claim to universality of this technical active intervention in the world. This 
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intervention at the same time requires that all peoples anywhere and anytime 
must also engage in reducing their environments to required material resources 
for technical transformation and exploitation. The term we used “liberation” 
was at times replaced by humanisation in a sense that we as natural beings in 
a natural environment are subjected to forces that are not under our control – 
they are alien and alienating, inhuman. Therefore once the environment 
and our own lives are subjected to the scientific methods and their way of 
transforming the environment and us, then we shall reach a human stage 
which liberates us from natural necessities. At this level, this universal claim 
provides a rationale for teleology and progress. The teleology proposes that 
there is a stage in which man will be a total master of the environment and 
himself and this then provides a standard on the basis on which others, those 
who have not yet join human history will have to judge their positions and 
lives as inferior. This is the logic that is offered by numerous organisations 
caught in theories of development. It seems that Lithuania is partially on the 
way to being part of this history – but only on the way. After all, as the “other” 
that entered globalization, it must play the game of never ending “catching up”, 
even if some citizens are equal in professional understanding to the “major” 
players. As pointed out above, such citizens become nomadic and leave 
Lithuania to serve global interests of the “advanced” and “developed” West.
Globalization is opening, standardising, and reshuffling cultures 
in ways that are mutually transformative and intertwining. Lithuanians 
practice yoga and Zen, applaud the global fame of their basketball players, 
and hire Afro Americans for Lithuanian teams. Global organisations are 
welcome and Lithuanian technical experts occupy important positions. 
Emphasis on technical training in Lithuanian institutions of higher 
learning produce globally qualified specialists who can work anywhere in 
the world – become nomadic. Perhaps this is one of the most significant 
results of globalization for Lithuania. While the costs of training highly 
qualified experts in many technical fields come from Lithuanian budget, the 
benefits are reaped by institutions and organisations that are global. As was 
just mentioned, exodus from Lithuania is severe, and most importantly, the 
exodus of technical talents which would contribute to Lithuanian economic 
“development” are lost. The loss is premised on the specific nature of the 
logic of globalization, expounded above. In brief, any technical discipline 
is, primarily an ability to treat everything as homogeneous matter (even 
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if it is a “living matter”) and thus to disregard all the perceived qualitative 
differences, including the signitive life worlds. The specialist can work 
anywhere in the world in which cultural differences have a local, but not 
a global meaning. The experts are in a position to work anywhere without 
commitments to cultural contexts, including the civic responsibilities of 
a particular place. The expert is a detached personality and thus even in 
his homeland, Lithuania, he is no longer concerned with public affairs – 
with an obvious excuse: “I am not expert in these affairs and thus need not 
participate”. Such a person is a detached nomad, relating to others who are 
equally detached and can work anywhere and be of any racial or national 
background which does not make any difference in the person’s expertise. 
He, and his like are nomadic, whether they are the Sultans of Cyberspace, 
the Geeks of Silicon Valley, the graduates from Technical University in 
Kaunas, the Japanese from Niigata University or a teenager hacking into 
global corporation’s records. One may have an “office” in London, but 
the office is equally global and can be accessed from any site. The newly 
trained technical experts in various fields in Lithuania have no qualms in 
seeking work around the globe where better laboratories, pay, and access 
to colleagues of the same field constitute a life world on the move. Why 
should one attend a Lithuanian opera in Chicago, when one is invited to 
a conference in Tokyo, focused on topics in his field? Collegiality is not 
national but global, and the relations transgress any national commitments. 
Experts gather anywhere and need not be concerned about civil duties and 
responsibilities, since nomads are transitory. 
The specificity of Lithuania is the sudden transformation: under the rule 
of Russian empire, one could hardly exhibit a pride in one’s ethnic identity 
without being accused of “nationalism” or worse – anti-Soviet sentiments 
and thus psychologically lagging behind historical progress. Meanwhile, 
before one could form a Lithuanian tradition and identity, one became 
Western and with open borders  – global. Thus, even a cursory glance at 
the proliferation of texts raising the question of cultural/national identity 
suggests an issue that has been elicited by globalization, associated with the 
modern western technological standardisation. Most severe resistance to 
such globalization and its Western secular philosophy, comes from all sorts 
of personality cults, specifically those of Middle East. There is even a two 
volume Encyclopaedia of Identity, replete with contributions on cultural, 
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ethnic, race, religious, etc. identities. So far, the question of national and/or 
ethnic identity was analysed in terms of globalization as a mode of creation 
of “technical” (even if changing) standards, be they computer systems, 
internet, medical, attire or the “look”. Various postmodern “thinkers” even 
suggest that despite multi-culturalism, there is a standardised Western 
culture both accepted and resisted by the “others”, to speak in extreme, 
although metaphorical terms, the tension between “Jihadisation” and 
“McDonalisation”.This tension is very much experienced in Central Europe, 
among the nationalities that either belonged to or were “satellites” of Russia/
Soviet Union. Having been liberated from the latter, they joined the West, with 
all of its “advanced” inventions and lifestyles. As some writers of that region 
suggest, the populations of this area found themselves “between a plough 
and a computer”. Having rushed into the “computer” world, they found that 
they have lost their national/ethnic identities: became Americanised or at 
least “standardised” by European Union. While this region will be used as an 
example, the same process is occurring globally, and examples can be found 
readily in China, India, and Middle East. In the last chapter we shall discuss 
a global confrontation between the modern western globalization and the 
efforts to fight against it by the very means provided by globalization: high 
technologies, internet, economics and sophisticated training  – although 
mediated by a “higher” purpose or calling.
Going under the terminology of “discursive practice”, educational 
institutions (and governments) are emphasising the creation of technical 
disciplines in order to advance national economies, health care, competition 
with others and national prestige. In Central Europe, the teaching of huma-
nities, and this includes national languages, cultures, histories, is pushed 
aside in favour of technical training in accordance with global standards. 
While this might seem trivial, yet national identities are premised on the 
understanding of local cultures and their difference from the globalised 
“culture”. If the latter becomes preeminent, then the former will vanish.By 
virtue of gaining technical set of skills, be they medical, computer, managerial, 
the members of a given nation/ethnicity become global and in their interests 
are more “at home” in the global community of professionals in their area 
of expertise than with the members of their traditional cultures. They attend 
international conferences, form associations and common projects, and 
are accepted everywhere. It is to be noted that the proliferation of technical 
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disciplines is without a limit. Chemistry, microchemistry, macro chemistry, 
biochemistry, genetic biochemistry, etc., all the way to the changing “latest” 
and “improved” medications. The very language of such communities is 
discipline specific and inaccessible to everyday discourses. 
The members, of the communities of specific technical fields seek better 
conditions to engage in their craft and either find positions or are invited by 
institutions to do research away from their native areas. They move from place 
to place where they are needed and thus settle – for a while – in a different 
nation and among different ethnic groups – meanwhile maintaining close ties 
to their community of technical peers. In this sense they become nomadic, 
without any national cultural allegiance or even political commitments. 
What is significant is that the members of these global-nomadic communities 
comprise a contemporary elite, separated and living apart from general 
populations. Being part of the global elite, they tend to promote technical 
programs at pedagogical institutions, thus creating an increasing gap between 
the elites and the populations. While all this may sound normal, the migration 
of technical elites to “better” institutions or research facilities, to better paying 
positions, depletes the local nations of the best means of developing their local 
“brain trust” and the building of expanded economies. For example, among 
the former Soviet Union members, the liberated Baltic States have joined the 
European Union with its open door policy that immediately began to deplete 
such states of the best talents. Lithuania alone, out of 3.7 mil. population, lost 
seven hundred thousand to emigration – not all are of the highest technical 
quality, but the best have become global nomads with high positions in every 
part of the world. 
Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only the 
process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the 
identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible for any 
culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of 
choice between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, 
or the right of a particular group to respect its own identity. The globalising 
universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by postmodernity 
in such a way that the others in their own self-reflection upon who they 
are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out their 
lives, between what they can be as universal individuals or what they 
can maintain as members of their culture. The autonomous self-creating 
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subject that is being globalised as universal has become a background 
on which the others, as culturally different would be inscribed with their 
own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual, unique, with 
a right to self-preservation. This self-preservation is a phenomenon that 
has no basis in any ontological, metaphysical, or theological claims since 
all these are equally unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they 
will have to be adjudicated in power confrontations each calling for the 
maintenance of its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. 
Nonetheless in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this 
self-creation syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning 
the criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, the modern 
West, on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot 
constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some of the 
intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, follow the same 
globalising logic of wilful destruction – and do so on a hidden premise of 
evolution: the others are on a lesser level of evolution and hence have to be 
brought up to the modern western instrumental rationality by discarding 
their outdated myths and modes of life. 
Lithuania, as many other cultural nations, belongs to the “other” and 
thus has acquired a dual consciousness. Citizens became Lithuanians after 
independence, but with one leap they became Europeans and, by extension, 
global. Encountering the latter was facilitated by the mentioned flood of 
novelties and modes of life and, just as important, by the disappearance 
of the Iron Curtain – the world is open to explore. The metaphor for this 
openness among the young was: New York is closer than Moscow, not 
to speak of Paris, Rome, Berlin, Madrid, Morocco and London. More 
important than all the images seen in advertisements, the glamour and 
romance on television, became reality if one simply left Lithuania and 
found work elsewhere, with a direct access to all the novel things and 
sensations. This is the first level of exodus based on globalization. For a 
small country, the exodus was massive, with the likelihood that they will not 
return – and not retain their recently acquired Lithuanian identity. Students 
sought and obtained support to study in foreign universities, requiring no 
national identity or cultural adherence. While the consciousness of being 
Lithuanian remained and remains intact, what that being means is diluted 
by daily concerns in a foreign land – a land to which one must adapt. 
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Of course, the door to go back to Lithuania was always open, but the 
prospects for the “good life” were elsewhere. This also meant and means 
that for the immigrants, and those remaining in Lithuania – even if to a 
lesser degree – Lithuanian culture had and has to be “constructed” through 
the media of globalization, and thus through a continuous presence of a 
double consciousness. This is more so in case of immigrants who enter 
another country where the life world is interlaced by multiple scientific and 
technical discourses and practices. One cannot buy a cereal box without 
being exposed to multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, 
nutritional, caloric, etc. codes. All this also implies productive, normative, 
and legalistic interconnections as aspects of such a life world. This is to 
say, the scientific and technical discourses and practices do not overlay 
some primordial life world that traditional Lithuanian culture might appeal 
to, but comprise our understanding of the way our world and we are, live 
and relate. In this world the mass media are equally replete with reports 
of scientific “studies” and reports of inventions and progress, and even of 
protests against some scientific inventions and technical innovations – all 
being understood as aspects of this life world. No wonder, then, that global 
technologies are regarded equally as “objective” as trees and cucumbers.
We have reached a point at which every culture is regarded to be self-
generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or theological grounds. 
This is to say that the modern globalising position led to the conclusion that 
all discourses are autonomously constituted and, therefore, are equivalent 
to one another. After all, there are no criteria external to such discourses 
which will allow the adjudication among them concerning any truth claims. 
If there is anything common among them, it is their difference. Given 
this level, the theories that at times are paraded inadvertently such that a 
discourse somehow represents something are no longer maintainable. But 
this also implies that there is no misrepresentation. A particular discourse 
that frames a cultural world view is in no position to either represent the 
others or to misrepresent them. The only thing that can be suggested is 
that each discourse inclusive of cultural discourses, will interpret others 
within the parameters of a giving discourse. This is of course premised on 
the basis of the abolition of an essential presence of a subject or a structure 
of the world. But this essentialism has been already destroyed by the 
assumption that even the modern subject has no essence, but must make 
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of himself in terms of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, 
the multicultural proposition is not premised on a pre-given essentialism, 
but in fact is constituted on the globalising modern self-destruction of an 
essential subject. The only criterion that this globalising self-invention, both 
of the individual subjectivity and multicultural identities, is its practical 
efficiency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of 
the subject, but a view toward what works given that a particular people 
will be offered practical solutions to whatever they think they are lacking 
in their lives, or what they are told they lack in their lives. No question that 
the lacks are unavoidable, since the global media parades images of things 
unseen by a given group and thus reveals a lack of such things in the group’s 
life world. This was the case of Lithuania after independence. The flood of 
what one could have and be, created a lack and a new globalising subject; 
the latter will be discussed in the next chapter.
At the first glance it might be possible to argue that some of the forms of 
the acquisition of material well-being through the modern establishment of 
power allow the individual almost unrestricted freedom of choice without 
abolishing the principle of equality. One such form is offered by the symbolic 
design called capitalism. Granting the most implausible proposition that 
capitalism somehow promotes freedom of choice, it makes no sense here 
to speak of freedom as autonomous. Freedom of choice, compelled by the 
material forces, i.e. by the constant pressure to maintain one’s material edge, 
is reduced to the struggle for the management of instrumental means in 
order to secure one’s constantly vanishing position. Indeed, the more one 
engages in this “freedom of choice” in the technical material domain, the 
more one is exposed to the determinations of its necessities, and the more 
one neglects the public arena due to the “lack of time” for irrelevancies in 
face of “real concerns”. In this sense the very notion of freedom is subverted 
and is paraded merely as an ideology to attract the unsuspecting and the 
innocent as a way of achieving power over them. What was just said must 
be understood at the symbolic level. The “material forces”, interpreted as 
causes, still presume the initial shift in modern Western cosmos to a linear 
time, allowing to speak of causes as events following a determined sequence. 
But we already know that such a causal sequence has been abandoned, 
and belongs to symbolic design and not to the way time, with its reflective 
horizons, composes our life world. In this sense, causal compulsions are a 
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way of using a symbolic design to justify whatever one does, whether it is 
an exploitation of others or excuses for failures. In principle, the life world 
of signitive interconnections, is our own invention, equally on the basis of 
signitive connections which have no symbolically designed causal force.
Capitalism and communism, after all, believe that the only moving 
force of history is material and in principle any other view, such as the 
autonomy of the individual makes no sense in such a belief. In this context 
both would have to maintain that any worthwhile future is a continuous 
and increasing material fulfilment. And since the latter is a symbolic 
design, surrounded with images of values and meaning, then it seems that 
material forces rule the day. Of course, once valuations are imbedded in 
and become coextensive with material-technical life world, then it seems 
only natural to speak of “material forces” as causes. Yet neither capitalist 
nor communist symbolic designs are compatible with the global life 
world. While materialistic ontology – the unperceived world of atomism 
was a catalyst that unchained the material mastery of nature, in its own 
way it got lost in this very “labour” through history toward self-liberation 
from the material power, a self-liberation that set up the conditions for 
the opposite: it as ontological symbolic design created self-enslavement 
through the incrementation of material power and thus the reduction of 
the very arena that would guarantee one’s self-liberation to the pervasive 
forces of material needs – which are constantly invented and thus never 
complete. The result of this peculiar paradox is the resurgence of man 
ruling over man and not of laws posited by freedom and freely accepted by 
the very creators of the laws. 
The ideological solicitation of the individual to “freedom” is quite 
transparent with power. The public opinion is not only shaped, but has 
already taken for granted that “other freedoms follow” from the “freedom” 
of materialism, specifically in its economic form. Two consequences seem to 
follow from this state of affairs. First, the public arena is neglected unless one’s 
own material interests are at stake, and second, the collapse of the public and 
the social into the material sphere of interests, making the public arena of 
freedom exposed to the possessors of greater material power, i.e. economic, 
technical, and scientific. There is no lack of complaints concerning the ways 
that public servants are bought and sold in Lithuania and, of course, around 
the globe. In the United States, it is taken for granted that the billionaires 
143
Chapter IV. Past and Future
will buy the presidential office; the only question is: which billionaires. But 
it must be pointed out that the major players, who possess those billions, are 
technology “moguls” whose wealth comes from technical innovations.
Going back to the question of causes and necessities, the issue is 
somewhat complex. The so-called material forces of history are regarded as 
conditions, causes, necessities to which one must adhere, submit, and even 
use as basis for the construction of “objective” theories of socio-economic 
and political life. In turn, such forces are structured in accord with human 
designs and rules of functioning, and hence possess a “subjective” base. 
Moreover, with political enlightenment, there were posited principles for 
adjudication in the material sphere and the possibility of realignment of 
this sphere for the benefit of a consensual public. Although one might argue 
that numerous “founding” fathers of various modern national entities, were 
most concerned with the maintenance of property discriminations and 
perhaps even the security of material wealth among the possessors of such a 
wealth, this very concern indicates that there was no longer any necessity to 
regard material force as preeminent. It appeared in its vulnerability and in 
principle required political adjudication. Hence all the arguments between 
those who stressed democracy, and those who opted for republic present a 
disrupted necessity. It is possible to adjudicate the material domain by the 
public by raising the question of rational legitimation of the appearance of 
material power in the hands of some against other members of society. This 
is to say, if laws are to rule, then any inequitable distribution of material 
power, leading to a rule of the human over the human, is a contradiction. 
Such a misdistribution precludes the free positing and following of laws 
and introduces necessities in the arena of inter-human relations. As we have 
already noted, the only viable POLIS is rational and free, and hence the 
introduction of material-irrational component is counter to the concept of 
a political society. No doubt, one may offer rational justifications for the 
inequities, but it should be noted that such justifications are either efforts 
to legitimate an established inequity by positing an irrational factor in 
human life, or means to explain human activities by constructing reasons 
for such activities, reasons which do not coincide with the activities. Such 
justifications, in principle, accept irrationality as the base of political life; 
given such a base, one then becomes “free” to justify one’s actions by any 
arbitrarily constructed reason in the guise of ideology.
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At any rate, the legitimation of the production of increased material 
power through science-technology conjunction is offered by the lure that 
such a power is for human benefit. More things, more benefits, more 
enjoyment, more health, more.. more.. One could even say that this power 
incrementation becomes self-legitimating in face of the public’s demand 
for more securities in the material sphere. But this raises an immediate 
question concerning the legitimation of the public arena and the elected 
public servants?. What must constitute its main function? The free discourse 
for the public benefit is not an issue; the issue is material the well-being – 
private. Hence, the public domain, in order to be legitimate, must be 
reduced to the sum of private material interests. The political parties must 
shift their operations toward the fulfilment of material wants. But once this 
shift is made, there is no turning back, since in order to be legitimate, the 
political parties must fulfil the material promises. Failing this, they cease 
to be regarded legitimate. This is what constitutes the legitimation crisis 
of the political domain in modernity. In order for the political parties to 
maintain themselves in “power”, they must possess material power capable 
of satisfying the demands of the masses. If not in practice, at least in mass 
propaganda, the two systems vying for “the minds of the masses” offer 
their lines of wares in terms of material fulfilment. Both economise every 
facet of socio-cultural and political life. The populations, in turn, take the 
economisation for granted and exert pressure on the systems to “produce” 
visible results. Failing such results, one can justifiably argue that the system 
has no legitimation. The system responds by either military power to keep 
the populations working, or by promises of future improvements, or finally, 
by political theatre in various forms, inclusive of rituals and above all, 
ideological incantations. There is a credibility gap between political rule 
and its legitimation. Since the gap cannot be filled by material means, i.e. 
neither system can fulfil its promises of material well-being, then it must fill 
the credibility gap. By symbolic designs where ideology is one preeminent 
mode of filling this gap and, at the same time, of providing an inexpensive 
way of obtaining legitimation. 
Globalization and Cultures
For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is whether 
a given culture, with its own constituted discourses, has the same practical 
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global needs that the globalising autonomy is offering. This is to say does 
a particular cultural discourse allows the definition of the environment to 
be reduced to homogenous resources for arbitrary reconstruction? The 
first limit of modern non-essential conception of total and unconditional 
possibility of inventing any discourse for the sake of applying it for “human 
needs” may be given in the discourses of other cultures. In order to set 
a limit for globalising modernity, we must demonstrate that within the 
logic of this globalization there is also a reflective recognition that it, as 
invented culture, must respect the equivalences of other invented cultures 
without any other criteria apart from those that each cultural discourse 
possesses within itself. This means that if another culture has a different 
ontology and even metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology 
of metaphysics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not 
operate with the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the 
homogenised environment. The limit would be set with the lack of primacy 
of instrumental rationality. If the meaning of life of a particular people 
within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfilment of 
indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, 
then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalising 
modern logic, permitted to pursue its own mode of having a life world. 
To sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the 
discussion of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, 
we suggest that the very abolition of an any pre-given subject in favour of 
self-invention in modern sense leads to the notion not only that the others 
are equally self-inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self-
invention to the modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumentality. 
This is to say that if every discourse is deemed to be invented and only 
valid within its own framework, then the very concept of discursive self-
generation belongs within the framework of modernist and Western 
postmodernist discourse. But this means that even if the other cultures 
are regarded as self-generated, their self-generation may have very 
different self-conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practices that did not 
respect the logic of modernising and globalising ontologies and methods. 
Practically speaking this means that whatever purposes there are and 
however the environment is interpreted need no follow the logic of causal 
efficiency of reconstructing the world into our own needs and power. If a 
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culture regards that playing music, listening to the stories of the ancients is 
meaningful and the metaphysical entities are relevant for life as protectors 
of the environment then there cannot be an introduction of a criterion 
that would claim that such conceptions are not realistic, mystical, non-
productive, since the latter concepts belong to another framework. In brief, 
the confrontation between the two is not between some truth and some 
falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein each will interpret 
the other in its own unique way.
Yet it is also the case that a globalising logic with its technical efficiency 
and promise of better life is an aspect of the others. They see themselves 
in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural necessities, which 
becomes part of their own self-understanding as different from and yet 
related to this globalising logic. This creates an internal tension within 
various cultures that constitute dual self-recognition wherein one still 
maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges those discourses in 
light of the global other. This is the source of alienation and destruction of 
cultural self-identity. We still want to maintain cultural identity, but we also 
like to be like the other, to judge ourselves from the vantage point of the 
other. This is an invention of a dual consciousness that frames the power 
struggles within various cultures. The modernisers who at the same time 
claim to be part of the same culture want to transform that culture into 
civilized, practically efficient, objective, and beneficial. While it liberates 
the individuals from her own culture yet there is a wish to claim against the 
globalising process the uniqueness of her own culture. In one sense, there 
is a demand to use the environment in a “desacralised” manner, purely for 
the purpose of the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, 
wages, employment, increased possessions as signs of the good life. 
In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have 
our spiritual values that do not allow anyone to reduce the environment, 
including the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the 
adjudication cannot be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able 
to decide which is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. 
Hence, we witness the many confrontations between the groups within 
given cultures that promote modernisations and at the same time their 
intellectuals who resist modernisations. This means that a given culture is 
split into those who propagate the need to become globalised and modern 
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and at the same time those who, recognising the necessity of modernisation, 
propose a battle against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they 
claim that we may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very 
logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalising 
logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-
called passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems that the reason for this 
power confrontation rest in the failure to understand the already posited 
limit by the other within which the globalising process must function. 
This limit is the very requirement that the other and its self-generated 
cultural framework is equivalent to the globalising logic. Therefore, the 
latter seems to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to or not 
to live within its own limitations. When we say whether it wants it or not, 
we do not mean a choice between two options, but a power confrontation 
that is inevitable since there are no external criteria in this confrontation 
that would allow a free decision, in favour of one or the other. What we 
have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one possibility 
is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is offered as the 
future. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states that the one from the past is 
conservative and traditional, while the other is liberal, individualistic open, 
and even humanistic. Whether this designation is true or false is not our 
concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, in their dual consciousness, 
will play out their roles as both maintaining their tradition and at the same 
time proposing future transformations. Of this confrontation we shall 
speak in our last chapter.
It is important to note that the filling of the gap is not offered by some 
purely conscious structure, i.e. ideality which would be distinct from 
materiality. Rather, the promises are of direct material fulfilment in the 
multi-levelled modern sense. The first principle that rules such a fulfilment 
is the final “ideal” of modernity: man is the maker of himself; the second 
principle is: man is on the way toward fulfilling this state of affairs. Thus 
incantations of symbolic designs and theatre constantly stress human self-
realisation, fulfilment, material security, in an everyday language. The ideal 
self is already taken for granted by the modern man: material power to 
enhance oneself and to make of oneself what one wills. And the “ideals” of the 
symbolic designs become structures of consciousness pointing to directly 
perceptual, sensuous, bodily, fulfilment, offering everyone the means 
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to achieve those ideals in any corner drug-store, beauty parlour, grocery 
outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a skin-deep equalisation in 
numerous domains lending the appearance of increasing material equality. 
Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, even similar looking 
clothing – despite differences in quality – and hence the promises seem to 
be approximated. While there might remain vast differences in social class 
distinctions, economic and political power inequities, at the surface level 
there seems to be an apparent equitable fulfilment. Everyone is “enjoying” 
an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated images and looks. 
“She looks like a million” and this despite the fact that she is working on 
an assembly line and is not the manager of production or an owner of the 
means of production. This seems to be the rhetoric of a symbolic design 
inscribed in the commodities for the subservient classes’ consumption, 
lending the appearance that the working class is fully participating in the 
“style of life” of the ruling class. The saturation of all domains with the 
images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, the working class 
is completely submitted to the power of a given symbolic design in “flesh”. 
Semiotically speaking this constitutes the trick of codification of the lower 
classes with the signs of the power of the upper, ruling class. 
If a symbolic design is to function at all, it cannot directly display power. 
Rather, it translates power into significance, and makes it “rational”. We can 
no longer think of symbolic designs in terms of nineteenth century when it 
was deemed that such designs expresses the interests of a dominant economic 
class. Semiotics has dispelled this view by pointing out that economic power 
is not for the sake of economy, but for the sake of numerous socially coded 
important positions. This is to say, symbolic designs prescribe signs of prestige 
and significance and, with the material power of transforming all events 
into a humanly designed image, it also imposes the coded bodily “look” 
both “on the skin” and as an attire. Images of an ideal female, ideal male, 
ideal body, from toenails to hair, are proliferated for the “consumer”. This 
is to say, a symbolic design is no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting 
the material-economic or technical conditions, but is an inscription in the 
body, in the images, the passions and desires appearing through the images 
and on the body. The so-called idealities of the ideologies of the capitalist 
symbolic design of the nineteenth century, due to the logic of globalization, 
have become. In the late capitalism and state-corporate systems, coextensive 
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with the daily discourse, daily imagery, mass-media, sounds and tastes, 
architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circulation thus making 
any art-form accessible and “popular”, and mimetic activities of the subjects 
who have become “subject” to the codes.
The question must now be raised concerning the “credibility” of the 
political incantations, the verbal depictions of the good life, the material 
fulfilment and equality. It seems that the political promises, which would 
be merely depiction of conscious ideals reflecting the position of the ruling 
class, should have very little impact on the population. Yet it is to be recalled 
that the modern magic of language is one of power, an ability to transform 
words directly into deeds, indeed words having become deeds and material 
facts; hence there is a credibility of speech in all “educated” domains. And 
it is to be recalled that the political incantations are not dealing with such 
high and noble principles as autonomy, rights, dignity and liberality of 
the human but in a language of materiality, interest, incomes, shoes, cars, 
washing machines, crops, and “decent” incomes. And it is precisely this sort 
of discourse that is taken for granted by the public opinion as capable of 
“producing”. Add to this sort of discourse some hints, veiled suggestions 
of utopian imagery, and the result will be a believing public. After all, 
the emphasis on materiality is already granted by the public opinion. To 
speak in modern terms, materialism of the sort depicted above – invisible 
atomism, is also an accepted form of idealism.
The Ideal of Globalization
The very constitution of ideality lends it a semblance not only of 
universality, but also of a natural law and sequence. The punishment and 
control seem to follow an inevitability of cause and effect, untainted by human 
arbitrariness. But this sequence must be established by representational 
associations, by relating signs in a precise manner of permissions and 
prohibitions, each having associated and inevitable consequences. While 
thinking of one, the person is immediately subjected to a represented effect. 
One is subjected to a representational habit which can become a calculus 
of punishments for transgressions and remunerations for obedience. 
Behind a beggar, there is a habit of laziness. Submit the beggar to work 
as a punishment and as a corrective. This will yield new associations, e.g. 
work pays, begging does not. If one is proud, do not punish him by physical 
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torture, since the latter will be useless; rather, submit the subject to public 
ridicule and shame. But all the penalties must be calculated for effect. If a 
penalty is permanent, then no reform would work, since there would be no 
hope of achieving the rewards for being reformed. 
The early reformers of the power of law based their thought on a 
prejudgment of “productivity” and reward as a solution to transgression. 
This was enhanced by the shift toward the public as the arena of 
punishment where the public submits the guilty to collective and useful 
appropriation. Public works had two sides: one, to act as a punishment and 
a corrective, and two, to appear as a sign of punishment and as an evocation 
of representations in the public. This is a school for both, the condemned 
person and the public, a living lesson in the museum of order. The punitive 
arena would be everywhere; at the crossroads, bridges being built and 
repaired, workshops for all to see, mines and ship yards. The maintenance 
of the convicted in idleness creates more vices and fails to punish, while 
reform can be a sign to the public. 
But the argument for the prescription of associated codes as repre-
sentations of sequential events in nature – deed results in a punishment – 
had included another, and a more basic component that haunts modernity: 
implicit self-accusation and singularised guilt. It is deemed that each 
penalty derives directly from the nature of a crime; hence all arbitrariness is 
vanquished and the penalty does not depend on the whims of the magistrate, 
lawyer, legislator, and jury, but on the nature of the deed. It is not the human, 
or the public that does violence to the person, but the person’s own actions 
do violence to him. He is imprisoning himself and is responsible for being 
punished. It is a kind of masochism. If penal codes assume a reified status, 
then indeed the transgressor is not punished by others or even the public, 
but has become a monster, an aberration, a violence to a normal sequence 
of causes and effects, calling for rehabilitation by any means necessary. As 
mentioned above, one of such means is labour.
The education through work would compel the individual back into 
a system of “normal” interests, showing that labour is more advantageous 
than idleness; the forced labour would be similar to a small community 
functioning to demonstrate that he who wants to live must work. But 
the work would be remunerated in order to instil a desire to produce for 
earnings. Coupled with work there was reinvented the monastic “solitary” 
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punishment, serving as a place where the individual could reach his 
conscience and spirit, and become converted. While Catholicism maintained 
the monastic cell in its cultic incarceration of “devotees”, Protestantism took 
over this sort of monasticism as a model for prisons. This indeed was one 
of the basic designs in American penal system. It added a greater process 
of individuation and at the same time surveillance by inclusion of outsiders 
to determine the individual’s character and eligibility for changing of penal 
duration. Such groups kept the records of the individual and monitored 
all the recorded acts and thoughts, feelings and dreams. The record was 
identical with the condemned, and followed him from the trial through 
prison and beyond. It was a private life constituted publically.
The public constitution was based on the classic discovery of the body 
in its twofold functioning. First, the invention of “human the machine”, 
dealing with the anatomical metaphysics in purely mechanistic terms, and 
second, the political technology that structured the body by numerous 
regulations calculating the controls and shaping the functions of the body: 
military, school, hospital, and work disciplines. There was the metaphysical 
or the intelligible body of explanations, and the functioning body that can 
be submitted to utility controls. The body mechanism is one that reacts, 
and in itself is docile; it can be improved through manipulation, restriction, 
and enhancement. But the latter are not freeing of the mechanism, but 
miniaturisation, refinement, for utility. Structured movement, precision, 
rapidity, reaction, and individuation of functions for observation by 
the judges, rulers, supervisors, each keeping records. It is no longer the 
signifying functions, but the economic, the efficient, timeable, localisable, 
and exchangeable. Restriction bears upon power of resistance and not 
upon signs. One is engaged with the differentiation of time, space, location, 
movement, in a code that is horizontal, prior to the question of some final 
purposive meaning. The methods control directly the passive-utilisable 
body, and these controls subject the body to domination.
What is here formed is a political technology of coercion of the body, 
a mechanics of power that breaks the body down into parts and rearranges 
the functions. Such disciplines produce the bodies that are subjected and 
alienated, body of aptitudes and required functions. This, for Foucault, would 
be a body conjunct of material forces which allows one to read a culture at 
a level prior to meaning, allowing one to escape the cultural judgements 
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and metaphors. Objectified body submitted to material controls. Here, an 
increased aptitude is coextensive with increased power of domination.
The coercive materiality is equally designed: architectural enclosures, 
locating the body and its functions with precision. The architecture was 
modelled on monastery, with cellular access to supervision and monitoring. 
The barracks, the work place, the assigned machine and its precise 
requirements of body movements, the bells compelling the body to be at 
certain times in proper places, all excising the wasted body movements, the 
undisciplined functions. Such disciplinary spaces are subdividable in accord 
with required body functions and precise distributions. Access is provided 
for elevated bodies that oversee all the functions, which monitor all the 
movements and places – at all times. Here a body is individuated, where 
every function is seen, judged, adjusted, and subjected. Each part of the 
body is divisible into numerous functions of speed, skill, duration, capable 
of being judged and ascribed to the individual. The latter can or cannot 
perform the required functions, deserves or does not deserve a certain 
degree of remuneration, is correctable or incorrigible, i.e. docile or having 
residua of disruptive chaos.
Here the metaphysics of body-machine, founded on an ontology of 
partes-extra-partes, subjected to functional divisions and disciplines, lends 
itself for exchangeability of functions. Each not only occupies a place, but is 
arranged in a hierarchy, leading to the notions of hierarchy of skills. The place 
on occupies is dependent on the rank in a system of functions. Discipline, 
here, assigns social status in accordance to the degree of subjection and 
acceptance of the coercions, of increased “adaptation” to the materially 
designed functions of the environment. Accordingly the general form is one 
of militarism, of competition for higher positions, of upward mobility all 
the way to noble generalhood. The individual’s power depended on greater 
subjection to the rule and the latter prescribed the ranking in a hierarchy. 
Speaking metaphorically, it is a pyramidal arrangement of body functions 
and utilisations. One’s ability to subject oneself lent one an increasingly 
higher position in the pyramid. Thus each is constantly surveyed and judged, 
a function in a system of records, a completely individuated body. The given 
system whips the chaos, the multitude into shape, into individuality under 
the universal and material environment. Such arrangement is designed to 
maximise the economy of body utility. Wasted motion is uneconomical. 
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This is equally the source of classes, where individuals are classified in 
accordance with subjection. The greater the accepted subjection, the higher 
the class to which one belongs, in terms of which one is classified. It is 
both, the characterisation of an individual and the ordering of multitudes. 
Monasticism turned into disciplined military bodies. In this sense, the 
functional efficiency must be exhaustive both spatially and temporally. 
Here one creates an army of the fit, and the unfit, the imbecile who does 
not submit, does not become a subject, i.e. socialised. For these residual 
bodies one has to invent correctional facilities, the insane asylums, the 
prisons. In these settings there appear other authorities, legitimated by 
other knowledge – correctional. As in other cases, here too the mechanical 
body is slowly superseded by the functional body. Here a society is invented 
with social equality and functional inequality, leaving aside the question of 
freedom. Socially, freedom means a subjection to the disciplines required 
by the hierchised material environment and bodily functions. Education 
is no exception: one is subjected to the disciplines arranged in a hierarchy 
and the temporal requirements of novel techniques of subjection. Precise 
degrees of examination, supervising and recording levels of functional 
competence, designed to entice and lead to higher positions in the pyramid 
of power. Here one finds that it is not the numbers that count, but the 
efficiency and discipline that lead to success and advancement.
The attainment of a position requires not only a submission to spatial 
architectonic, but above all to temporal sequence and serialisation. These 
would be procedures that impose an economy of activities on the body; 
such activities are multifaceted and are subsumed under the general name 
of exercise: repetition and graded differentiation. The exercises are surveyed 
and measured by either the final stage, or in relation to other individuals, 
or in relation to an organised program. At the base are various observations 
of qualifications. Various, because the observer can look, listen, check the 
records, the reports, the histories, and the expectations with respect to 
functional bodies. It is of interest to note that the metaphysically conceived 
anatomical bodies, reshaped in accordance with the functional requirements 
of the reified environment, are reassembled into a mechanically conceived 
organisation. The latter needs precisely calibrated and graded parts that 
are individual and replaceable in accordance with their efficiency, lack of 
efficiency and required upgrading.
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The measured functions of bodies must submit not only to the varieties 
of surveillance, but equally to precise commands that are brief and call for a 
univocal reaction, producing a cause-effect system of signals. Here language 
is reduced to signalisation, allowing no deviation. One perceives the signal 
and reacts to it without any intermediary of thought or other signs. This is the 
origin of nominalist, empiricist, and behavioural conceptions of language, 
appearing in the context of the efforts at behavioural modification. In this 
system all representations are excluded, all reflective possibilising vanishes, 
resulting in a despotic, militaristic, and blind obedience. The least delay is a 
slack and a deviation to be tightened up, reexercised, or punished. It is one 
modality of war of a system on the person. This war can be extended into a 
political war on a population through various mass media and propaganda. 
Sloganeering, repeated incantatory sayings, flashing of repeated images, 
parades, monumental architecture, and solicitation by simplistic promises 
and solutions.
What is being prepared is the new knowledge of the human, a new 
objective science and its technocracy. Every act must be seen and recorded, 
subjected to precise exercises and tests, exploited to the limit of variation 
and differentiation, leading to a total invasion of the functional body by 
the incisions of disciplines. This incisive omnivision is deemed necessary 
to exclude the least incompetence, slack, deviation. It is deemed that an 
overlooked slack in an organisation of thousand functioning bodies would 
multiply the wasted motion thousand fold, leading to minimised efficiency 
of the whole mechanism. Surveillance, thus, becomes a major militaristic 
and economic-technical preoccupation, not merely of serialised body 
functions but also as a disciplinary power. The new management is no longer 
left to the “boss” who observes the body functions of his underlings; it is the 
traditional Taylor’s management system transformed into digital program 
which is no longer restricted to industrial workers, but to all who are in any 
kind of “productive” segment, including service workers, office personnel 
and managers themselves. The novel invention is a “sociometric” badge, 
worn around the neck that measures every movement, the tone of voice, the 
seconds one speaks or listens to others. This is to confirm the notion that 
while global logic is full of innovations, it also opens the possibility to abolish 
any choice of using or not using such innovations. If one wants to have a job, 
one will have to wear the sociometric badge. The latter determines the value 
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of a person in a system, and hence the signitive global life world decides 
what meaning a person has in a hierarchy of functions. 
If we were still to speak of ideology, we could say that human sciences 
are techniques functioning to punish and reward. The student, the one 
who is exercised, is submitted to gradations, and is compelled to engage in 
mortal combat against others in order not to be punished, not to be left at a 
lower rank. After all, rewards and punishments come through comparison. 
In this context, the disciplinary power is invisible; it appears on the bodies 
and psyches of those who are subjected, in their competitions, punishments, 
rewards. Correlatively, the subjection made visible is an objectification both 
of power and the body. The objectification, here, has a different ceremonials, 
theatre, and rituals: revue, parade, examination, in which the subjects are 
presented as subjected objects for the vision of the power. The subject does 
not see the power directly, but feels it in the control of his/her muscles, 
gestures, feelings, and deviations.
In the next sixth chapter we shall have to offer a Lithuanian under-
stan ding of a life world that is different from the global logic and the 
modern subject – to be explicated in the next chapter. At issue is the world 
understanding not in terms of modern ontology and metaphysics, but on the 
basis of the “way that the world turns”. We shall argue that such a way is not of 
the past, but is lived by all, regardless of cultural and discursive practices and 
differences. The point is that an alternative to globalization is equally global 
and Lithuanian traditional language and culture will offer such an alternative. 
But meanwhile, it is necessary to explicate other dimensions of the logic of 
globalization, including “who” is it that is globalising and being globalised.
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The Global Subject 
Introduction
The breakdown of the modern Western thought into multiple theories 
and sub theories, leading to separate and autonomous discourses with their 
power to make the world in accordance with their formal prescripts, has been 
extended by the postmodern writers into cultures as discursive systems, each 
different from and equivalent to others, and each having its own life world. 
In this sense, all understanding becomes cultural anthropology with all the 
attendant issues of theory and methodology. The term “culture” has become 
iconic, ranging from lyric poetry to nomadism. In brief, everything is culture 
and culture is how everything acquires meaning. The language about culture 
is equally instructive: there is multiculturalism, there are rights to discursive 
spaces – and those who grant them, there are pop and post pop cultures, 
public exhibitionisms, “selfies” and even corporate and military cultures. All 
in all, these facets are the media of currency and legitimation and provide 
the dynamics of culture as multiple incomprehension – not because of the 
pronouncements of various deaths – death of subject, poetry, philosophy, 
identity, text, humanism, modernity, all the divinities and their mothers, and 
even death of death, but because of their constant and mutual interpretation 
of one through the other. Shall we follow scientific culture or mythical 
stories, or are they equivalent simply because no specific culture can claim 
to be a representation of any reality: each constructs its own “reality”. Yet 
a fact remains that such cultural constructs have become globalised and 
pose a question concerning their interpretation from one ethnic group to 
another, from nation to nation, and from language to language. Can rap 
culture be the same in Lithuania as it is in African-American community? It 
seems that there is a transition from one to the other that never maintains an 
identity assumed by the creators of this culture. In such a transition there is 
no transmission of the original, but its reinterpretation in a different cultural 
setting. By extension, it can be said that there is no original: everything is 
mediated by modern technologies.
The transition and reinterpretation suggests a mixing of differences 
into a novel and unique result. Islamic music guardedly resonates with jazz, 
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with American country music and even with hints of hard rock. While 
still Islamic, it is also in transition. Other cultures, such as political are 
equal in flux due to their mutual encounters. It is fascinating to hear of 
contemporary efforts to establish an “Islamic republic” as if the latter were 
akin to the traditional Islamic mode of social rulership by a Caliphate, or 
efforts to “export” democracy to parts of the world where democracy turns 
into license to appropriate public funds for private enrichment. The call by 
purists, such as Sadr to fight for the reestablishment of global Caliphate and 
not an Islamic republic are signs that political culture is in transition and it 
is too late to return to some purity – if it ever existed. In turn, it is obvious 
by now that exporting democracy turned out to be a disaster. Such cultural 
transitions seem to avoid cultural contradictions. But this also implies that 
there is no clear understanding of the other’s culture and indeed no clear 
comprehension what comprises the historical and current cultural clashes – 
if they are cultural at all. Before this question can be articulated, a more 
precise delimitation of the issues involved in outlining what is the global 
subject matter or, indeed, the subject that is being propagated or rejected.
It is a global case that contemporary encounters among civilizations, 
as mentioned, provide a great variety of views concerning human “nature” 
and even “essence”. There is the Hindu Atman, the soul that is coextensive 
with Brahman – the cosmic rhythmic “breath” exhibited by cosmic dancers 
such a Shiva, and made present by divinities – the avatars – in the form 
of Krishna. We see Krishna worshipers, attired in ritualistic garb, chanting 
up and down the streets of Vilnius, and we find institutionalised efforts 
to study other civilizations, as well as Yoga for health clubs, and even Zen 
clubs. Each offers a unique and distinct notion of who is the “self ” – no 
doubt worthy of consideration. We want to know how to live and acquire 
means to “find ourselves”. The West also has various traditional subjects, 
specifically pervasive in Lithuania, having names such as “soul”, created 
by Middle Eastern paternal master, destined for rewards or punishments. 
There is also a residuum of Soviet self as a functioning social value, serving 
“the people”, and traditional Protestant self, whose identity depends on his 
direct communicative access to the highest authority which guarantees 
worldly riches for being a faithful believer. Interesting and valuable as these 
“exotic” views offered by traditional Middle Eastern context and other 
civilizations are, we cannot examine them, because they are in trouble even 
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in their own life worlds. As was mentioned in the first chapter, joining 
the process of globalization, Japanese could not decide who they are, as 
evidenced by hundreds of books on that subject matter. Meanwhile, Middle 
Easterners are tearing each other apart concerning whose soul is closer 
to an absolute autocrat and who will be rewarded for what actions in this 
world. This is the result of globalization with a face of a modern Western 
subject. Who is, then, this subject, specifically since up to date Western 
philosophers themselves are in a quandary concerning its status. Not to be 
told that we picked the wrong subject as the instigator for globalization, we 
should offer a brief indication as to what sorts of subjects modern West has 
concocted or, to be more polite, constructed.
Sight and Reason
The well-known and constantly repeated credit states that Descartes is 
the father of modern philosophy. And he is also the father of modern subject, 
in one of its contestable forms. Renee Descartes proposed to establish science 
on undisputable foundations that would be secure against any scepticism 
and doubt. It is to be understood that this project against scepticism 
requires the context in which scepticism was prevalent. One major reason 
for this scepticism is the fact that during the medieval period philosophy 
had lost the classical Greek model of philosophical thinking: unrestricted 
challenge to any view, even challenges to the nature of philosophy, and 
became subsumed under theology. The task of philosophy was to prove the 
“theological truths” presented in cultic texts. Since the latter consisted of 
numerous contradictory pronouncements, such pronouncements led to a 
plethora of conflicting views, each demanding philosophical legitimation. 
This means that philosophy lost its independence and became subservient 
to proving the pronouncements of cryptic sayings. This led philosophy 
into wild speculations such that it was impossible to take any of them 
seriously. Thus, one had to become sceptical not only about the theological 
pronouncements, but also about the philosophical speculations that were 
constructed to legitimate these pronouncements. In this context, Descartes 
starts his venture from a pre-given ground of scepticism, which is to say, 
he wants to doubt the grounds of any claim to knowledge and truth such 
that if these claims cannot offer incontestable proofs, they must be rejected 
no matter how much they may seem to belong to everyday experience. 
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Descartes begins with this daily experience and, reflecting upon it, shows 
its lack of precision and certainty. It is precisely the reflective turn that 
characterises this venture, demanding the constitution of a subject who 
must guarantee knowledge within the subject’s parameters. Descartes gives 
credence to his ultimate quest of founding philosophy to the mind. It is, for 
him a substance that is distinct from physical substance, a material thing 
made of material parts, but it is also (inexplicably) related to this physical 
substance. Yet the quest to understand the mind and what it consists of 
requires, for Descartes, methodical doubt. What is notable is that his 
methodical doubt is a “thinking reflection” upon the functions of his own 
mind. This allows him to claim that he knows that he is a substance the 
whole nature of which is to think. Thus the self which is the mind by which 
I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and is easier to know than 
the body. What the mind thinks as its own thoughts is radically distinct 
from the world of material objects. 
It seems that in his sceptical reflections on all facets of experience, 
Descartes already assumes that the mind, as a self, is a reflective process 
that can discover, within the functions of the mind, what it will regard as 
worthy of the title knowledge and hence of the true self as a thinking mind. 
While mind possesses sense experiences, such experiences are unclear 
and hence could be doubted, specifically with respect to other aspects of 
the mind, such as dreaming. How does one distinguish clearly between 
dream sense experiences and “waking” sense experiences? These questions 
suggest the priority of the mind as a thinking self, and the latter is granted 
the status of being indubitable. The result is this: the Self is self-reflection 
but in such a way, that this self-reflection becomes a standard of everything: 
it reflectively sets up criteria as to what shall be accepted as true or false, 
as real-objective and subjective. For Descartes the self as reflective posits 
standards in terms of which it judges the world. Mind can show that we 
cannot trust our senses, because there are too many instances where our 
senses deceive us. Ahead of me I see a wet surface on the road, but when 
I come closer I find that the surface is not wet. Was my previous sense 
perception wrong, or is my current sense perception wrong? I am placed 
in doubt concerning my visual sense. My visual perception of the sun tells 
me that it is the size of a beach ball, and yet my mental calculations tell me 
that my vision is wrong. Meanwhile, the same sun appears to go around the 
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earth, while the earth seems to be stationary – in all cases showing that my 
sense of vision is wrong. Here Descartes points out that the characteristics 
of sense experienced objects, which we attributed to such objects, as if they 
belonged to them, now are doubtable without a contradiction. Following 
this argument, we can also doubt the existence of the object, of the thing, 
since all we can know about the thing are the sense impressions we have; 
but since the sense impressions are ours they do not imply the existence 
of things. The very notion of a thing as objective is placed into question. 
Regarding sense experience, it is the case that there are more vivid dreams 
than daily experience, leading to scepticism of the latter.
Next argument proposes the following: in searching for possible 
certainty, one discovers in one’s mind mathematical ideas. According to 
Descartes, here we find clarity of thinking. After all, it is obvious that the 
proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 is true. But, Descartes argues, even in this case 
we cannot be absolutely certain, since our minds are finite and therefore 
cannot guarantee that from an infinite mind the proposition 2 + 2 = 4 
will also be true. What Descartes is suggesting is this: there is a difference 
between clarity and certainty. We may show that when we extend our 
counting further, we may be clear that 4 + 4 = 8 is also true. We can do this 
indefinitely and still be clear. Yet the continuous clear calculation, will never 
reach an end. This means that while up to the present we are clear about 
every proposition, we cannot be certain that from the infinite side, the 
propositions might be otherwise. This means that while our finite minds 
can be clear about finite propositions, they cannot be certain concerning 
the way mathematics would look from an infinite side. Hence I can doubt 
even the truth of mathematical propositions. This is the crucial point that 
allows a claim that mathematical method, as the metaphysical side of 
modern sciences/technologies, is equally a constructed technology. Now 
we are in a quandary: there is no proposition that we cannot doubt, and 
in this sense even the mathematical science that goes beyond our sense 
experience is in doubt. This most rational of all rational sciences cannot be 
used as a foundation. Which way should we turn?
For the next argument, Descartes points out that through all his 
arguments that led him to doubt everything, there was one thing that he 
did not doubt: the fact that he is doubting. Here one discovers that doubting 
is not just a natural scepticism but, above all, requires thinking. But to 
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think that one is doubting one must have an absolute certainty that one 
is thinking. In this argument Descartes points out that to doubt that one 
thinks requires thinking and hence such a doubt would be a contradiction. 
One can push this argument as far as possible and claim that “I am not 
thinking”, and yet such a claim includes the notion that “I think that I am 
not thinking” and hence proves that the first statement is contradictory. 
From this Descartes concludes that the only thing that cannot be doubted 
without a contradiction is that we think. Hence his famous statement “I 
think therefore I am”. This does not mean that what one thinks is true; all it 
means is that we have a basis that is absolutely certain: we think. 
To demonstrate this certain knowledge, Descartes proposes an 
experiment in thought: assume an existence of an “evil genius” who has 
an infinite power to create all sorts of sense experiences, shifting images, 
contradictory thoughts, and uses this power to continuously confuse a 
person. Yet despite its power, the evil genius cannot do anything against the 
certainty that “I think that I am being confused”. Here thinking guarantees 
its own certainty despite, against, and because of any power. According to 
Descartes, I may not be certain about the existence of anything or anybody 
else, but I am certain that I think and therefore that I exist. To say this in 
other terms, I can doubt my thinking only by thinking, and thus prove the 
certainty of my thinking. This is also a modern position concerning one 
level of individuality and the exclusion of all sorts of theological powers. 
While a divinity might throw all sorts of obstacles against me, it cannot 
abolish individual’s independence. Here, Descartes must admit that he 
has proven a case that leads directly to what is known as solipsism, from 
“solus” (solitary one) “ipsus” (existing); While at the material-atomistic 
level there are distinct individuals, the same can be said of the subject, who 
is dramatically independent and a source of legitimation of any scientific 
claim. Such a subject is one form that has become globalised and a challenge 
to some sort of traditional power thrown against him. 
The significance of this type of subject for globalization is known 
by the modern, although much debated, term “Egocentrism”. The Ego is 
identified with the self in such a way that it is even closed within itself, 
and all that it possesses are his, such as his thoughts, feelings and even a 
mechanical body. This is one source of the modern notion of “individual 
rights” and even private property. The numerous and well known global 
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cases in national and international courts attempt to adjudicate various 
technical and artistic creations under the name “intellectual property”. 
This means that if one invents a formal system that is applicable in some 
technical field, then the invention is a property. Moreover, the global 
reach of this Egological subject pervades the social arena, specifically in its 
cultural dimension: individual in confrontation with the cultural. This is to 
say, while symbolic designs of specific life worlds demand the submission 
of its members to cultural norms and demands, the same members or at 
least some of them, demand rights to be individual whose wants, thinking, 
opinions count. One of the most important aspects of Egological subject 
is an inevitable tendency to relate everything to itself, to be the centre of 
the universe and finally a narcissistic understanding of the world as his/
her projection of wants, opinions, and interpretations. As mentioned, one 
result is the technology allowing everyone to record everything about 
himself/herself. Thus one photographs the coke she is drinking, the pizza 
he is eating, the surroundings he sees and herself in those surroundings. 
This Egological self is extended to include the virtual reality of her choice 
which she takes with her regardless of her surroundings. “Me and my 
world”. The global “human sciences” have a tendency to take “opinion” 
polls and report statistics on what certain populations, in certain parts of 
the world think, want, and even fight for. While it might be pleasing to an 
individual who is asked for his opinion, he should also recognise that he 
is not an individual but a statistic. The Egological subject as a centre, is 
also present in the taken for granted “perspectivity” that pervades much of 
modern and postmodern terminology: “From my perspective”, or “From 
the perspective of Hinduism”, or “From the conservative perspective”, or 
“From the perspective of morality”, of “economy”, of “the laws”, and so on. 
Of course, there is no comprehension what philosophical arguments allow 
one to speak of “perspectivity” apart from the Egological subject. Since the 
thoughts belong to this type of subject, then rationality is his possession. One 
of the most telling indication of the pre-eminence of the Egological subject 
as “rational” appears in all areas of social life: everything this subject does is 
for “rational self-interest”. This is purely modern notion of rationality which 
we have articulated in previous chapters: instrumental. To be philosophical, 
classical reason was completely “disinterested” and the rational human, 
who sought to disclose truth, had to exclude all of his interests and even 
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the self. Thus anyone, who joins the logic of globalization, does so from the 
“perspective” of self-interest. The latter means that reason is a cunning way 
to trick, manipulate, and gain advantages over others – even if that involves 
the cooperation of the others.
There is another major dimension of the Egological subject: security. 
Modern psychology has concocted a militaristic notion of the main activity 
of this Ego: Ego defences. Whether such defences are psychological or 
physical is not essential; what is crucial is the building of the novel means 
to make us “safe”, even if such means would place us on the brink of 
extinction. This is different protection of the self than the one invented by 
Middle Eastern symbolic design. The latter, being a patriarchal autocracy 
and theocracy, regarded women to be the most dangerous, alluring, and 
conniving creatures against whom men had to defend themselves. Thus 
women had to be made “invisible” by means of dress codes, seclusion from 
men, leading men to build walled monasteries as fortresses where the sin 
bearing women could not enter. It is a curious fact that no women ever 
built monasteries – it is men who locked women up and wedded them to 
one male: in another world. The modern defences are of different kind, 
from economics through wealth, education, and above all technological 
protection. This includes the novel ways to detect enemies, build secure 
homes, neighbourhoods and even countries. Another way of understanding 
this Egological self who orients everything to himself is the pre-eminence 
given to the “middle class”. The rhetoric from the West insists that if we help 
build middle class around the globe, then global stability will be secured. 
And to no one’s surprise, the centre of middle class is the Egological self. She 
wants to acquire more things, be a consumer, and demand of governments 
to guarantee that anyone who is a “good” person, obeys the rules, works 
hard, deserves to reach the middle class status. Even psychiatry accepted 
this striving toward middle class: where Id was Ego shall be. This is to say, 
where the dark and dirty working class was, middle class will come about.
The Empirical Self
Within the context that frames modern philosophy, there are surface 
variations such that some give credence to reason as the ultimate arbiter 
among all events, others claim that only sense experience can secure 
understanding. We must point out at the outset that neither of these sides, 
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rational or rationalism, nor empirical or empiricism can argue for such 
aspects as human nature or essence, cause and effect, and a thing with 
characteristics that belong to the whole. What is left consists of arguments 
for the priority of one side over the other. As we have already shown, 
Descartes opens two sides of philosophy: the purely empirical, sense 
awareness, and the purely logical, mathematical, rational awareness. The 
latter, for Descartes, is “innate” in the mind, and is a requirement for science. 
The British empiricists, among whom Hume is preeminent, argue that 
there is nothing in the mind that does not come from the senses. Sensory 
experience is, in principle, all that we have and the rest, including ideas, 
must be derived from and explained by, the ways that sensory experience 
works. One major argument against rationalism and its claim to “innate 
ideas in the mind”, is this. If everyone had such innate ideas, then there 
would be no need for learning through sense experience. All we would have 
to do in order to know is to search our minds and discover the truth. Yet it 
is not the case that this takes place, and we have to struggle to learn logic, 
mathematics, and to check truth claims about the world through sense 
experience. In this sense, according to empiricists, the best strategy is to 
begin with the senses and reject the claims of the rationalists.
It should be obvious why the Egological subject, with its rational self-
interest, is significant for globalization – after all the self-interest to master 
the world on the basis of instrumental reason, is the innovation of all the 
novelties for this ego to live “forever”. But the empirical subject is significant 
for other reasons. First, it is a residuum of the argument for the primacy of 
parts over the whole, such that the experienced characteristics – qualitative – 
do not belong to reality. They are impressions given to the subject and thus 
belong to the subjective experience. Empiricism simply rejected the aspect 
called “subject” and was left with pure, qualitative impressions and that 
the subject is nothing more than such impressions. At this level, it is not 
possible to speak of ‘My impressions” since there is no one to claim them 
as an entity possessing them..Following this strategy, empiricism argues 
that sense experience is the basis of all knowledge claims. Whatever we can 
know depends on the discoveries by direct sense awareness. It is obvious 
that sense experience is very limited: we have impressions of colours, 
sounds, tastes, tactilities, etc., which do not imply anything more, such as 
an “object” that this sense experiences would suggest. Thus the question 
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arises concerning the “nature” of “real objects”. Now in philosophy we 
must demand that any explanation must adhere to its first principles. For 
empiricism, the only claims we can make are based in principle only on 
sense experiences. Resultantly we can say that we have a colour impression 
of red, a tactile impression of smooth, a taste impression of sour, and by 
habitually associating these impressions we may say that there is an “apple”. 
This is not to say that we have an empirical impression of an apple. An 
apple is a sum of associated sense experiences. This means that we cannot 
make claims apart from and beyond “constant conjunction of impressions” 
that come one after another. Constant conjunction means that anytime 
red appears, then smooth and finally sour, we begin to associate these 
impressions one with the other and call this conjunction an apple. In short, 
given this constant conjunction, we form habits of judgment and claim that 
we have an apple. The apple is a term that is applied to the conjunction of 
impressions but does not name an object, a substantial thing with its own 
characteristics underneath the impressions. 
Given the parameters of empirical experience, empiricism then argues 
that what we call “ideas” in our minds are actually associations of present 
to previous impressions. This is to say that if one sees certain colours, 
hears certain sounds, etc. and has a vivid set of impressions that have been 
habitually associated to be called a “dog”, the “idea of a dog” is simply a 
vague and diffused image that one has in the absence of current and vivid 
impressions. The image as an idea is equally empirical – it is simply less 
vivid concerning the detailed impressions. It must be maintained clearly 
that empiricism cannot permit the assumption that there is anything in the 
mind apart from the impressions and their vague “after affects”. Regarding 
the term “affects” there is no implication of “cause and effect”. For empiricism 
to speak of cause and effect is to speak, once again, of habitual association 
of impressions. For example, there appear a yellow, bright, at times orange 
flickering phenomena. One moves closer to it, and experiences an impression 
of warmth, still closer, one experiences a sensation of heat; then one moves 
away and experiences cold. Having repeated this movement a number of 
times, one forms a habitual association and claims that when one moves 
closer to this flickering phenomenon, one constantly experiences heat; thus 
one forms a habit of association and claims that this flickering (termed fire) 
“causes” heat. According to Hume, there is no “empirical impression of 
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cause:” How does a cause taste, what colour it is, how does it sound? None of 
these sense phenomena are given as parts of the term “cause”. Hence, all one 
can say about causes is that they are our habitual association of the constant 
conjunction of impressions. Since cause is not given empirically, then there 
are no “necessary connections”, but only “contingent” associations. All 
empirical impressions could be otherwise than they are. Resultantly, the 
only self that is available is identical with the impressions. 
Following this logic, one can also claim that the only way we can 
understand ourselves is in terms of acquired habits. By performing certain 
actions habitually, and by associating the impressions, we form our 
“identities”. One is a carpenter, because one has associated one’s activities 
in a setting and can identify himself with those activities. In another setting 
and forming different associations, one would be a different set of habits 
and hence a different self. There is no substantial or essential human 
being under the habits. Take away all the habits and constant associations 
and there will be nothing left. This is part of the empirical theory of 
“behavioural modification”. Present someone with different impressions 
and their associations, and there will be a formation of different habits 
and different personalities. The previous personality, as a “vague” image 
(Idea) will eventually fade and will be replaced by the new and more vivid 
image, as a sum of new association of impressions and habits. While for 
classical philosophy habit was a “second nature”, for modern empiricism it 
is the only “nature”. Given this understanding, it is impossible to speak of a 
continuous self through modifications of habits. In fact it can be said that 
if the modifications are fast, one could be totally different from day to day. 
A conclusion can be radically severe with respect to responsibility: who is 
responsible for the crime one year ago, if that someone, as a set of habits, is 
no more, and a new set of habits is now a different empirical being.
What we would normally call self-identity is, for empiricism, not only 
a set of associations and habits, but also a name attached to them. Hence, 
we claim who we are by acquiring a label that too is an arbitrary invention: 
“I am John the carpenter” or “I am Suzan the priestess” are not designations 
of some essential person, but given names. In this sense, what would be 
seen normally as a unity underlying sense impressions, would be “nominal” 
or a name. You get a name on the basis of your repeated activities that 
form you into a recognisable “person” with a name. One result of this sort 
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of understanding is that language performs the organising and unifying 
function, even though we presume that somehow it copies or represents 
the way things or humans really are. Yet as we already noted, if we adhere 
strictly to the empirical principle, language, taken at its empirical level, is 
simply another set of associated impressions. This suggests that empiricism 
must assume more than its principle allows without showing us what such 
an assumption would be or how it could be irrelevant for the way things 
are and the way they are understood. We should insert a brief indication 
that modern philosophy, including empiricism, cannot speak of substantial 
things and their characteristics, since the only aspects that we know of such 
characteristics are our impressions. The characteristics will change with the 
changes in our sensory changes. Thus, there are no criteria to demonstrate 
whose sensations are valid and whose not. The importance of the empirical 
“subject” for globalization will be discussed after we articulate the arguments 
that lead to the ultimate self and its unavoidable self-fragmentation.
Before we get to the other levels of pleasure, it is advisable to disclose 
another factor of globalization, going under the rhetorical code: “information 
age”. The discussion of the logic of globalization contained another domain 
that implied the pre-eminence of information in modernity. But information 
is usually seen linguistically as a transmission of knowledge. The question 
that leads back to globalising logic is revealed by asking, why is it that 
European postmodern writers give language a dominating power? Such 
dominance is announced in claims that all discourse is fascistic. Taken as 
a universal rule it is comprehensible mainly within the context of Western 
modernity. In general, postmodern writers are concerned with discourse 
and the way it structures human socio-political and ideological life. This 
is a variant of a very broad conception where the claim is made that who 
controls language and, above all, mass media, determines the consciousness 
and behaviour of a population. In principle it is rhetorical power. Such 
rhetoric is employed by autocratic and theocratic systems which construct a 
symbolic design to maintain power and invent “reality”, including historical 
“reality” to suit temporary needs of the rulers. The rhetorical designs may 
look like information, but it is not about anything, but about the perception 
of anything. If this claim is correct, we are still in the dark how modern 
discourses could assume such pervasive power. If the discursive domain is 
coequal to the productive-technical domain, then discursive knowledge and 
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its praxis implications become most significant. It is not difficult to see how 
any discourse will have to be translated into quantities of information, and 
anything that does not lend itself to such a translation will be discarded. 
This is the “discursive power” that rules the modern understanding that all 
“expert” speaking is a power of making. The producers and users of knowledge 
will have to perform this translation in order to continue producing and 
inventing. This requires not only a total exteriorisation of knowledge, but 
also of its reduction to the system of signals, its militarisation. Since the 
productive processes are already militarised, knowledge too will become a 
sought after product and will be used in new combinations and sold as any 
other commodity. It is no longer avoidable that, in this sense, information 
emerges as the major stake in the global competition for power. The battles 
range over information, as once they did over territories, raw materials 
and cheap labour. At the level of information one can find a conjunction of 
industry, wealth, military, and politics. 
It should be obvious that the invented technical systems are not a 
simple technological fact, whether it is genetics, computers, smart phones; 
they embody information systems, the logic that was used to design tech-
nologies is carried by them and can be read as any other signitive text. 
In this sense, an exchange or proliferation of all sorts of technologies is 
equivalent to exchange of information. The latter is both material and in-
tellectual, resulting in global controversies about “intellectual property”. 
Global circulation of technology is circulation of information which can 
be picked up anywhere and enhanced transformed and become more valu-
able as information. By now, Lithuania is in a process of transforming its 
education precisely on the basis that technical knowledge is information. 
Characteristically, the “age of information” is coextensive with the techno-
logical systems and resultantly pervades the pedagogical process. While 
initial academic institutions of modernity were modelled on Berlin’s uni-
versity, stressing “science for the sake of science”, the shift to discursive 
“signals” demands training in performative information, i.e. an acquisition 
of knowledge that empowers one to subject oneself to a function. Instead 
of universal, critical, and emancipatory education, the education is shifted 
toward the applied, the professional, technical, and basically functional in-
formation; although the “humanities” are still part of the curriculum, they 
are tolerated as a part of the tradition and are periodically paraded under 
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“values” and opinions, or denounced as disruptions of serious scientific 
acquisition of information.
This is of concern for Lithuanian pedagogy, specifically as the country 
is engaged in the debate about education reform. In essence, the reform 
hinges on the increase of universities after independence and the tendency 
of young generations to aspire to a university degree. The issue is the quality 
of such a degree in light of the competition by the numerous universities for 
a shrinking student population. Quality is lowered to attract less interested 
students, whose main purpose is to get a degree and not so much to 
achieve great learning. But a more prevailing tendency is revealed by the 
fact of Lithuania being drawn into the process of globalization, requiring 
“marketable” skills or professions. This is the juncture at which the local/
global shows up. There is no lack of views claiming that the production 
of specialists is premised on expanding global economy which “inspires” 
educational institutions to shift toward “practical” skills, i.e. education is 
the principal domain affected by globalization. Currently there is no one 
global system of education, yet the trend is clear. Just to name organisations 
such as UNESCO with its agenda, expressed in rhetorically incantated 
phrase “education for all”. Other global entities such as World Bank, and 
even the organisation for economic development, promote the notion 
that education should develop the pool of professionals needed for global 
economy. Local/global means that while local economies may require 
specific professions, the latter must also adhere to the demands of global 
technological innovations in order to be abreast of, or catch up to the 
new requirements – stay in human history. Although no global system of 
education is yet available, there are global tests and their comparisons, with 
a heavy emphasis on sciences and mathematics, placing Lithuania in an 
average range. Yet this might become significant, since EU has a vision for 
European professional training to be implemented by 2020. 
At any rate, the power of humanities is merely rhetorical and has little 
bearing on “real” issues. Thus the university, in the true sense of the word, 
disappears; it becomes a contributor to the technical performance within 
the social system, and its funds are tied to its ability to produce subjected 
functionaries. This emphasis tends toward the abolition of emancipatory 
education in favour of subjecting training allowing no critical discourse. 
The latter is “soft” and offers no tangible rewards. The subject of peda-
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gogy, the student, is no longer concerned with the political domain, with 
human rights, dignity, meaning, and the general well-being of the world. 
He is focused on narrow, technical expertise, private enrichment, and self 
enhancement. Once the public domain is abandoned, civic responsibilities 
and cultural identity become secondary issues  – and they are secondary 
everywhere the logic of globalization appears. Once more, this is the reason 
why the technically trained can live anywhere as experts, without the need 
to participate in “local affairs. It is sufficient to point out that the current 
debates about the best societies introduce a major claim that the autocratic 
powers, such as China, can and has produced greater progress in creating a 
global technical reach than did democracies. The latter become past tradi-
tions which are no longer relevant for global affairs.
Given this context, it is impossible to offer an all-inclusive, universally 
acceptable “social theory”. If democracy is irrelevant, and autocracy is also 
discredited with the fall of fascism and communism, then globalization 
is the sole remainder that might be expected to offer a theoretical 
framework. The evidence for this claim does not come from some 
critical view concerned with the failures of social theorists, but from the 
theorists themselves. If we accept the claim that civilization is the broadest 
social unit, offering explanations of all events, then we must also accept 
the notion that sociologists, engaged in the study of civilizations, are 
in disagreement as to the nature of a civilization and, in face of the fact 
that there are more than one civilization, no agreement can be reached 
which among them should be regarded as a universal standard. There is 
an agreement that each civilization has its own standards, different from 
others, and thus no universal social theory is possible. In addition, if a 
social theory is proposed by members of a given civilization, then such 
a theory rests on the context of understanding of such a civilization and 
thus is incapable of encompassing its own and other civilizations. This is 
the situation in which democracy and autocracy can become equivalent, 
each offering its own social theory, resulting in the logical conclusion 
that no encompassing social theory is possible. And yet, most distinct 
and even ideologically opposed publications – journals, monographs and 
media reports continuously mention “globalization” in two major senses: 
economic and technological. While the former is attributed to the power 
of global players that determine the destinies of local governments and 
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even the structures of societies, it is the latter that has become the leading 
edge of everything associated with progress. 
Given that there is no universal social theory, it is possible to revert to 
universal “praxis” that, despite different civilizations, societies, cultures and 
life worlds, all accept the global requirements of technology and progress. 
By doing so, they also must accept the theoretical basis of technology and 
progress that are founding aspects of the modern Western civilization. Thus 
in the practical sense, it must be admitted that globalization has become 
equivalent to the acceptance of the Modern West as the universal practical 
horizon with its background ontology and metaphysics that allowed the 
West to become preeminent. Such ontology and metaphysics comprise the 
theoretical/philosophical and methodological base. The latter also founds 
the social and political order of the West that includes educational systems 
intertwining theory, praxis, civil society, economy and public participation 
in political affairs. It is well known that not all civilizations and even 
cultures within them, possess a public domain for the participation of all 
social members in making public decisions, having rights and duties to 
change laws and public representatives, and establish educational programs 
for younger generations. And yet, even such civilizations accept and 
compete for technical innovations and progress – immersing in one major 
aspect of the Modern West: praxis. In this context, there is currently an 
abundant literature offering a basic claim that diverse philosophical schools 
are converging toward a conception of practical activity and basically of 
praxis. This convergence has a tendency to assume that human activities are 
embedded in an intersubjective and historical horizon of sense comprising 
the lived world of a society. Such offers of convergence on the basis of praxis, 
and more generally, on practical activity, cannot be taken for granted at 
face value. We have no consensus among the various directions concerning 
the meaning of the lived-world, intersubjectivity, horizons of sense, social 
world, forms of life and action, etc. In addition, the emphasis on praxis 
continues to assume silently that it offers an overcoming of metaphysics in 
favour of human understanding and specifically of human social life world. 
The latter is precisely what humans make and how they act in relationship 
to the environment and to each other. It is to be noted that by the middle 
of 19th Century, there was a common premise that, ala Kant, the things 
in themselves, i.e. reality, is unknowable, and what is knowable depends 
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on the ways we organise the world of awareness. Indeed, the principles of 
philosophy were discarded and the notion of theory was not to “interpret” 
the world one more time, but to change it. This means that any theory 
will count as valid if it will serve practical affairs, practical human needs, 
whether at an individual level as is the case in American pragmatism, or at 
the grand social level, as seen by Marxism. In this sense, any theory does 
not depend on what it offers as an understanding of reality, but what value 
it has for human practical needs. 
This means that any understanding of social technology, presupposes 
this modern Western conception of theory as a value laden instrument for 
human requirements. Above mentioned fact that not all civilizations and 
the cultures and societies within them contain a public domain that would 
allow the participation of all social members, rests on the question of social 
technology: who is to decide what technical needs are of social value; is it the 
general public, or the “leaders” with the advice of “experts” of all practical 
domains, from bio-chemistry, to weapons. This is obvious in the process of 
globalization that creates various selectivities by “authorities” who are intent 
on “protecting” the members of their communities from unacceptable 
influences. Thus the practical-technical domain might remain in place, 
and all societies to engage in globalization, but block all other suggestions, 
such as discussion of civil society, deemed to be disruptive of normal 
operation of “productive and progressive” life. China, and most of Middle 
Eastern societies, ban Western education which is outside the parameters 
of globalization. The problems they encounter are also technological; 
the latest technologies, which are the bearers of meanings, are difficult 
to control and allow all sorts of incursions of ideas and information into 
most protected regions. This incursion is equally problematic in the global 
world of the West in terms of “privacy” concerns. Once one enters the 
technological media, one is in a cyber world accessible to all, and to such an 
extent that legislative protections cannot keep up with the rapid technical 
innovations. On the other side, there is a proliferation of “anything goes”, 
i.e. if we can make it let us make it. Of course, the public is immersed in all 
sorts of miraculous promises from “rejuvenation” to cures of all disease, to 
becoming rich and in fact, saving the world from poverty. This is evident 
from the engagement of European Union with a 2015 project to eliminate 
poverty around the globe – and all premised on social technology.
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The Limit
The mentioned bans on globalization of Western education beyond 
technologies, reveals the final dimension of the globalising subject. While 
investigating the modern consciousness, we can reach a conclusion that the 
globalised modern subject has an awareness of itself and the world as if they 
were created out of nothing, as if they had no measure which could be used 
by humans to discover some stability for themselves that would lend a place 
in the scheme of the world, would release them from the bewitched circle of 
constant aim at the elevation of progress and power. The first glance would 
suggest that such a view overstates its own case, yet closer analyses of the 
modern ontological base and metaphysical method show that we were 
too mild. The modern consciousness is much more radical, and appeared 
with a sudden revolution. This revolution was directed against everything 
that was developed through the medieval period and even against the 
classical conception of cosmic order. One of the main directions of this 
revolution appears as a humanly constituted “divine complex”. The latter 
consists of consciousness which rejects any claim that humans belong to 
nature or to divinities which rule over nature. The result is a dramatic effort 
by the Modern Western person to achieve an omniscient and omnipotent 
position. The understanding of the basis of this effort comprises the modern 
ontological consciousness. In the second chapter we presented ontological 
and metaphysical arguments which led to the birth of the modern subject, 
but the latter fell into distinct interpretations, all the way to being a 
mechanical function in a technological world. In light of the postmodern 
claims that the subject is dead, we shall have to address the issue of the 
subject and what kind of a subject that is proclaimed to be dead.
The first ontological act, comprising Political Enlightenment, is the 
devaluation not only of the “external” nature, but also of whatever humans 
would consider to be “inborn” in human nature or even essence, whether 
it is a soul, spirit, a mind having specific features. The rejection of anything 
predetermined, essential, is one of the fundamental reasons for the rejection 
of the notion of humans as belonging to nature, and indeed a proclamation 
of human as not yet defined entity. The words which announced the new 
ontology were written by Pico Della Mirandola. In his re-evaluation of 
the Old Testament concerning the “creation” of man, Pico shifted the base 
toward man’s “self-creation” and even autonomy. While elevating human 
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dignity, Pico is rewriting the Old Testament to make man appear as a “grand 
miracle”. According to Pico, after the world was fully created, after the 
standards and forms for all creation were completely exhausted, the divinity 
decided to create a “new son” (novo filio). Since all the standards and forms 
were exhausted, there was no standard by which the divinity could create 
man in accordance with a specific measure, nature or form. Moreover, if 
the world was completed and full, there was no longer any specific place for 
man in the cosmic scheme of things. Thus the human was created neither 
in accordance with a “nature” or “essence” nor for a specific place in the 
cosmos. In this sense, man finds himself without measure, without any 
limits and without a place. Resultantly, man must establish his own measure, 
his form, limits, his talents, in accordance with his wishes and decisions or 
in terms of his own “projects”. The human is neither divine nor demonic, 
neither mortal nor immortal; all this depends on human will. According to 
Pico’s “testament” humans can make anything they decide of themselves. To 
speak in terms of methodological hermeneutics, there appears a suppression 
of the text of nature, of essence in favour of autonomy and ultimately 
rulership over nature. As we saw in previous chapters, this domination over 
nature is an unavoidable consequence of modern philosophical shift toward 
materialistic ontology and quantitative metaphysics.
Not having any measure, above all not having any “limits” that 
comprised classical rationality, man is free to create himself by creating his 
own standards, his nature and his environment: he is completely a master 
of himself and his world. Individualistic American ideologues had no 
problem calling some achieving entrepreneur as “self-made man”. Although 
there are various modern expressions of autonomy, extending from Pico 
through Kant, and all the way to Sartre, Pico was the first to express this 
autonomy in its full ontological dimension. In this dimension it does not 
mean that human autonomy is founded on will, a choice between two forces 
or attractions, be they from outside or from within. Every such attraction 
ties humans to natural events and assumes that humans have inborn needs 
correlated to such events. To be attracted in this sense means that one is 
still subjected to events of inborn needs and their natural fulfilment – one 
is not autonomous. The modern ontology of autonomy has an opposite 
meaning: not having any standards, humans are autonomous because 
they must create the standards and laws ex nihilo, and must follow such 
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standards and laws despite external and internal attractions and drives. The 
humans are law givers and thus are autonomous, completely free sources 
of laws. We ought not to miss the radicalness of this ontology: the modern 
subject has nothing from itself and from the world; thus anything that will 
count as laws, essence, and environment must first be created as if out of 
nothing. Thus even who we are is first established by us. The consciousness 
of modern man’s ontological essence is “self and environment creation”.
Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only 
the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept 
the identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible for 
any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the 
logic of choice between the right of every individual to make his/her own 
identity, or the right of a particular group to respect their own identity. 
The globalising universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by 
postmodernity in such a way that the others in their own self-reflection upon 
who they are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out 
their lives, between what they can be as universal individuals or what they 
can maintain as members of their culture. The autonomous self-creating 
subject that is being globalised as universal has become a background 
on which the others as culturally different would be inscribed with their 
own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual, unique, with 
a right to self-preservation. This self-preservation is a phenomenon that 
has no basis in any ontological, metaphysical, or theological claims since 
all these are equally unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they 
will have to be adjudicated in power confrontations each calling for the 
maintenance of its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. 
Nonetheless in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this 
self-creation syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning 
the criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, the modern 
West, on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot 
constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some of 
the intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, follow 
the same globalising logic of wilful destruction – and do so on a hidden 
premise of evolution: the others are on a lesser level of evolution and hence 
have to be brought up to modern instrumental rationality by discarding 
their outdated myths and modes of life. 
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Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their different 
reading of cultural, and indeed all other, phenomena. To say that the 
others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that we have a criterion 
of the “right culture” which belongs only to one culture. But in this sense, 
one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objectively and 
equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and require that 
all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requirements. Yet, by 
the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and without prejudice, 
we have just offered a position that requires (1) the treatment of other 
cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in terms of one culture’s 
requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice of objectivity, 
and allowing other cultures their modes of awareness that do not regard 
themselves as either objective or subjective. Given this setting, we revert 
back to the problematic mentioned above: how can one claim to know the 
other “objectively” when one has imposed one’s own cultural component 
of “objectivity” on others and hence not only did not understand the other 
culture, but failed to escape one’s own culture. In this sense, the very claim 
to be able to treat one’s own culture objectively, is to accept this very culture 
without any “objectivity”, since one already lives and accepts the terms of 
her own culture. This problematic is a result of the globalization of modern 
subject who, despite the proclamations of its death, is a condition of such 
proclamations. The replacement of such a subject is based on the argument 
of such subjects in all sort of psychological guises.
In turn, as an ontologically autonomous being, man is the ground and 
source of laws and norms in the social/political sphere. From autonomy flow 
human value, respect, dignity, equality, rights and responsibility. Political 
Enlightenment, taking this base for granted, can be essentially political 
“liberation”. Since every person is a source of standards and laws, there 
is an awareness that each person must have full rights to express his/her 
autonomy and to reject all traditions and customs. This is the suppression 
by autonomy. This simply means that autonomy implies equality of all 
persons as law givers and hence a prohibition of domination of a person 
by other persons, groups of persons, or traditional cultural forms. It must 
be noted that equality has different foundation from the one articulated in 
Classical philosophies. In the latter equality was based on the argument for 
common human nature which comprised human essence and human limit 
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and a natural place. Yet in the modern ontology all are equal not because 
of human essence and its limits, but because all are unconditional sources 
of laws and need not accept any limiting rules, unless such rules are agreed 
upon with other persons. 
The question of modern subject and its responsible confrontation 
with globalization is the philosophical question for our day. In brief, it is 
impossible to practice philosophy and not to raise this question. We are 
confronted by modern philosophy in its ontological and metaphysical 
guises that require a serious consideration whether we can even think of the 
relationship between a philosopher as a modern subject and responsibility. 
It is our task, then, to consider what sort of position will open up for an 
intellectual that would be worthy of philosophy. Responsibility must be 
coupled with intelligibility, since to be responsible requires an awareness 
of what is the subject matter, what is a specific “reality” that we confront. 
The discussion in chapter two disclosed the basic issue of ontology – the 
nature of all things. On the one hand, classical thought demanded that a 
thing must be understood as a whole within its essential limits, if such a 
thing will be intelligible. On the other, the modern ontology excludes such 
limitations by positing a reality that is contingent, inaccessible to perception, 
and exposed to arbitrary treatment. Since human beings are part of this 
ontological reality, then they are not different from such reality. They too 
can be treated arbitrarily because they have no objective intelligible limit 
such as being essentially different from other material things. The question 
of responsibility is totally related to the question of self-limitation. At the 
first glance, self-limitation appears in an extreme form of a world created 
by globalization  – a world which by all modern accounts is regarded as 
objective without recognising that it is humanly and indeed autonomously 
objective. Let us look at this “objectivity” in various contexts. 
Self-limitation and Subjection
It was argued above that humans construct their symbolic designs 
which, in turn, become “legitimate” reality. Anything we do or become is 
dependent on such designs. A name is acquired ritualistically, as is one’s 
social rank or one’s possessions. Under the assumption that humans are 
autonomous, the symbolic designs become the limitation to autonomy. This 
is even the case in the political society – democracy – where a mutual and 
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free establishment of rules comprises a self-limitation of autonomy. In this 
sense we speak of obeying the laws which are inscribed as legal codes, given 
to all members of such a society as objective. As the common saying goes, we 
all are “subject” to laws. Regardless of the variant, we subject ourselves and in 
most cases demand that others do the same. Thus the strange preoccupation 
of “exporting” such designs, as was the case with Lithuania when it subjected 
itself to Middle Eastern theocracy, or is the case with the costly and fruitless 
efforts by the United States to “export” democracy; the clear case is an 
invasion of Iraq. More severe cases of the subjection to a symbolic design is 
present in Middle East, so well exhibited in our own time.
The figures and images of that design are regarded to be absolute reality 
to such an extent that the population is not only subjected to this design, 
but must worship such subjection by constructing sumptuous architectures 
on which reside these absolute figures where they are worshiped, adored, 
feared, begged, where the edicts are pronounced that limit human autonomy, 
and most torturous punishments are envisaged for the transgressors of such 
edicts. Give the global reach of technological means of communication we 
see the self-subjection of people everywhere: on their knees, on their bellies, 
worshiping what is regarded as reality. That “reality” becomes the medium 
of all understanding and the latter are the limits imposed upon ourselves. 
Symbolic designs may contain various discourses, including legal, moral, 
social, economic, selection of values, all designed to limit our being and 
action. A simple social discourse in feudalism allotted “divine privileges” 
to the lords, including the possession of the bodies of their subjects; in 
this sense, a serf could not claim to possess his own body, in contrast to 
a modern western person whose body is his individual first property. The 
latter is possible under a different symbolic design called political society. 
In principle, any system seems to be designed as a self-limitation of the 
autonomous subject  – limitation which can be imposed and accepted 
reflectively by an individual or a group who does the imposing, or accepted 
as a “given”. In autocratic/theocratic symbolic designs, there is established a 
system of surveillance of the public, carried out by spies and informants. It 
is said that an emperor has eyes and ears everywhere – a sort of pan-opticon 
with some variants, such as cosmic seer who knows what you do and think, 
extended to confessionals. In modern era, this kind of surveillance was 
superb in Russian/Soviet and Fascist empires.
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It is interesting that the population under emperors was less concerned 
with the nationality of the emperor and more with his benevolence. 
Whether the emperor is Italian, French, German, or anyone else, is of little 
interest; as long as he does not constantly trample the fields and slaughter 
the stock for sport. But this cross-border nomadism is equally characteristic 
of our modern technocratic nomads. The population, now also subjected 
to various technocratic organisations – bureaucracies, corporations, parties, 
and social controls, is less interested what nationality a corporation wears, 
and more interested whether the organisation will be more benevolent than 
others. When Ford moves to Singapore, the people in Tennessee are more 
than grateful to accept Nissan. When an organisation, requiring technical 
professionals settles in Lithuania, mass media, the political figures, proclaim 
the great news as a benefit to the country and a creator of jobs. For the 
nomadic technocratic powers any national boundary functions either as a 
hindrance to be overcome, or a symbolic design to be used for maintaining 
controls over a given local population. One is building a global society on the 
basis of expanding technical power and its nomadic arbitrariness, and thus 
one has no need for a political society i.e. public political domain and public 
participation. In this context, whether in a mild or severe cases, all discourses 
are fascistic. Of course in all such cases the imposition is guaranteed by some 
force, whether it is the police, or some ultimate authority. In brief, we are 
living under a discursive power in such a way, that the discourses are ours 
and yet they assume a limiting power over human lives.
At this juncture it is possible to surmise a very different “discursive 
power” For modernity, its power lies in its realisation in the material 
environment. This realisation is what constitutes the concrete, material 
environment of the modern person. The latter faces a world which is an 
embodiment of the formal-quantitative methodology, and the arbitrariness 
underlying its application. In this sense we are in a position to appreciate 
the claim that post-modern age is confronted by a power capable of 
direct production of the proofs of its own truth. But this means that the 
production is technical and requires vast technical means, affordable 
either by governments or by organisations possessing sufficient economic 
power. In this sense, “proof ” and truth are functions of wealth, possession 
of appropriate formal discourse, and the produced material results. We can 
extend this conjunction to include “justice:” thus, discourse, wealth, truth, 
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and justice. By now it is obvious that the widening gap between social groups 
also implies the difference in who will be in charge of justice. Those in charge 
of wealth, of governments, are the persons who are in a position to exercise 
technical power and establish their truths, their justice, in order to maintain 
the global “system”. Thus, the system becomes self-legitimating; it constantly 
strives to increase its efficiency, and thus the increasing ability to produce its 
self-verification. Its truths will have to coincide with its value, its good, and 
its justice. What once were deemed to be laws derived from the consensus of 
autonomous individuals, become now performances in a technical system. 
Indeed, normativity of autonomous laws will be replaced by performativity 
of technical procedures. It is a peculiar kind of procedure: if reality is what 
provides the evidence of proof, and correlatively shows the prescription that 
includes normative, public and private results, then mastering the rules of a 
discourse is equivalent to the mastering of the produced environment. And 
this is precisely what is afforded by modernity. All these factors reinforce one 
another mutually and constitute a self-proliferating system. If the discursive 
power is performativity, efficiency, productivity, wealth, and effective 
verification of its own proposed prescripts, then science is legitimated by 
its material efficiency, and the latter legitimates science. Governments and 
economic syndicates become eager subsidisers of scientific ventures which, 
in the world of praxis is the global, objective environment. While radically 
pluralistic, with numerous semi-autonomous disciplines, the system tends 
to become self-generative and encompassing.
One creates the formal-quantitative discourse and subjects the 
material environment to its rules in order, thereby, to free oneself from the 
natural and experienced phenomena. One aims at achieving autonomy by 
establishing and increasing technical power over the material environment. 
Indeed, all materiality is deemed subjectable to formal discursive rules of 
construction. Thus the human body also assumed two dimensions. First, the 
invention of the “mechanical body” dealing with the anatomical ontology, 
and second, the “political body” to be structured functionally in accordance 
with the requirements of the produced and productive technical – signitive 
environment. The body is here structured by numerous regulations, 
calculations, controls that shape the functions of the body for utility, efficiency, 
miniaturisation, refinement, and restriction. Military, with its most current 
and sophisticated technologies and work “training” become equal functions. 
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The training is observed, judged, supervised, graded, and compared, 
resulting in an increased functional individuation and homogenisation. Each 
acquired profession, regardless of how limited, can fit anywhere in the global 
logic. And this process is visible everywhere: almost everyone is attached to 
an apparatus, whether it is a mobile telephone, iPad, Stay Young magazine, 
or virtual vision. Lithuanians on the street, in the shops, at work, in school, 
restaurants, are talking/listening, texting, searching, photographing, and 
even “selfying”. The movement to gain independence and autonomy from 
Russian/Soviet Empire, switched to a countermovement to the autonomous 
process of individuation in modernity. Here the body, the thought, feeling, are 
individuated, singularised, correlated to technical means, judged, adjusted, 
and subjected. Each function of the body is divisible into numerous other 
functions of speed, duration, and skill, capable of being judged and ascribed 
to the individual. The latter can or cannot perform the required functions, 
deserves or does not deserve a prescribed degree of remuneration, is docile, 
correctible, or incorrigible, with a residuum of disruptive chaos, refusing or 
incapable of being subjected.
While individuating, such performative functions are formed for 
exchangeability. Each not only occupies a place and time but is arranged in 
a hierarchy of coded skills. The place one occupies is dependent upon the 
rank in a system of functions, and one can assume such a rank if one accepts 
precise subjection to the functional requirements of the global technical 
logic. Thus discipline, here, assigns social status in accordance with the 
degree of subjection and acceptance of coercion, of increased adaptations. 
The global logic whips the unrestricted and chaotic autonomy, the 
multitude, into shape, into individuality, under the universal law of modern 
discourse, whose increased subdivision into disciplines calls for an increased 
articulation and subjection of human functions. Here the meaning of this 
subject is subjection. Thus there appears an army of the fit and the unfit; the 
imbecile who fails to submit, to be subjected, who ceases to be a viable social 
subject. This is the reason why so many European thinkers claim that the 
subject is dead. While coextensive with the subjection by symbolic design 
and its discursive power, the globalising discourses subject one’s actions 
directly – materially – in the signitive logic of global technology. 
The coercive environment, the signitive life world, is equally designed: 
architectural enclosures, locating the body and its functions with precision. The 
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architecture was modelled on monastery, with cellular access to supervision 
and monitoring. The barracks, the work place, the assigned machine and its 
precise requirements of body movements, the bells compelling the body to be 
at certain times in proper places, all excising the wasted body movements, the 
undisciplined functions. Such disciplinary spaces are subdividable in accord 
with required body functions and precise distributions. Access is provided 
for elevated bodies that oversee all the functions, which monitor all the 
movements and places – at all times. Here the metaphysics of body-machine, 
founded on an ontology of partes-extra-partes, subjected to functional 
divisions and disciplines, lends itself for exchangeability of functions. Each 
not only occupies a place, but is arranged in a hierarchy, leading to the notions 
of hierarchy of skills. The place one occupies is dependent on the rank in a 
system of functions. Discipline, here, assigns social status in accordance to 
the degree of subjection and acceptance of coercion, of increased ”adaptation” 
to the technically designed functions of the environment. Accordingly the 
general form is one of militarism, of competition for higher positions, of 
upward mobility all the way to noble generalhood, corporate manager and 
power. The individual’s power depended on greater subjection to the rule and 
the latter prescribed the ranking in a hierarchy. Speaking metaphorically, it 
is a pyramidal arrangement of body functions and utilisations. One’s ability 
to subject oneself lent one an increasingly higher position in the pyramid. 
Thus each is constantly surveyed and judged, a function in a system of 
records, a completely individuated body. The given system whips the chaos, 
the multitude into shape, into individuality under the universal technically 
signitive environment. 
Such arrangement is designed to maximise the economy of body utility. 
Wasted motion is uneconomical. This is equally the source of classes, where 
individuals are classified in accordance with subjection. The greater the 
accepted subjection, the higher the class to which one belongs, in terms of 
which one is classified. It is both, the characterisation of an individual and the 
ordering of multitudes. Monasticism turned into disciplined military bodies. 
In this sense, the functional efficiency must be exhaustive both spatially and 
temporally. Here one creates an army of the fit, and the unfit, the imbecile 
who does not submit, does not become a subject, i.e. socialised. For these 
residual bodies one has to invent correctional facilities, the training for 
menial jobs, filling out welfare forms, and diminished chances of climbing 
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the social ladder. . In these settings there appear other authorities, legitimated 
by other knowledge – correctional. As in other cases, the mechanical body 
is also slowly superseded by the functional body. Here a society is invented 
with social equality and functional inequality, leaving aside the question of 
freedom. In praxis theory, freedom means a subjection to the disciplines 
required by the hierarchised technical environment and bodily functions. 
Education is no exception: one is subjected to the disciplines arranged in a 
hierarchy and the temporal requirements of novel techniques of subjection. 
Precise degrees of examination, supervising and recording levels of functional 
competence, designed to entice and lead to higher positions in the pyramid of 
power. Here one finds that it is not the numbers that count, but the efficiency 
and discipline that lead to success and advancement.
The attainment of a position requires not only a submission to spatial 
architectonic, but above all to temporal sequence and serialisation. These 
would be procedures that impose an economy of activities on the body; 
such activities are multifaceted and are subsumed under the general name 
of exercise: repetition and graded differentiation. The exercises are surveyed 
and measured by either the final stage, or in relation to other individuals, 
or in relation to an organised program. At the base are various observations 
of qualifications. Various, because the observer can look, listen, check the 
records, the reports, the histories, and the expectations with respect to 
functional bodies. It is of interest to note that the ontologically conceived 
anatomical bodies, reshaped in accordance with the functional requirements 
of technical environment, are reassembled into a mechanically conceived 
organisation. The latter needs precisely calibrated and graded parts that 
are individual and replaceable in accordance with their efficiency, lack of 
efficiency and required upgrading.
The measured functions of bodies must submit not only to the varieties 
of surveillance, but equally to precise commands that are brief and call for 
a univocal reaction, producing and extending the signitive life world into 
greater divisions of environment and human functions. Here language is 
reduced to signalisation, allowing no deviation. One perceives the signal and 
reacts to it without any intermediary of thought or other signs. This is the 
origin of nominalistic, empiricist, and behavioural conceptions of language, 
appearing in the context of the efforts at behavioural modification. In this 
system all representations are excluded, all reflective possibilising vanishes, 
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resulting in a despotic, militaristic, and blind obedience. The least delay is a 
slack and a deviation to be tightened up, re-exercised, or punished. It is one 
modality of war of a system on the person. This war can be extended into 
a social war on a population through various mass media and propaganda. 
Sloganeering, repeated incantatory sayings, flashing of repeated images, 
parades, monumental architecture, and solicitation by simplistic promises 
and solutions.
Based on our above considerations, there are obvious implications 
concerning the pre-eminence of information in modernity. If the discursive 
domain is coequal to the productive-technical domain, then discursive 
knowledge and its praxis implications become most significant. It is not 
difficult to see how any discourse will have to be translated into quantities 
of information, and anything that does not lend itself to such a translation 
will be discarded. The producers and users of knowledge will have to 
perform this translation in order to continue producing and inventing. 
This requires not only a total exteriorisation of knowledge, but also of its 
reduction to the system of signals, its militarisation. Since the productive 
processes are already militarised, knowledge too will become a sought 
after product and will be used in new combinations and sold as any other 
commodity. It is no longer avoidable that, in this sense, information emerges 
as the major stake in the global competition for power. The battles range 
over information, as once they did over territories, raw materials and 
cheap labour. At the level of information one can find a conjunction of 
industry, wealth, military, and society. Lithuania is shifting rapidly in that 
direction, specifically, as mentioned, in educational institutions. Going 
under the terminology of “discursive practice”, educational institutions (and 
governments) are emphasising the creation of technical disciplines in order 
to advance national economies, health care, competition with others and 
national prestige. In Lithuania the teaching of humanities, and this includes 
national languages, cultures, histories, is pushed aside in favour of technical 
training in accordance with global standards. While this might seem trivial, 
yet national identities are premised on the understanding of local cultures 
and their difference from the globalised “culture”. If the latter becomes 
preeminent, then the former will vanish.
What is being prepared by the global logic is a new knowledge of the 
human, a new “objective” science and technocracy. Every act must be seen 
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and recorded, subjected to precise exercises and tests, exploited to the limit 
of variation and differentiation, leading to a total invasion of the functional 
body by the incisions of disciplines. This incisive omni-vision is deemed 
necessary to exclude the least incompetence, slack, deviation. It is deemed 
that an overlooked slack in an organisation of thousand functioning bodies 
would multiply the wasted motion thousand fold, leading to minimised 
efficiency of the whole mechanism. Surveillance, thus, becomes a major 
militaristic and economic-technical preoccupation, not merely of serialised 
body functions but also as a disciplinary power. Exercise that disciplines 
requires observation, recording, and examination, and these function 
to qualify, classify, and to punish. In these techniques lies technocratic 
knowledge that is coextensive with power. If we were to speak of ideology, 
we could say that human sciences are techniques functioning to punish and 
reward. The student, the one who is exercised, is submitted to gradations, 
and is compelled to engage in mortal combat against others in order not to be 
punished, not to be left at a lower rank. After all, rewards and punishments 
come through comparison. In this context, the disciplinary power is 
invisible; it appears on the bodies and psyches of those who are subjected, 
in their competitions, where victory is of brief duration. Correlatively, the 
subjection made visible is our own invention which not only subjects us but 
above all watches us. Whether we are under surveillance by street cameras, 
governments collecting data on everyone, or internet programs which 
can access what we think, do, buy, talk to, or televisions which can watch 
you and record what you do and say, you are subject to a pan-opticon of 
very different kind. We are in an era of infinite examination, surveillance, 
and compulsory objectification, and writing is instituted as a mode of 
disciplining. Writing is not only classificatory, but is also used to record, to 
keep track of, and to singularise histories of the person, tracking detailed 
trajectories of lives, measuring gaps between individuals, specifying their 
fitness for “duty” or punishment, placing them in the curve of distributions. 
Written history, here, is not a monument of a life, but a disciplinary record. 
The mechanisms of discipline, the vigilant surveillance, maintain all in a 
state of an object.
Perhaps it is the inspiration of Plato’s Laws, depicting the nocturnal 
council that would watch the population’s activities, that reverberates across 
modernity. One can imagine the ability to see everything, to intervene in 
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all affairs, to have access to all records, having recorded all movements, 
gestures, thoughts, sayings of the population, one then would have a 
complete power, one would have a social technology. There are three models 
of such a vision: the first one is the divine vision that sees everything and is 
inescapable. In many cases it is mediated by a priestly class who assumes a 
position of prescribing disciplines, punishments and rewards on the basis 
of stories that people tell at confessionals. Every statement is subjected to 
a code of evaluations and resultantly of degrees of punishments. This form 
is extended to a contemporary psychiatry. Second form is one that walls 
off, incarcerates in order to watch and discipline, the third is more mobile, 
lighter, everywhere and invisible. The latter requires coded information 
on all social members on the bases of assessments, records, rumours, and 
intersecting hierarchies of power centres that mutually share informational 
records: police records go to banks, bank records go to work place, work 
place records couple with family records, confirming or contradicting 
police records, vacation, education, travel, medical records, crisscrossing 
from one disciplinary centre to another, as centres of competing powers 
exert greater subjection of the individual and specifically of the body. 
Discipline is then the technique that reduces the body to a political force at 
the least cost for maximising it as a functional element is the technological 
system: this creates a social anatomy that is intersected by diverse power 
centres and their constituted technical environments. The power centres 
may be called institutions of higher learning, or attractive research centres, 
health providers, credit card organisations, systems of transportation, bank 
accounts, and even purchasing practices. 
Our delimited double movement from autonomy through formal-
quantitative discourse to the production of an environment, to the 
restructuration of the lived world, and then to the structuring of body 
functions in accord with the efficiency required to correspond to the produced 
world, led to a shift from sign to signal. This means that communication 
between the human and the world is designed to be univocal. The more 
precise articulation of the human functions, their subjection to the exact 
environmental constructs, the more efficiently does the system function. It 
is a kind of militarisation of society: a precise command calls for univocal 
reaction, instituting a system of signals that must approximate a desired 
“information” society. Discourse is reduced to signalisation, allowing no 
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deviations of reaction, no horizon of a sign system, no slack. One perceives 
a signal and reacts to it without any intermediary of thought or of other 
signs. At the same time one is trained to deal with the technical world in the 
same manner: direct reaction to functional requirements.
At this level we reached another reason for the claim that the subject is 
dead. Remember that modern ontology presumes a mechanical, meaningless 
universe, such that if there is meaning, it comes from the subject. But if the 
outcome of the global logic is technical functionalism, then meanings have 
become redundant for modernity. The once autonomous enlightenment 
individual has been re-individuated by the system and its demands. One 
is measured, timed, clocked, examined, recorded, surveyed, observed, 
tailored, and hierarchised to assume precise functions and gestures, feelings 
and thoughts, required by a technological system. In turn, the system seems 
to lend an appearance and aura of “naturalness” to such functions. Thus one 
is extolled and elevated if one is capable of abolishing signs, of restricting 
their slack, in favour of signals. In this sense, the cultural practices can be 
described and analysed as if every sign were a univocal signal, as if lived 
perceptual meanings and their interconnections were replaceable by unme-
diated and repeatable responses to signals. Nominalism, behavioural theory, 
and explanatory theses of human action are variations on this fundamental 
conception. While this system is modelled upon monastic and militaristic 
disciplines, it can also be regarded as a war of the system upon the person. 
Anything personal, loose, and autonomous, cannot be tolerated; it is too 
democratic, human, inefficient, wasteful, and uneconomical. The more 
meaning can be excluded, the more one is subjected to identify oneself with 
the functions of the system, the greater are one’s chances to advance in the 
prescribed hierarchy.
While subjection is one layer of global logic, shifting education toward 
professional training, this level, pervading global life world has excluded 
options to extricate ourselves from it. We are totally dependent on it. Enter 
any office, walk down the street full of carriers of smart phones, full of autos, 
soon to be controlled by computers and cyber technology, telling us that our 
driving skills are inefficient and thus driving functions, thinking functions 
will not be ours, although we shall depend on them – provided by the very 
extension of ourselves that we invented. Convenient, of course, releasing us 
for “other tasks” yes, but the latter will be a shift to other technologies and 
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their demands. The dependence is global, since any changes, innovations, 
variations in signitive practice vibrates across the globe. Globalising logic 
circulates our thoughts, inventions, friends and expertise. Such circulation 
is open to anyone, and anyone’s personal life in all possible respects, once 
it is inserted into this logic, ceases to be persona. We know that there is a 
“noisy” concern about “privacy” or “anonymity” of information, but such a 
concern can no longer be addressed by closing some specific issue, such as 
private health information. Other systems, such as person’s buying habits, 
educational level and taste in music will be accessed and through them, 
there will be a way to access one’s health issues. The argument for such “right 
to information” on anyone is also technocratic. Scientific research cannot 
be denied data base if it is to be successful and beneficial. Such research is 
another pooling of information that becomes available to anyone and hence 
comprises self-proliferation of greater visibility of everyone, i.e. greater 
subjection and dependence.
Between Eternity and Pleasure
Above it was mentioned that while progress is its own purpose, there 
is a tacit “promise” of extending life if not eternally, at least at the beginning 
indefinitely. We want to life as long as we can and must do everything to 
postpone our entrance into paradise. Whether one is a beggar or a high 
priest, one avoids the inevitable at any price. Of course, there are those 
who joyfully jump for a chance to enter “the other world” but only when 
prompted and convinced by promises from the shamans that if they sacrifice 
themselves, they will be met by eager virgins and flowing wine in the other 
world, although the shamans themselves are not ready to abandon this life. 
Of course their justification is equally devious: they cannot perform acts of 
suicide because the ultimate Lord forbids it. So be it, but at any rate, there 
is no end of literatures  – magazines, books, brochures  – and institutions 
advising what latest technology will guarantee a prolonged life, all the way 
to such rhetoric as “turning back the clock”. This is the egological subject, 
clinging to self-identity and its indefinite continuity. But this identity is also 
fragmented by global logic insofar as one is dependent for existence on a 
subjection to a specific function and thus dependent on it for continuation.
While continuation is important, living at present is equally important, 
and with the vanished subject that was a source of meaning, what remains of 
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the present is a dispersed sensuality of “pleasures” or immediate gratifications. 
In this sense, the global logic has another task: massive production of 
gratifications. We must recall that the qualitative awareness, for the modern 
West, has been reduced to the subjective region and, given the arguments 
of empiricism, our awareness is identical with qualitative sense impressions, 
including the impressions of pleasure and pain. Why, then, is empiricism 
important for globalization? An answer is based on the previously discussed 
logic of globalization, with the final understanding that progress serves 
everyone’s needs and their fulfilment. Most of the needs are invented by 
globalization which reveals “lacks” or what we do not have, but must have; 
nonetheless they are “qualitative” insofar as they depend on sense experience. 
“This new telephone is better” and “The genetically enhanced tomatoes 
taste much better”, and “The pill relieves my pain, my anxiety, and increases 
my sexual satisfaction”. This means that the vast network of old and new 
inventions have another level of meaning: it means a maximising pleasures 
and minimising pains. There is no specific definition what pleasure or pain 
mean – they are purely subjective as far as modern ontology is concerned, 
but “objectively” speaking, the global novelties, in whatever domain, present 
choices to satisfy most exotic tastes. The filling of lacks by global flood of 
novelties is regarded as “pleasant” and conforms to the utilitarian ethic: 
humans seek pleasure and avoid pain, and globalization offers the possibility 
of maximising pleasures  – purely empirically. Indeed, globalization’s one 
major production is “entertainment” and “tourism”. Both are designed 
for pleasure, without a required identity apart from one’s correlation to a 
specifically created environment that has “pleasant nodes” to which one could 
attach. There are the movie stars, deemed to be “sexy” and/or “great” and 
must be emulated in their attire, look, and walk. There was the “Madonna” 
look in Lithuania, creating an entire “industry” of cosmetics, underwear and 
miniskirts. There are clubs where one can “enjoy” the imported drinks and 
crashing “music” till the sun comes up, and there are shopping malls, full 
of latest styles, sexy images, and fast food. A pleasant life, something to talk 
about with “instant” friends who circulate on one’s web site or internet and 
share their feelings and opinions. The latter, after all, cannot be contested, 
since there are no criteria as to what is true, good or just. 
 Being exhausted with the Russian/Soviet Marxist, Leninist rhetoric, 
which had to be repeated as Eminent Texts in all areas of intellectual work, 
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Lithuanian academicians, writers, intellectuals, and artists were suddenly 
exposed to the “intellectuals” of the West, specifically the European brand. 
Here they encountered most novel writings, specifically in “philosophy”. 
There was the challenge to the entire Western tradition by Heidegger, 
offering the very gift of authentic Being and salvation from the mass 
collectivism so prevalent in Lithuania during Russian occupation. And then 
there were major figures in hermeneutics, such as Gadamer and Ricoueur, 
whose writings were read with speedy dispatch and led to the notion that 
everything is interpretation, based on historical traditions which had no 
other necessity apart from a claim that all understanding is identical with 
the language of one’s tradition. The flood of post-modern texts, read hastily 
and appropriated uncritically, resulted  – and continues to result  – in a 
“liberation” from any principles, such that any question of truth, falsity, 
dialogue, became redundant. As the post-modern “rule” assumes: “It is 
true because I say so”. In brief, anything goes and, there being no subject, 
all responsibility is abolished. Add to this shift from autocratic edicts of the 
Russian/Soviet period to the sudden liberation from such edicts, and the 
result is obvious: no edicts, no principles, no essences. This novel context 
was further enhanced by the rhetoric of “deconstruction” with the basic 
claim that there are no statements which could have a “univocal” meaning, 
since all meanings are divided into indefinite other meanings and the latter 
are fragmented into other meanings, etc. The only thing that is left is “the 
difference” without positive components. An addition of semiotics extended 
the notion that everything can be understood through discourses and their 
codes. In this sense, one need not study the world, but the language which 
is coextensive with the world, 
The significance of this dramatic intellectual shift appears in the 
ease with which the younger generation of intellectuals became imbued 
with those latest “philosophies”, and the ease with which the mixing and 
eclecticism of these novel trends was accomplished. Just as in globalization, 
new academic disciplines were sprouting and splitting into varieties of 
branches. Suddenly there are philosophy of film, of culture, of education, 
of feminism, of Orient, of nothingness, of and of… But just as the subject 
vanished, so vanished any in depth study of any subject matter to the extent 
that most diverse disciplines became mixed under the guise of multi-
disciplinary topics. In this context, philosophy can be anthropology and the 
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latter becomes part of psychology and ethics, science becomes culture and 
politics, and reality, of whatever kind, becomes a construct. This mixture 
has impacted public discourse, specifically in light of the pervasive view that 
no one has any claim to truth. Political misdeeds by elected public servants 
are judged in terms of morality or psychological features such as “lacking 
a feeling of shame” but not as law breakers.No doubt, public debates are 
a most welcome feature, but one must be principled and logical, and not 
hide behind rhetorical figures of speech. Of course, this kind of “political” 
practice is part of globalization, but Lithuania need not be globalised by 
this trend. At any rate, the outcome is precisely the globalising logic at 
various levels: one can invent oneself, or one can live the life of “pleasure” 
and employ any means to achieve the means for global circulation. This 
circulation is also a way of weakening of personal commitments in family 
structure. Of course the latter is being “assaulted” at its very foundations.
For Western modern understanding, the hindrance to the immediate 
gratification was the myth of the Oedipus complex, providing the technique 
to locate some sort of deviance from the norms to which one is subjected, 
prevalent in social institution of the patriarchal family. The cure for any 
and all deviations that have no identity, is a reconciliation, mediated by the 
doctor, with the family, and a forming of a family of one’s own. But this cure 
has an identity premised on the Egological subject who is no longer available. 
The desire for pleasure does not have an object; rather, it is invested in whole 
environments, impulses and fluxes, and is essentially nomadic. We always 
make love to the world. Eroticism pervades all; the way a technocrat oils the 
machinery, the way a judge pronounces a sentence, the way a corporation 
screws the worker. Only through articulation, exclusion, and isolation that 
pleasure becomes restricted to objects or persons. The restrictions result in 
a produced subject. Yet it is important to note that the objects or persons 
are intersections of agonistic and protagonistic confluences of biological, 
social, historical, and psychic fields which have been equally subject to 
investments for pleasure. Thus at this immediate level of “pleasure logic” 
organisms and environments formed from unformed sensations  – are 
coextensive with their functioning: they do not signify or represent, aim 
at or mean anything. Their analysis must, thus, be functional. This is not 
to say that they function mechanically or even vitalistically in a sense of a 
particular anatomy or instinctual action – reaction connection. After all, 
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the organism for modern understanding is a massive number of chemical, 
genetic, cellular, etc. processes which can be technically transformed, 
although each of these processes combine into Desire Machines. The 
nutrition, the oxygen, the earth, the light, are analogues in nature; each 
system, with its own order, nonetheless connects with the organism as it 
connects with them. The bee is part of the reproductive system of clover, as 
is the wind, the human hand and the tail of a dog. 
Lithuanians are contending with these notions as globalising process 
of attachment to any pleasant point but are not quite cognisant of the level 
at which this process “flows”. To show this level, we must disclose its surface 
nature, without any depth or even any kind of self. It is assumed that our 
customary conception of ourselves as a unitary ego and will, an actor behind 
the acts, is a pretence of integrality: I am working, and I am enjoying, and I 
am in love all reveal at once an illusion of any unity, and the nomadism, the 
constant renaming of the self, and show that there is no inherent synthetic 
unity, but selective processes that overlap and accommodate, tense and 
adjust. The Desire Machine is productive of its environment to be correlative 
to pleasure and equally reproductive of itself. In this sense such processes 
never change to negativity, a desire because there is something lacking. The 
multiple processes produce environments to which they attach and find 
their pleasure. Thus the products, the technical innovations, constituting 
the signitive life world of univocal points of attachment, become regarded 
as pleasure fulfilling domains, the domains that the processes as desire 
consume. What this comprises is a dismissal of cultural inventions of 
symbolic designs, including the fixed family structure and social cohesion. 
In fact the latter, expressed in the Oedipal image, emerges at a certain 
conjunction of cultural history. In this sense, it ceases to have a universal 
and necessary validity, an all-encompassing explanatory force, and becomes 
contingent, historically limited, and a partial mode of speaking. Indeed, 
such an explanatory force is not at all a theoretical operation, but a social 
practical invention, leading subsequently to a specific concept of reason 
that no longer engages in a dialogue with its opposite, but is a monologue 
about the opposite, the linguistically deemed irrational. As we saw, the 
very notion of rationality is instrumental and productive and thus serves 
productive means of circulation of pleasures. This is a modern set up where 
the socially dysfunctional in terms of the logic of productive efficiency, are 
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regarded as irrational, deviant, too much attached to daily pleasures. Not 
sticking to prescribed schedules and thus unfit members of society. 
Yet the “fit” members are left with nothing else except these surface 
pleasure processes that demand circulation to be a nomad, a tourist, to attach 
to some pleasing (even if it terrifying) point on the globe, to feel the live fish 
wiggling down one’s throat in some Japanese restaurant, to feast ones eye 
on exotic advertisements of bodies, dressed only in space, to have a “secret” 
affair with an exotic dancer, to roll in sensuous waves with natives, or to 
get drunk and sent into ecstasy on drugs. In this sense, one’s professional 
nomadism is paralleled by sensuous nomadism. One level circles the globe 
to carry the other level. The sensuous body is not only different from the 
functional system, but can be also contrasted with the organismic system. 
The corporeal surface is orgasmic and not organic. This surface is neither 
constituted by nor coextensive with the practical and functional operations 
that are a vectorial and oriented system of daily life with all its discursive 
articulations and connections of the world. The orgiasmic and the organic 
cannot be contrasted as physical with metaphysical. They overlap in a way 
that the organic surface is orgasmic and circulates its own intensities. Only 
due to the latter that an organic surface is constituted and extended. There 
would be no organic surface without the orgasmic. The organic would be a 
punctiformal discontinuity, a discrete and disconnected bombardment of 
stimuli deprived of communication even at the functional level. The surface 
excitations are out of all proportion to the stimuli. The latter are inadequate 
to account for the differential that allows an organism to have an extended 
surface. It must be noted that the very lack of punctiformity also abandons 
a notion of time for the intensive surface. It is an intensity in passing that 
does not trace a past or project a future. It is a singular TENSE that, in its 
surging, is an ephemeral, delocalised shudder. This delocalisation is what 
distinguishes it from punctiformal and organic stimulus. 
The passing and delocalised intensities exhibit no direction or aim, as 
if they were copresent to a lack, a need, but incite other intensities without 
being complements or completions of one another, without forming 
a system. Their nexus is jealousy that is more primary than the Oedipal 
envy, and they excite one another without being causally connected. The 
term “jealousy” is laden with modern psychological meanings and fails to 
convey this domain in its fundamental “force”. Perhaps the term “vital” is 
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more conducive to speak of these intensities and their nexus. The intensities 
cannot be called excitations without verging on intentionality. Rather, they 
are primary circuits that subtend the organic body; they do not point to 
external references, but first compose intensive distributions of the organic 
surfaces. The phenomenal field, then, is deployed in accordance with 
such distributions and not in accord with some prearranged system of 
objective or subjective stimulations resulting in excitations. The intensive 
nodes are positivities, affirmations of multiple and incompatible arcs; only 
upon slackening the intensities that the incompatibility is articulated and 
each intensity segregates toward something or other and thus becomes 
a sensuous and primary trace, a memorial sensuality. Here intensities 
become desires. It could be said that this distribution of delocalised and 
atemporal intensities is what primarily constitutes the extension of the 
organic surface. The intensities comprise a shifting theatre of inner political 
economy where all events, regardless of their location, become invested 
with an erotic intensity. This is the source of metaphor. At the same time, 
the intensive forces precede and constitute the organic body. This is clear 
in light of the breakup of the organism in erotic encounter an organism 
reverted to the orgasmic deployment of intensities jealous of one another, 
and thus forming a vital nexus one with the other. 
For a worker, for example, Mr. Smith does not only signify a boss, a 
singular individual, but a guardian, all seeing, power over one’s destiny, 
tool of exploitation and subjection, evoking and provoking tingles of anger, 
anxiety, hate deprivation and indifference. Mr. Smith covers a collage of 
intensive processes. The edicts by Smith are equivalent with divine edicts, 
since they regulate even the carnal functioning, demanding a deviation from 
what every other creature takes to be normal. But this may not be interpreted 
in dialectical terms of mastery and subservience. After all, Mr. Smith 
is not a designation of a unitary and sovereign subject, but the intensive 
effects evident in the workers intensive processes of disconnecting organic 
functions, allurements of rewards, intense ambivalences crawling up the 
skin wanting to thank and to choke at the same time and jealousies vibrating 
across contradictory feelings. Mr. Smith is equally in the same situation; in 
face of the worker he too can no longer maintain his identity. But this is 
not a face to face situation. Whatever each says, vibrates across all intensive 
nodes and in unpredictable ways such that even the formed habits that have 
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diminished the intensities to function as sensations, cannot be counted upon 
to maintain their patterns. Thus, there is no longer a subjectivity having 
a libido and radiating its vectors of signification from a central ego. The 
intensities are passions conducted by an anonymous circulation of surfaces 
of a dismembered body; these very surfaces undergo constant shifts and 
transformations. There is no hidden libido that strives for self-manifestation 
and expression in dreams, writing, sayings, myths, and cults. 
Obviously, if the very surface of the organic body depends on, and is 
structured, extended by, the orgiasmic process, then it would be difficult to 
offer a localisation to the orgiasmic, a place “in” something like an organically 
delimited system. The intensities of the orgiasmic carnality are excitations 
at the conjunction of surfaces, whether one’s own or another’s, whether 
earth’s, solar outlay’s, or social system’s; all are productive of the intensive 
flow. Following this passionate body and its by now global logic of pleasure, 
we can contend that there is an orgiasmic economy in the circulation of 
technically produced commodities, comprising the political economies of 
modernity. Is it not fascinating that such systems are regarded organically. 
No doubt, political economy is designed to circulate commodities on global 
skin, but there is also a circulation of a carnal and orgiasmic couplings with 
the pleasure nodes, the points of intensities, the tourist thrills at designated 
locales, proliferated by glossy advertisements of sumptuous images of feasts, 
orgies, extremely satisfied customers and happy hosts. Modern political 
economies are organic systems constituted by an orgiasmic extension of 
intensive excitations around the globe. Each node a city, a secluded enclave, 
a place for thrills and spills spreads the economic organism by allurement, 
jealousy of novel couplings, each node of intensity communicating its force 
directly without representations, through shivers and phantasms. Even the 
stoic and conservative stalwarts of modern economy in China and Russia 
can hardly maintain their territories against the pull of jealousies constituted 
by the “exciting” places that may well become replicated in those very 
territories. After all, this is what increased productivity the pain of being 
a functional body, promises. Thus we see post-communist Lithuanians on 
sunny beaches with borrowed wives, their eyes caressing young waiters and 
waitresses, we read of the “adventures” of mountain climbers, attached to icy 
nodes, and politicians on missions of national security to some region, such 
as Khajuraho in India, gazing at thousands of passionate statues embracing 
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each other. Indeed this global circulation is visible everywhere that is 
transforming ideological commitments. As an important Chinese member 
of political elite on a cruise ship, after an evening of watching a “girl show” 
suggested: social class distinctions must be maintained so that the “hard 
working members of society” could enjoy their appropriate rewards.
The Logic of Identity as the Other
We have reached a point of globalization at which every culture is 
regarded to be self-generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or 
theological grounds. This is to say the modern globalising position led 
to the conclusion that all discourses are autonomously constituted and, 
therefore, are equivalent to one another. After all, there are no criteria 
external to such discourses which will allow the adjudication among them 
concerning any truth claims. If there is anything common among them, it 
is their difference. Given this level, the theories that at times are paraded 
inadvertently such that a discourse somehow represents something are no 
longer maintainable. But this also implies that there is no misrepresentation. 
A particular discourse that frames a cultural world view is in no position 
to either represent the Others or to misrepresent them. The only thing that 
can be suggested is that each discourse inclusive of cultural discourses, will 
interpret others within the parameters of a giving discourse. This is of course 
premised on the basis of the abolition of an essential presence of a subject or 
a structure of the world. But this essentialism has been already destroyed by 
the assumption that even the modern subject has no essence, but must make 
of himself in terms of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, 
the multicultural proposition is not premised on a pre-given essentialism, 
but in fact is constituted on the globalising modern self-destruction of an 
essential subject. The only criterion that this globalising self-invention, both 
of the individual subjectivity and multicultural identities is its practical 
efficiency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of the 
subject, but a view toward what works given that a particular people will be 
offered practical solutions to whatever they think their lacking in their lives, 
or what they are told what they lack in their lives.
To sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the discussion 
of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, we suggest 
that the very abolition of a pre-given subject in favour of self-invention in 
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modern sense leads to the notion not only that the Others are equally self-
inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self-invention to the 
modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumentality. This is to say that 
if every discourse is deemed to be invented and only valid within its own 
framework, then the very concept of discursive self-generation belongs 
within the framework of modernist and Western postmodernist discourse. 
But this means that even if the other cultures are regarded as self-generated, 
their self-generation may have very different self-conceptions, ontologies, 
methods, and practices that did not respect the logic of modernising and 
globalising ontologies and methods. Practically speaking this means that 
whatever purposes there are and however the environment is interpreted 
need no follow the logic of causal efficiency of reconstructing the world into 
our own needs and power. If a culture regards that playing music, listening 
to the stories of the ancients is meaningful and the metaphysical entities are 
relevant for life as protectors of the environment then there cannot be an 
introduction of a criterion that would claim that such conceptions are not 
realistic, mystical, non-productive, since the latter concepts belong to another 
framework. In brief, the confrontation between the two is not between some 
truth and some falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein 
each will interpret the other in its own unique way.
For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is whether 
a given culture with its own constituted discourses has the same practical 
global needs that the globalising autonomy is offering. This is to say does a 
particular cultural discourse allows a definition of environment that must 
be reduced to homogenous resources for arbitrary reconstruction? The 
first limit of modern non-essential conception of total and unconditional 
possibility of inventing any discourse for the sake of applying it for “human 
needs” may not be given in the discourses of other cultures. In order to 
set a limit for globalising modernity, we must demonstrate that within the 
logic of this globalization there is also a reflective recognition that it, as 
invented culture, must respect the equivalences of other invented cultures 
without any other criteria apart from those that each cultural discourse 
possesses within itself. This means that if another culture has a different 
ontology and even metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology 
and metaphysics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not 
operate with the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the 
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homogenised environment. The limit would be set with the lack of primacy 
of instrumental rationality. If the meaning of life of a particular people 
within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfilment of 
indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, 
then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalising 
modern logic, permitted to pursue its own mode of having a life world. 
Yet it is also the case that a globalising logic with its technical efficiency 
and promise of better life is an aspect of the others. They see themselves 
in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural necessities, which 
becomes part of their own self-understanding as different from and yet 
related to this globalising logic. This creates an internal tension within 
various cultures that constitute dual self-recognition wherein one still 
maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges those discourses in 
light of the global Other. This is the source of alienation and destruction of 
cultural self-identity. We still want to maintain cultural identity, but we also 
like to be like the other, to judge ourselves from the vantage point of the 
other. This is an invention of a dual consciousness that frames the power 
struggles within various cultures. The modernisers who at the same time 
claim to be part of the same culture want to transform that culture into 
civilised, practically efficient, objective, and beneficial. While it liberates the 
individuals from her own culture yet there is a wish to claim against the 
globalising process the uniqueness of her own culture. In one sense, there 
is a demand to use the environment in a “desacralised” manner, purely for 
the purpose of the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, 
employment, increased wages as signs of the good life. 
In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have 
our spiritual values that do not allow to reduce the environment, including 
the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the adjudication cannot 
be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able to adjudicate which 
is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. Hence, we witness 
the many confrontations between the groups within given cultures that 
promote modernisations and at the same time intellectuals who resist 
modernisations. This means that a given culture is split into those who 
propagate the need to become globalised and modern and at the same time 
those who, recognising the necessity of modernisation, propose a battle 
against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they claim that we 
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may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very logic that 
this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalising logic 
constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-called 
passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems that the reason for this power 
confrontation rest in the failure to understand the already posited limit 
within which the globalising process must function. 
This limit is the very requirement that the other and its self-generated 
cultural framework is equivalent to the globalising logic. Therefore, the 
latter seems to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to or not 
its own limitations. When we say whether wants it or not, we do not mean 
a choice between two options, but a power confrontation that is inevitable 
since there are no external criteria in this confrontation that would allow 
free decision. What we have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a 
way that one possibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the 
other is offered as the future. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states that the 
one from the past is conservative and traditional, while the other is liberal, 
individualistic open, and even humanistic. Whether this designation is 
true or false is not our concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, in 
their dual consciousness, will play out their roles as both maintaining their 
tradition and at the same time proposing future transformations. 
Our challenge at the cultural level is whether this time awareness is 
universal. The cultural logics must be investigated within the parameters of 
peoples’ understanding of their world not only in terms of the life worlds 
and discursive practices, but also the life worlds that are subtended by the 
cultural preconceptions of what constitutes the universe as time. Within 
this context, we hope to articulate the limits wherein even the power 
confrontations of the dual consciousness find their own limitations. Each 
culture has its own world conceptions as conditions for their own self-
understanding. If there is going to be any adjudication among cultures 
underneath the power confrontations such adjudications will have to 
articulate the world conceptions of various peoples. In this sense, the 
challenge to the globalising logic will not come from the acceptance by 
the other of the efficient technical means that make their own culture 
inadequate, but by the recognition that their own culture has a very different 
world understanding. We know from other cultures, whether Mayan, 
Hindu, or Taoist that the world understanding, even at the ontological 
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or metaphysical levels, is different from the Western scientific and linear 
conceptions. So the task of cultural studies is to find the cosmic awareness 
that underlie their cultural parameters. This is also the case of Lithuanian 
tradition: its life world is based on a unique cosmic awareness.
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In previous discussions of Western modern modernity the conclusion 
has been reached that its ground is metaphysics of the will. Regardless of 
the variants of cultures, such as scientific technology, personality cults 
(such as Judaism, Christianity or Islam), progress, political systems, from 
democracy to dictatorships, the common denominator is unconditional 
will. Here, human autonomy as the source of law to the environment and to 
all the institutional rules and cultural designs is equivalent to the will of the 
unconditional creator of the world – the paternal divinity. In this sense the 
modern Western person assumes a divine complex. He creates himself and 
the environment as if out of nothing. After all, he creates the logics by which 
the world is composed and then realised in material shapes he constructs. 
He creates the very conditions under which he defines what he wants to 
become, so well expressed in utopianisms, and he invents cultures without 
any reference to any reality. Indeed, all reality is equally a result of his culture. 
His numerous theories, belonging to numerous disciplines, comprise the 
magic of alchemy – everything can be made into everything – and in this 
sense his practical life, i.e. what he wants to do is closely tied to his theoretical 
understanding. In this modern life world that is designated as “scientific and 
technical” there appears an arbitrariness suggesting that all relationships are 
power laden. That means that the life of conscience, i.e. what tradition called 
“ethics” is equally engaged in power and indeed – violence. While there are all 
sorts of violence, the concern here is the discovery of endless and destructive 
violence that can be called anarchistic. It is necessary to articulate what sort 
of consciousness is anarchistic and how such consciousness is coextensive 
with conscience or the life of practical action. The action must be explicated 
in contemporary global confrontations between two major incompatible 
trends, each attempting to limit the other by any means. While no longer in 
style, we shall reintroduce the notion of “Clashes of Civilizations”.
In the context of clashes of civilizations, we shall locate Lithuania as an 
alternative, even if it contains a symbolic design which belongs to one side 
of the clashes. Such alternative is based on Lithuanian cosmology that offers 
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a “natural” awareness, still prevalent in daily lives of peoples everywhere, 
from ecological concerns to counting longevity and even food production. 
While seemingly traditional and thus of the past, the Lithuanian life 
world is celebrated not in terms of more pleasures and surface circulation 
of intensive nodes on the skin of economy and technology, but as an 
attunement to the qualitative world awareness which could not be abolished 
by all the disciplines and discourses of globalising logic. The attunement is 
given in the search for “unspoiled” nature, for natural beauty, for the awe in 
the presence of sequoia giants, and in the silence of the wondrous nocturnal 
sky. While the modern dweller lives with light and noise pollution, he is 
drawn to deep contemplation and to joy (not pleasure) in confrontation 
with the “natural” cosmos. As discussed above, with the dawn of modern 
Western metaphysics, social sciences promised to explain all forms of 
human life across continents and civilizations. But the explanations rested 
on the modern prejudgments of praxis life world which, as we saw, not only 
fragmented social fabric into multiple claims and power confrontations, but 
also could not find a cohesive method to understand how humans could 
live together in a relatively peaceful way. Thus, the task of social researchers 
turned to ethnography which was designed to study small ethnic groups – 
the exotic – who would offer an “innocent” and primary structure of society 
and the “purity” of their life world. In fact such a life world was assumed to 
be “spiritual” prior to any major symbolic designs with their Parthenon of 
divinities: the spiritual life world belonged to the primitives. Such proposed 
studies rest on the notion that all the modern complexities cover over the 
direct awareness of the world that is common to all societies practicing 
rituals of attunement to nature. Of course, it is also methodologically 
admitted that there might be an unbridgeable gap between our modern 
cultural context, and those that belong to primordial human societies. Yet 
Lithuanian “primordial” life world is neither primordial nor of the past 
where we should seek alternatives. It is “ever present” even among the 
ethnographers who go in search of the primordial worlds. The search is in 
vain, since our lives and sustenance, our light and soil, are with us.
Global Confrontations
Having accessed the logic of globalization, its pervasive consciousness, 
and correlatively, the global utilitarian pleasure ethics, as its conscience, we 
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are in a position to find the limits within which such logic functions and 
what is posed as its radical opposition. We used the terms “consciousness” 
and “conscience” to show a basic background issue that frames global 
clashes. Various languages, including both German and English, distinguish 
between consciousness and conscience. Latin, in contrast, does not. For it 
the term consciencia covers both. On the one hand, the distinction seems 
warranted: philosophical, and even political systems, separate practical 
from theoretical domains. On the other hand, closer analyses of such 
systems, shows an inseparable correlation between these domains. Certain 
ontological modes of awareness are correlated to specific morphologies of 
norms, and vice versa. We can, then, suggest that a specific philosophical 
system contains both, and thus can be regarded as consciencia. What may be 
analytically separated in philosophy, is certainly connected in daily realms 
of awareness, such as religion, politics, sciences, and even arts. Structures 
of awareness (inclusive of theories), i.e. the modes of accessing the world 
of objects, subjects, and situations, are immediately linked with structures 
of selectivity and valuation, such as good and evil, right and wrong, 
abnormal and normal, true and false. We already know that theories are 
not free floating Platonic systems or some psychological components, but 
are direct modes of the way that the world is perceived and in the modern 
context made. As our discussion of the modern age has shown, we can look 
at the world “materialistically” as the only objective position, and hence 
treat the environment and ourselves as material. In this case our awareness 
and our practice will coincide to the extent that all our practical (ethical) 
engagements will have to be reduced to the variants of material explanation. 
In principle, since our materialistic perception of the world claims to be 
quality neutral, then our ethics will have to be one of “indifference” to 
experienced essential differences among things and resultantly our actions 
will have to treat everything with indifference. If we assume a nihilistic 
consciousness, then our actions will correlate to this assumption. In 
brief, theory-consciousness and conscience-action are constantly given in 
their correlation. In this writing, the term consciencia will be replaced by 
practognosis and used as a synthesis between consciousness and conscience, 
i.e. theory and praxis.
It is possible to trace a variety of practognoses. A careful reading of one’s 
own history is a good source, while reading about, or an encounter with other 
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civilizations give solid indications of this, and our awareness of our modern 
Western life world, containing a high degree of cultural complexities, seem 
to reveal a multiplicity of practognoses. This is not to say that the cultural 
complexity guarantees that individuals and/or groups will maintain 
permanently their practognosis. They can change, and changes are not just 
a question of choice. The changes are governed by rules which are neither 
identical with, nor derivable from the rules of psychology, physiology, nature, 
economy, or sociology. No doubt, these diverse disciplines may propose their 
own rules, and claim that everything else is derived from them, as is our 
discussed case of multi discursivity, but for the present investigation they 
will be excluded. The focus will be on the processes that shape the different 
types of practognoses and in the formation of their genesis. Metaphorically 
speaking, practognosis can be understood as a constitutional system, such 
that not every type is directly comprehensible or understood by other types. 
As has been discovered in the problematic of cultural studies, a direct one to 
one translation is difficult if not impossible to achieve. Presumably it may be 
possible to find a synthesis among some types, while for others the shift from 
one to another requires a radical transformation. Moreover, some types are 
stable, and others most unstable.
Given current civilizations, each having varieties of cultures, it is 
appropriate that there is a constant crisis. Each culture, as a practognosis, 
has a tendency to claim totality. Hence there is an undeclared “war” among 
them. The current fundamentalists and their Middle-Eastern relatives 
have their holy war and doomsday, the Skinnerians their Walden II, the 
racists their pure nation, the capitalists their pure market and above all 
the modern scientific technocrats their utopia. Civilizational awareness is 
a precarious balance among varieties of practognoses. The price exacted 
for this balance by specific cultures and individuals committed to them, is 
the maintenance of their practognosis in a lukewarm or mild position, and 
hence as a potential bad conscience. A perfectly good conscience is tied 
to a striving for the establishment and or maintenance of consciousness, 
i.e. the way the world is perceived as reality without any qualifications. It 
is of absolute authenticity in its claim to the only truth. It must be obvious 
that each such perception is different from those of others, leading to the 
modern/postmodern claims that there are many “world views” given as 
discourses, and each with the power to construct its own world. 
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To make certain that we understand these claims it is necessary to 
point out that for the modern tradition discussed so far, there is no “world 
in itself ”. It is either a result of some “divine” speaking-making in accord 
with his view of what kind of world it wills, or it is a “perspective” from 
which all events are regarded. Such a perspective is not a “view” toward a 
pre-given world, but it is the only world that a particular person has. This 
perspectivism ranges from psychological, social, economic, biological, 
and the rest of “disciplines” all the way to cultic. For a follower of a cult, 
there is no “world” without a world view. Thus, for a Middle Eastern 
person, whether belonging to Judaic, Christian or Islamic personality cult, 
the world is “created by the will of supreme authority” and nothing else, 
and ones actions must comply with the wishes of such an authority. For a 
modern person, the world is technically constructed and can be regarded 
as a material mechanism. In principle, every variation in the metaphysics 
of the will does not permit a world of things and events that would be 
independent of metaphysical entities. In this sense the world can be violated 
by various value judgments, regarding the inadequacy of its composition. 
These same judgments will regard other world views as inadequate or even 
false with respect to the one possessed by his own group. If a world view 
is identical with the world present in a language of making, then any other 
world view must be regarded as false, an illusion, perhaps even constructed 
by some evil geniuses, an enemy of truth, good and god. That is why some 
civilizations maintain requirements of tolerance of diversity even at the 
peril of being attacked from within by members of one of the world views, 
regarding diversity as decadent and tolerant of evil. We shall see this shortly.
For persons who possess an absolute truth, being tolerant means being 
lukewarm or mild, having a potential bad conscience, may be a matter of an 
oversight, even neglect; yet there are available justifications that are advanced 
for this potentiality. Obviously the justification is a matter of consciousness. 
Broadly speaking, it is a claim to some inadequacy, failure, in human or 
social fabric, temptations of the body, being born a sinner, not having 
enough understanding, and even not being worthy to live with the highest 
truth. Various aspects are posted by consciousness to fulfil these purported 
inadequacies. The achievement of authentic practognosis is projected 
toward some future utopia, or a call to establish socio-economic conditions, 
or unreachable in this world, wherein we can simply read portents, point 
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out signs to others, wait for the power from above to act and hope for the 
best. The continuity of a complex civilization hinges upon the degree to 
which such posted aspects are integrated in all types of practognosis of 
a civilization. As noted, the mild practognoses are unstable. They can be 
awakened, heated up, and unfold an appropriate authentic practognosis. 
From the latter, the mild is regarded as inauthentic and, having transfigured 
to authentic, will be an object of bad conscience. The factors which were 
deemed to be justifications are, resultantly, regarded as false consciousness. 
They do not correspond to truth, the edicts of a divinity, the factual needs 
of humanity, and the social and/or individual nature of the human. Those 
who become awakened to their world view as the ultimate truth, such as 
being “reborn in Jesus“, or pronouncing the appropriate words in Arabic 
to become a true Muslim, will regard their former tolerance of other views 
as immoral, as having allowed oneself to be a servant of some demonic 
forces. The “rebirth” must be taken literally, since in the modern world of 
the metaphysics of the will, one becomes exactly what the words demand – 
remade into a different being. The mild practognosis is, thus, temporarily at 
a distance to real authenticity.
Such a distance, nonetheless, can be founded in another type of 
practognosis. It is one constituting a reflexive view of the phenomena 
of all practognoses. Indeed, our engagement so far comprises this type 
of practognosis. Moreover, the method of this reflexive view is the 
status of human studies, leading to the positing of the different types 
of practognoses for analyses without accepting a commitment to any. 
The analytic engagement with them is a traversal, a going through all 
of them in order to disclose their invariants, variations, and if available, 
interconnections. Authentic types of practognoses would have to consider 
this type of conscience as the ultimate manifestation of bad consciousness, 
not committed to a specific truth and mode of action. A mild practognosis 
can be excused. Seen from the viewpoint of its authentic modification, it is 
only not fully aware of its position and hence can be illuminated, awakened 
and thus committed to its truth and action. In this sense even an opposed 
authentic or mild practognosis can be accepted – to a degree. Despite their 
different world views, the possibility of their conversion to an authentic 
one shows them to be of the same type. Each, in its authentic modification, 
has a goal to impose its practognosis on the whole civilization. Thus the 
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previously mentioned demand for the rule by King of Kings, or the current 
demands for a universal Caliphate, one Christian world, uniting “all faiths” 
or one utopia, comprise this effort to dominate by any means. Any means 
are moral in such an effort to serve the “kingdom”.
The reflective traversal of human studies is preserving a multi-
cultural civilization, and thus it must be in principle a Socratic, wondering, 
curious, and inquisitive practognosis. Its essential constitution is tolerance. 
It is rooted in a consciousness that has itself as its own type of tolerant 
practognosis. Every claim for objectivity of any practognosis is restricted in 
this reflective consciousness, and is considered as a moment in a network 
of claims. The appropriate aspect of conscience is a rejection of any absolute 
or unqualified commitment to one ethic and action. This practognosis does 
not coincide with anarchism. Anarchism is a type of practognosis which, in 
its authentic modification, demands the destruction of all social structures. 
It may possess a mild stage which consists of a universal distrust, and a 
demand for partial destruction of centralised power and highly organised 
systems. As every mild modification, this anarchism is compatible with 
human studies and its appropriate practognosis. Authentic anarchism, in 
contrast, is most radically opposed to human studies, not only because 
it is authentic, but above all, because its intention is a rejection of all 
theories, their use for justification of human and social life, and an ethic for 
specific action. Indeed it must accept destruction in principle without any 
justification. In this sense, the subsequent considerations about anarchism 
are developed from a non-positional stance which, by our logic, is radically 
opposed to anarchism. But there is no other way. Disciplines such as 
sociology and psychology will not make this admission, since it is not 
characteristic of scientific practognosis to be self-reflective. For philosophy, 
it is a requirement to recognise this reflection as a topic belonging to 
philosophical researches. Indeed, we could even say that the logic of this 
practognosis is Socratic-philosophical. Socrates did not claim to possess 
knowledge or truth; he claimed the duty to interrogate all claims.
Terrorism
In contemporary global life world, where technical systems of information 
interconnect, we are confronted with a phenomenon called “terrorism. 
Whether real or not, any “suspicious” act or look, is placed in the category 
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of being terroristic. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a 
global clash, and just about every side of this clash calls the actions of others 
as “terroristic”. It is necessary, as a result, to explicate the essence of genuine 
terrorism which plays a role in contemporary affairs. Let us look at the basis 
of this phenomenon. An authentic modification of practognosis is one when 
a good conscience constitutes an identity between action and the language of 
morality and truth. It also includes an aggressive social activity. The anarchistic 
movements of 19th and second part of 20th centuries have such modifications. 
What links both periods, at the first glance, is an extensive terroristic 
activity. There are some aspects in anarchistic practognosis that would allow 
terrorism to be an appropriate social activity. Yet some distinctions will have 
to be articulated in order to offer an essential delimitation of anarchistic 
practognosis and its own modifications. To appreciate such modifications, 
terroristic activities should be brought to a clearer relief.
Terroristic activities are, in general, of a minority that lacks the power 
of direct and open revolution. They are focused on the weak links in the 
established powers and, in terms of a given law, are violations and are regarded 
as crimes. Terror, in some revolutions, is premised on a consciousness that 
such actions will be considered legal in post-revolutionary society. What is 
suppressed by illegal terrorism today, will be suppressed by the law tomorrow. 
If legal rules allow extreme exploitation of one group by another, then terror 
used against the interests of the exploiter can be justified by the claim that after 
a violent revolution exploitation will be prohibited by law. The anarchistic 
terrorism is founded upon a different consciousness. First, the overthrow of 
established powers is in a distant future. Thus all actions will be criminal for 
a long time. Trials, imprisonments, and executions, are to be expected, and 
indeed considered as an integral part of terroristic actions. Second, not only 
is a given legal and ethical system not recognised, but it does not regard its 
activities as justified by any legal and ethical system in a post-revolutionary 
period. It is purely destructive and does not have, as would be the case in 
other revolutionary terroristic activities, an introduction of a new legal and 
ethical system. We are suggesting, here, that a practognosis of terroristic 
activities that can provide a good conscience, need not always be anarchistic. 
Thus, in ethnic conflicts, the source of good conscience is the consciousness 
that one’s own ethnic group has been violated in unpardonable ways and 
hence one has the right to use all means as self-defense. In turn, there 
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remains a lot of common territory in the practognosis of the two groups for 
some accommodations. The violated group can be reimbursed for its losses 
and rules can be formulated to prevent future violations. Thus, destruction 
is limited.
Some radical revolutionary movements which are engaged in terrorism 
need not be grounded in all instances in anarchistic practognosis. The 
good conscience of such movements is grounded in a consciousness which 
understands the given social, political, and economic order in general if 
not in particular, as the source of injustices. At the level of principles, the 
ruling groups might find some common ground with the revolutionary in 
their practognosis. Murder is murder, and science is science. Revolutionary 
movements of the 19th century used science as a corroboration of the positions 
of their consciousness. Obviously, the science of the revolutionaries was of 
a specific kind – one designed to fit the legitimation of revolutionary terror. 
Such positions were also the source of discipline and authority – obedience 
structure, promising guidelines for the post-revolutionary system of legal 
society. Even the obedience which the authority structure demands in 
concrete situations had to be justified by their brand of scientific analysis 
of the very situation. While there may be abuses and errors, no principle 
of consciousness is disconfirmed by error and abuse, especially when the 
revolutionaries could correct their science to fit the situation. The nimble 
ways that the Soviet Union, or Marxism-Leninism and Nazi Germany 
modified science to suit the current “revolutionary” interests, reveal a 
strategy of avoiding the inevitable conclusion of their being anarchistic. 
Revolutionary movements can apply terrorism. Whether they do or not, 
and whether they admit to such actions, is a matter of tactics. While the 
praxis is anarchistic, the practognosis is not. The good conscience follows 
such actions, since a legitimating account is being offered as a corroborating 
consciousness concerning the necessity of such action. We are not raising a 
question whether such efforts at legitimation are true or false, but that they 
are presented as such.
What is characteristic for an anarchistic practognosis in terroristic 
activity is a good conscience which has its justification in consciousness 
that provides no legitimating account for the truth or morality of action. 
Here we can distinguish two modes of anarchistic practognosis. Anarchism 
can be either the consequence of an intellectual movement in which the 
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significance of theoretical and moral or political justification is rejected a 
priori, or it can be a result of the deterioration of the positive positions of 
revolutionary consciousness, the discovery of the irrelevance or inappli-
cability of such positions for action.
Nineteenth century anarchistic practognosis has this general setting: 
its consciousness rejects all given social, legal and political institutions and 
their replacement by other institutions; all these are deemed obstacles to 
the freedom of individuals. Its conscience regards destructive activity as 
the only justifiable moral duty and rejects all other moral principles and 
justifications. It accepts as positive what are immediate implements for 
and consequences of destruction. Here anarchistic praxis has no interest 
in theoretical explanations, and specifically in scientific explanations. The 
only acceptable science is technology of destruction. Any other science that 
tends to explain events by causes, conditions, laws and rules is regarded 
as an obstacle to revolution. All such explanations serve as justification of 
existing realities; hence only pure action, without any justifying position, 
must be accepted. While the anarchist may belong to other revolutionary 
movements, he/she will regard such movements as relevant insofar as their 
members can be educated to the final meaning their revolution to be, in 
principle, anarchistic. Hence, the anarchist will have an elitist attitude and 
distance to other movements. This distance allows him to be radically 
individual and absolutely free of any position, including of his/her specific 
identity, although he will assume any identity that might be required for 
terroristic activity. The problem is what he has to do at the moment when 
he has to take up the task of revolution as his own.
The shift to practical activity without qualification elicits a crisis in the 
anarchistic practognosis. In order to constantly maintain the arche of the 
revolutionary striving, he has to reject any and all positivity of justification 
and establishment of any institutional structures in the public. Institutions, 
after all, have always enslaved the populations and their replacement by 
other institutions will continue to be oppressive. Thus her distance from 
any and all public institutions and individuals with positive wants and 
desires, theories and values, is absolute. Her individualism is a pure will of 
abstention from any positivity (and negativity as a position), and a pure will 
to “educate” the public not toward a better understanding, a better future, 
or freedom of choices of public options and legal questions, but complete 
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abolition of the public’s taking any justifying position. This anarchistic 
stance, its practognosis, is radically unstable and unpredictable or, as we 
were presenting the case of the modern variants of metaphysics of the will, 
totally arbitrary. 
Given this context it is now possible to explicate one major variant 
and its numerous sub-variants of anarchistic practognosis. It is constituted 
by what may be called diverse monistic contents of practognosis. While 
numerous revolutionary theorists, including Marx, Lenin, Hegel, used 
monistic language, such as materialism or dialectics, Marx and Lenin 
stopped short of attaining anarchistic practognosis. Hegel, meanwhile, 
is ambiguous on that score, yet most fundamentally his understanding 
is based on an unconditional will that is not compelled by any external 
reasons. The absolute, as consciousness, has no lacks; it simply “wants” to 
know itself by way of a fundamental self-division and unification, i.e. Ur-Teil. 
In this sense self objectivation of the absolute is based on the metaphysics 
of the will. No doubt, Marx and Lenin, despite their arguments against the 
anarchists, might turn out to be anarchistic too as cultural manifestations 
of modern Western metaphysics of the will expressed in an endless progress 
without a purpose. This we shall attempt to demonstrate shortly. The most 
appropriate invariant of anarchistic practognosis may be monistic positions 
expounded by Hegel. His language is at the outset anarchistic, specifically 
since we cannot claim to understand what the absolute is and what it 
wants. It is destructive of any essence and a block to the discovery of any 
natural and independent presence. His principle for our understanding 
of the world is that “essence is what has been”. And what has been is 
a product of the form of the above mentioned Ur-Teil in whose context 
any judgment about anything is a split of self-identity and an immediate 
transcendence and negation of what is being judged. Hence, one can never 
know either the absolute or a permanent essence of anything, including 
any institutions. Their givenness as an essence is immediately pushed 
into the past while the transcendence toward the future is not accessible 
without it too becoming a past. Sartre built his entire metaphysics of the 
self as nothing on this Hegelian anarchistic ground. What is significant for 
our understanding, that while Hegel attempted to save the modern human 
from being grounded in nothing by bringing in the traditional patriarchal 
divinity as the wilful master of all phenomena, Sartre dispensed with the 
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images of such a divinity as residua of personality cults and boldly accepted 
the conclusion that the modern human generates himself, the meaning of 
his environment and world out of his own non-being, his own nothing as 
an inescapable ground of all destructiveness. 
Absolute and Anarchy
Having established the context to understand anarchistic terror, it is 
now possible to address the contemporary world in which terrorism is seen 
as a major issue. The Middle Eastern personality cults, Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, have a symbolic design where an absolute and inaccessible being 
rules over the given universe and its inadequate order. Thus, the absolute is, 
regarding all established social, political, educational, scientific and economic 
orders, absolutely destructive. After all, Middle Eastern eschatology 
assumes a complete reversal and absolute inadequacy of any given order. 
The practognosis of such movements ranges from peaceful acceptance of 
the world apart from the notion that the absolute (having variants such as 
patriarch, god, creator, source) is to be trusted to act in his absolute wisdom 
and power. The individual, here, regards her activity as self-perfection in 
order to be worthy of the heavenly kingdom at the time when the patriarch, 
the god, or his son, will act. At present we must tolerate the others despite 
their false world view and immorality. We may exclude ourselves the best 
we can from their evil influences and attempt to live in accordance with the 
will of the lord. As we saw, this position is lukewarm or mild in contrast 
to its authentic modification; in the latter members of these groups regard 
their duty to be direct agents of the patriarch in this world. They hear the 
call to duty, become reborn, and are ready to spread the word and challenge 
all established institutions and orders. This may move through passive 
resistance, refusal to cooperate with institutions, terrorist activities against 
institutions, such as bombing of clinics, or efforts to change the institutions 
by “purifying” them of corrupted and polluted views and influences and 
thus of attempting to form sacred institutions and a theocracy. 
This anarchistic violence is prevalent in Middle Eastern civilization 
as exemplified by current jihadist activities. The propagators are “called” 
by their absolute Lord.to duty first to destroy all false consciousness and 
its attendant immorality, in order to establish the divine order on earth 
under one, faithful ruler. This means that any person or group, adhering to 
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a different view, is false, and cannot be tolerated; their actions are equally 
evil and must be forbidden and anyone performing such actions must 
be destroyed as an evil being, serving the enemies of the absolute. The 
destruction is regarded as legitimate and moral, since it is correlated to an 
absolute truth maintained by the jihadist. More generally speaking, anyone 
who even would propose a slightest deviation from such truth, would be 
regarded as a heretic. In this sense, all texts, whether contemporary or 
ancient, all authors, all monuments, cultural treasures, deviating from the 
announced truth and good, are false and evil and must be destroyed. This 
is a common feature of the practognosis of all Middle Eastern personality 
cults. The Spanish invasion of the “new world” was equally a destruction 
of all the literatures of great civilizations, such as the Inca, Maya, Aztec, 
destruction of the images of the symbolic designs of those life worlds, 
and their replacement by Christian images and temples, including an 
imposition of new texts containing the “only truth”. This common feature 
can be called an interpretation of “false” texts, i.e. an interpretation which 
abolishes such texts. This practice was spread through other absolutist 
claims, such as those of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism and Fascism, who also 
burned “heretic” writings and their authors. This practognosis is anarchistic 
insofar as the destruction of the heretics, unbelievers, believers in “false” 
gods, are destroyed absolutely. Even those, who proclaim to adhere to the 
same absolute Lord, and yet deviate from one another in interpreting the 
eminent text, become absolute enemies.
Then there can be geographic movements to find a haven where an 
unpolluted life, in accordance with magical prescripts from ancient stories, 
will rule the daily life of everyone, or invading “promised lands” and by use 
of terror and violence destroying or expelling the settled populations, and 
there can be militaristic phase of seizing power in a holy war in order to 
establish the kingdom of heaven. While on the surface these movements 
might appear to offer some minimal legitimation by a promise to establish a 
“true order”, they cannot sustain such promises due to the very composition 
of the relationship between the construct called “absolute” and (a) the 
possibilities of understanding what the absolute really wants. Human 
intelligence is in no position to grasp the ultimate message, and (b) the very 
establishment of “divine kingdom” on earth is never adequate, and hence 
must be constantly destroyed and its final realisation forever deferred. Here 
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we can see the absurdity of the consequences of this type of practognostic 
anarchy: after seizing power either in a peaceful or militaristic “revolution” 
it must turn against itself as an established power. The victorious church had 
a victory only because it has surrendered itself to the imperfect, unheavenly 
means of this inadequate world. The kingdom of the patriarch, a god, a 
prophet, has not been achieved. Various reformation movements are good 
examples of this failure. Protestant revolution’s central claim is that the 
Catholic Church has surrendered to the “lord of this world” and abandoned 
the direct “truths” of the eminent text – the bible – in favour of secular-
philosophical Greek texts. Moreover, the church had established power 
institutions from which it dominates entire kingdoms and populations 
and does so not only by verbal magic, rituals and thetoric, but by military 
means. While this protestant movement was deemed successful, it turned 
against itself by splintering into numerous groups, each accusing the other 
of having failed to understand the ultimate truth and thus having equally 
fallen into the hands of the lord of this world. Protestantism split and split 
into a universal falsehood. This anarchistic practognosis is repeated by all 
sorts of revival movements calling for the destruction of falsehoods and 
evils of non-believers. Yet all such efforts fail without, in the final analysis, 
offering any positive institution as a justification, since any established 
institution will not be adequate in principle to fulfil the demands of heaven 
and hence will have to be destroyed. This means that in the very centre of 
these personality cults is anarchistic violence without any justifiable result: 
terrorism for the sake of terrorism. 
The problem is how an individual is to act in light of the demands 
or calls to duty by the highest authority in prophetic cults. As mentioned, 
there are various phases, such as self-perfection and thus identification 
with the absolute. But in this case one must accept the world as it is and 
count on the ultimate authority to act against the “evil” forces in the world. 
But this also means a lack of real content in the individual’s consciousness, 
specifically for practical activities. If the ultimate authority is performing 
everything beyond the individual’s understanding, then the individual is 
left out of participation. Since reality is unacceptable, such as the presence 
of the unbelievers, believers in wrong truths and actions, and even believers 
who tolerate such positions, and nature as corrupted by deviant demonic 
forces, then one must turn against such reality but in a totally negative 
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way – in the name of the ultimate authority. The negative way is simply a 
destruction of all institutions, terrorist violence against everything and, as 
mentioned, all without possible justification.
For this variant of practognostic anarchy, the destructive force is 
the ultimate, absolute being who is outside the reality of this world. The 
follower of the ultimate claims to be the agent of this authority and also 
maintains a position outside of this world by appealing to “morality 
beyond all moralities”, to a justice higher than any other justice but whose 
positions are inaccessible to the individual. He must act purely on faith 
which demands pure will for violence for the sake of violence. The crisis 
in this practognosis appears at the moment when there are portents, 
signs, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storms, wars, disease suggesting 
the presence of the absolute authority and an imminent appearance of 
the “absolute kingdom” requiring immediate joining for the “final battle”. 
The current activity of the “evangelicals” in the United States is a principle 
example of this terroristic anarchistic practognosis. But at present, the 
jihadists are more akin to the “mother of all battles”. Indeed, this anarchistic 
practognosis must turn against the openness of philosophy which, in the 
modern West, had to become identical with world history, its progress and 
innovations. Here, the ultimate, as beyond the world, is lost among the 
multiple disciplines, cultural discourses and human self-invention; it dies – 
leading to one variant of “god is dead” theology – and the individual cannot 
act on his own to destroy the institutions in the name of the ultimate. 
At this level, this type of anarchistic practognosis is called upon to act for 
total destruction of the world erected by faithless secularism and its tolerance 
of fallacies and evils. But this means that the one who hears the call, who reads 
the portents, does not have a positive position as to what is to be established 
after the destruction of the false and evil world is complete. After all, portents, 
signs are not a position but an indication, a pointing to, but what they point 
to – the ultimate – and what it wants is incomprehensible. One cannot think 
to it, since thought is rejected not only as human and inadequate in face of an 
absolute, but also as premised on interrogation of the truth of specific claims; 
one cannot argue through it, since arguments are a secular, faithless mode 
of life. Indeed, thinking is tolerant of a variety of claims if they seem to be 
rationally plausible. This simply means that philosophy is not permitted. If 
the portents were to indicate a kingdom to be erected, then such a kingdom 
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will fail. As mentioned, first, because we do not know what it would be in 
terms of the requirements of the ultimate, and second, we would use secular 
means, rational explication as to what to do, and hence would be in the 
hands of the philosophical devil and thus what we build would have to be 
destroyed as inadequate, and forever inadequate. In this sense, this type of 
anarchistic practognosis is the very core, periphery and foundation of the 
way one must live with monistic personality cults proclaimed to be ultimate. 
A slight variant could be added to indicate that one aspect of this type of the 
ultimate is “primacy of will”. We should recall our previous discussion that 
according to the story, the patriarch makes a world by willing and hence it 
is in a position to change the way the world is “at will”. Since the world is 
regarded to be inadequate and in a fallen state, then this will is against the 
world. But as noted above, pure anarchistic practognosis is also premised on 
unconditional will prior to any reason or justification. 
Being empty it too is against all institutions and positions and its 
destiny is destruction in principle. In this sense, miracles and all reform 
movements claim the intervention in this world of the will of the absolute. 
While such movements may be seen as fringes within basic institutions 
established by cults, they also remind such institutions that the movements 
are the true spirit and the very essence of all institutions and their corner 
stone. As already noted, reform movements tend to “go back” to the 
pristine eminent text that has been corrupted by worldly interests and 
institutions created to promote and pursue such interests. In turn, it would 
be appropriate to say that reform movements fail, because they too want to 
establish institutions with the means of the fallen world, and thus are called 
back to the “core teaching” in order to repeat the reform and hence destroy 
the very institutions that reforms bring about. Hence, the new reform 
movement will have its corner stones and in a true spirit will again become 
on the “fringe” and may even be regarded as radical, but in accordance with 
the logic of personality cults, it will equally comprise the very core. It is one 
principal claim of the movements based on personality cults is that they 
are duty bound to “spread the word”, transform and “save the world”. Thus 
the appeal of such radical movements to vast populations, even if the latter 
remain mild in their own actions and tolerance of others. 
This appears in a sharp relief in contemporary “debates” concerning 
the “radicals” and the “moderates” of the Islamic world, although the same 
217
Chapter VI. Clash of Civilization
debate is relevant for the “liberal” and “fundamentalist” postures in Jesuist 
and Judaic cults. The radicals have declared a holy war against the “secular 
West” as the region where the great Satan rules. Secularism is an aspect of a 
classical philosophical tradition where open public debate decides all issues 
and affairs and where truth is sought by rational means. But this also means 
a necessary tolerance of others and in fact a duty to allow them to present 
their case, even the case for the relevance and value of personality cults. 
From the radical position the moderates have been partially corrupted 
by secularism, specifically by accepting to live under laws which are not 
strictly in compliance with the will of the supreme patriarch. In short, they 
have yielded to the temptation of philosophy, of thinking, they have fallen 
into errors and have become identifiable as the enemy of truth and good. 
The very institutions they built are false and destined for destruction. The 
very presence of the moderates is a sign of a total decline and corruption 
of the pure tradition and the supreme authority has issued a call to a holy 
war not only against the secular West, but against all who have been tainted 
by its presence. Once again, the will against the world is manifested in 
its glaring outline. The radicals promise to return the people to the only 
truth and good, but the price is a holy war against all who are “not of the 
faith”. All corrupt, i.e. secular and worldly institutions have to be destroyed 
through terrorist violence and replaced by theocracy. Yet it is obvious that 
such a replacement will fail a priori simply because the institutions will be 
of this world and fallible, and new radicals will appear to challenge such 
institutions; but they too will fail – there will never be a heaven on earth and 
in the final analysis there cannot be any justification for terrorist violence 
except for its own sake. 
We must not be misled by the phenomenon of some nations being 
Islamic, Christian, or Jewish and for two reasons. First, there is no agreement 
within the theocrats which of them represents the “pure text” and hence 
the terrorist violence among themselves cannot cease. Indeed the terrorist 
violence among such nations cannot cease since all claim that it is the only 
rightful heir to the initial founder of the cults. Hence the others are either 
outcasts from the “family” or have gone astray and must be destroyed with 
the rest of the evil world. It will not do to argue that one or another of these 
nations is moderate, since the moderation does not belong to that tradition 
but is a corrupting influence from the secular world, the Satanic domain of 
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the West. We must remember that the West also contains vast populations 
that are committed in a mild manner to Middle Eastern personality cults 
and thus can be awakened to the authenticity of the cause. In the main, they 
simply take on the duty to spread the word, to send missionaries to change 
the peoples around the globe to become members of their cult. While there 
is a rhetorical obfuscation concerning tolerance and respect of other modes 
of life, since the main protagonists of these cults demand that the followers 
“go and convert” those |others”. 
We may recall the last gentle pope who went around the globe many 
times promoting tolerance, and yet, as was the case with his visit to India, 
commanding the “faithful” to convert the Hindus. This mild stage is usually 
attended by a central presumption that if the word is not heeded by the 
infidel or the unbelievers, then more severe measures will have to be taken: 
power and violence against the indigenous populations. From crusades 
against each other to conquest by sword rules the day. To his embarrassment, 
the pope Benedict accused Islam of brutality for contributing to violence 
by traditionally extending its Islamic dominion by military conquest, 
forgetting not only the crusades, but also the actions of the knights of the 
cross who committed genocide against Eastern European ethnic groups. 
Second, as is well noted by leading writers within these personality cults, 
as long as there are worldly, secular and hence Satanic places, the heaven 
cannot come down to earth since any place where evil still remains will be 
a diseased area capable of polluting the entire theocratic world. In brief, 
there is a demand that the entire world must be conquered and one ruler 
established in the name of the given cult. 
The anarchistic practognosis of these types may survive in another 
mode apart from the tradition of such radical groups. It is an integral part 
of that entire tradition itself. It survives for long periods in dormancy as a 
collection of literary stories. Such stories become revived and their purity 
may require actualisation or awakening. These awakenings have variations. 
Sympathy for the real commitment to the kingdom of the ultimate in former 
times, such as total self-sacrifice and a total rejection of the order of this 
world. The saints, the great prophets, the unyielding warriors defending 
their faith become examples to be emulated. This sympathy can also be 
transposed to present times and lived actively in a war of destruction both 
as a revenge for the wrongs done to the previous martyrs, and as a way 
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of actively sacrificing for the pure truth they had embodied. The difficulty 
of the reformers is that they cannot shake completely their position, since 
they are a part of and must accept the tradition that contains the abolition 
of the established worldly orders and the presumed theocratic order the 
reformers had established, but not in a quite complete form, since it too had 
declined and became obscured and covered over by false prophets, infidels, 
heretics and evil powers. In brief, they have to claim that they wish to 
abolish all orders as worldly and corrupt, and yet one aspect of such orders 
is the acceptance of the unsuccessful abolition of all orders as a sign that no 
success is possible and therefore all terrorist violence will remain forever 
anarchistic. In other words, parts of the available institutional powers 
were established by revolutionary reformations that were in principle 
unsuccessful and therefore anarchistic.
Once more, then, the difficulty of distancing from all positions of 
anarchistic practognosis reappears. The best demonstration for this is the 
present schizophrenia of all types of conservativisms: In order to actualise 
themselves they have to be, regarding established powers, a destructive 
force. Thus, since the dawn of the 20th century there are not only revolutions 
from the right, such as fundamentalisms, fascisms and Marxisms, but 
also their attendant anarchism and terror. The contemporary anarchistic 
practognosis of the type of prophetic movements in the West faces a world 
which is partially its own product. To face the religious establishments 
instituted by a variety of religious reformations is to face its own products 
as failures. The failures are obvious, since the institutions are works of 
this world and must be destroyed anew in subsequent reformations, ad 
infinitum. In this sense, and in principle, the anarchistic terror and violence 
of this type of practognosis can never establish the kingdom of heaven and 
hence its activity becomes self-referring and self-warranted. Violence and 
terror for their own sake. At least for this world, the members of prophetic 
traditions must engage in terroristic violence for its own sake without 
any justification. It could be said that all the joy about Heidegger and his 
deconstructive followers belong in this domain: there is nothing that we 
can say about a given text and what it means, but we can forever engage in 
deconstruction for its own sake without saying anything.
The argument from numbers will not help the claim that the majority 
of the members of these personality cults are moderate and are tolerant 
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of others. It is in the essence of such personality cults that anyone, even 
a singular person, can be inspired by a reading of fables in an eminent 
text and demand a return to truth, a call to armed resistance against the 
demonic and worldly secularism and be a catalyst in heating up others to 
their authentic position and correlative action. After all, the eminent texts, 
full of miraculous stories, can be read in indefinite ways suggesting, for 
the present times, all sorts of signs, miracles, and prognostications. It took 
one regular monk, Luther, to start a radical movement and a protracted 
“holy war” which would lead the erring populations back to the one truth 
beyond the worldly institutions such as Catholic Church and its reliance on 
the writings of heretics – the philosophers. The truth is in the text full of 
stories, fables, allegories, miracles and metaphors. It required one Islamic 
writer in Egypt – Sayyid Qutb – to create an “Islamic revolution” leading to 
followers such as Bin Laden and a “holy war” even against his own “erring” 
country, Saudi Arabia. The weeding out of all the influences of secularism 
in all places, including Islamic nations, is a way of reading the stories in 
an eminent text that seem to be inspiring, identifying, and uplifting. In 
principle, both Protestantism and Islamic revolutions are premised on the 
claim that each person is a “priest” and hence duty bound to spread the faith 
and save the world. Perhaps even a question of identity might be involved, 
specifically in times when secular Western globalization, with its promise 
to make everyone autonomous and self-creating. 
Such anarchistic practognosis is exhibited most clearly by Islamic 
fundamentalists, demanding a return to a previous glory of Islamic Caliphate 
and its establishment as current “Islamic Republic”. While attempts were 
made to do so in various regions, the constant demand to improve such 
attempts indicates that the Islamic revolutions were not quite successful and 
hence have to be radicalised. Hence the claims of the fundamentalists are 
indicative that (a) all that has been established so far has to be destroyed, 
and (b) that the destruction even of Islamists who are “polluted” by foreign 
ideas, such as tolerance of other views, including those of “infidels” are also 
to be destroyed. Their major enemy is the West, and specifically the secular 
West which, as we already noted, is the Great Satan. It goes without much 
discussion that the secular West is no longer located in the West alone; 
it is also a part of the Islamic world and hence the task is to remove it by 
terrorist violence everywhere. While numerous and well-meaning groups 
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both in Middle East and West claim that they object to the means used 
by the fundamentalists, some of these groups, equally fundamentalist, 
although Christian in the West such as the evangelical movement in the 
United States, agree that the ultimate enemy is secularism. Hence, when 
the Trade Towers in New York were destroyed, the evangelicals agreed 
with Faulwell’s and Roberts’ pronouncement that United States is being 
punished by God for its secularism. In brief, to please this divinity, secular 
institutions of tolerance of numerous truths, moralities, and ways of life 
must be destroyed since it is on the side of evil and falsehood. And we 
should remind ourselves how the current pope, who constantly insists that 
the real enemy is secularism, forgets to mention that it is secularism as a 
basic philosophical domain that allows others to speak, to question and 
to change. Of course for the pope as well as for the Islamic and protestant 
revolutions, philosophy is the seat of evil and hence its abolishment would 
bring back the good days when theocrats were the only ones who could 
have a voice in public – indeed were the voice of the public because there 
was no other voice possible. How could anyone else speak when a theocrat 
had announced the divine truth. In this sense there emerges a principle 
that can be used to decipher the approximation of commitment to terrorist 
activities: the more conservative, the more fundamentalist these move-
ments become, the more anarchistic violence they must exercise.
Globalization and Anarchy 
The contemporary theories, all the way from Nietzsche’s regard that life 
is a wanderer, to postmodern conceptions of nomadism, and our analysis 
of the logic of globalization, are basically ontological. As we saw, the latter 
is structured by the innovated metaphysics of the modern subject who is 
also distinct from and transcends the natural world of direct awareness. It 
might turn out that the collision of western globalising logic and its radical 
opponents are based on a very similar metaphysical principle. Above was a 
summary of one civilization and its inevitable anarchistic terror, stemming 
from the requirements of an innovated being from “outside the world”. 
Everything in this world is made by this being simply by its verbal power – 
the magic of discursive making as a manifestation of unhindered will. As 
noted, this will is being universalised in terms of a symbolic design devised 
to establish the world in accordance with the wishes of this will. Apart from 
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other examples, the West was colonised by the nomadic spreading of one 
ultimate truth, willed by one patriarch. Having subjected itself to this truth, 
the West became neocolonials and in turn went out to spread it through the 
rest of the globe and hence to engage in this type of nomadic colonisation – 
but to their advantage, they had instrumental 
With the appearance of modern subject as distinct from and trans-
cendent over nature, and indeed being the determining factor of nature, 
there opens up a reflexive region that lends nature not only a secondary 
status, but above all a being that is dependent on the metaphysical discour-
ses of the subject  – an innovator of modern sciences. This implies that 
thought being prior to nature is not determined by anything and hence 
can determine nature in many ways, dependent upon the will. This is to 
say, if thought is the starting principle irrespective of the “height” of its 
transcendence, the nature is determinable by it in more than one way.
There appears a peculiar reversal: the classical understanding of the 
world, as independent from human power and obeying its natural logos, 
its own measure, with its enduring strength against which all powers were 
temporary and contingent now is forced to be contingent and unnecessary, 
a being dependent on the transcending thought which is deemed necessary 
and incontestable. The latter is the stable power that can determine the way 
that nature will be reconstructed. Here the Lord and its nomadic power, 
i.e. a will that needs not respect the logos, returns in a new guise, except 
now as a modern subject. Within this reflexive context the human finds 
itself in a position of transcendence over nature, in a position of being a 
source of all the law that, while not yet in total command of nature, is in a 
position to establish such a command. This is to say, nature can be regarded 
as dependent upon the subjects discourses, not in some ontological sense, 
but perhaps more fundamentally, in a practical sense, i.e. in a sense of being 
“made” in human image. 
In this context, one becomes detached from a place, community, and 
can look upon the environment and others with indifference. This sort 
of practognosis has a consciousness, an intentionality toward the world, 
also justified by conscience of detached indifference. In the following the 
arguments of Western modern modernity will open up two intentionalities 
that subtend this global modernisation and its type of anarchism. The 
priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought as the creative 
223
Chapter VI. Clash of Civilization
power also permits the priority of will as that which can choose what sort 
of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, with its own logos, has 
to be subsumed under a power that is capable of dominating and altering 
nature and in principle making nature contingent. This is to say the necessity 
shifts to the will and its creative power leaving nature exposed to arbitrary 
rule. Indeed, without an imposition of an order by the will nature would be 
without reason and form, without value and goodness. The composition here 
allows thought and will to have a direct influence and control over all, such 
that the latter becomes contingent and dependent on will and thought. This 
is to say, the composition of the ultimate creation of nature by the ultimate 
will is at the same time excluded as irrelevant for the human knowledge 
and assumed by the human as his own composition of knowledge and will. 
Knowledge and will are taken, nonetheless, to be prior and transcendent to 
nature and hence capable of imposing an order on an otherwise irrational 
material nature. What comes along with this structure from the cosmic 
assumption of the absolute power and its creation of nature is the shift of 
power toward human thought and will over nature. Thought and will, logic 
and valuation become the necessary conditions for the being of the world for 
man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, blind phenomena.
First result is the appearance of the initial syndrome of arbitrary power 
with respect to nature, except now in the guise of the subject who is “everyman”, 
i.e. any individual is in a position to be the master of his own destiny by his 
own thought, will and ability to make the surroundings in his own “image”. 
He neither has a nature, nor a nature to settle; he can become, with respect 
to the environment and geographic topography nomadic. This is to say, he 
is free from any place and can remake nature in his own image anywhere 
he decides to settle an image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. 
The modern western modernity is the nomadic power of the unchained 
rule over nature, appearing both in the guises of capitalism and Marxism. 
The land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons and of natural rhythms, 
and the local settler, regardless of spaceplace, are now exposed to become 
raw material and labour power for the technological edicts controlled by 
unknown “emperors” in distant regions. Although such emperors are most 
interesting insofar as they seem to possess what the current designation 
would call “economic power”, the more interesting factor is the breakdown of 
traditional legitimation of power by birth right and demanded legitimation 
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by “the people”. But the latter are either “labour power” to be constructed 
in accordance with the needs of production, or are mobile individuals 
capable of settling where there are not yet exploited “raw materials” for 
production this is to say colonisation. To understand this transience it is 
necessary to decipher the constitution of direct western modern modernity 
in its nomadic form, specifically with regard to technologisation that led to 
the establishment of vast bureaucratic machinery of experts comprising a 
privileged elitism.
There is no necessary connection between the formalisms, or their 
signitive discourses, and the transcendent “physical” reality. The connection 
is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality which is not 
necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive 
discourses to the posited discourses of material reality. The arbitrariness 
appears under various guises: the application of theory to praxis, the most 
lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of 
the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts 
to humanise nature and the human animal, the aims of improving nature, 
and the exclamations that something is good because we say it is good in 
accordance with our own tablets, etc. In principle, the intentional connection 
between the formal domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, 
and it need not respect any prescription and qualitative discourses of the 
lived world. And yet it is the required nexus. After all, the signitive formal 
discourses do not point to anything that would be visibly similar to them. In 
this sense arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation 
to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from 
the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the material. Such a 
connecting intentionality is empty and hence can shift from the formal to 
the material; its primary fulfilment is modal discursivity that has no specific 
attachment to any qualitative aspects of human life. It is a priori nomadic and 
anarchistic. In principle, one is in a position of a pure metaphysics of will to 
constantly violate both the formal, and the material worlds.
While this might seem obvious, there appears a background 
phenomenon required for the second level fulfilment of various 
possibilising transitions: corporeal activities. Such activities are directed by 
projected choices of what is materially possible. The formal compositions 
require active interventions to construct the posited homogeneous world in 
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accordance with the formal discourses. Since the latter are constructs, they 
too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction of the material reality in 
accordance with our willed projects. As we noted in previous chapters, all 
this seems to rest on nothing. This is to say that the “intention” to control the 
environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, 
Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the 
possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connection between theory 
and “reality”, an arbitrariness that allows volitional (currently psychologised 
into “desire”) activity to subtend reason and nature.
The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the 
“real” swings between two possibilising structures: the formal discursive 
possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, and a realisation 
that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be 
reconstructed at will. These formally designed possibilities are also in a 
position to align the material reality toward intuitive fulfilment by human 
intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding 
the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed 
underlying homogeneous matter in accord with arbitrary discourses. This 
shaping comprises the source of both, the labour theory of value and life 
the primacy of homo laborans and technology, inclusive of the appearance 
of political technocracies which promise to redesign the “environment”, and 
the “human” in line with the theoreticalmethodological discourses: a world 
produced by scientific technology that can wander everywhere and use the 
indifferent homogeneous material including the human as resource. Some 
scholars in fact suggest that the modern world has two intentional histories: 
one, which is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals, 
and the second, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with 
the formal discourses we ourselves posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is 
assumed and the intentionality of will that swings between the formal and the 
transcendent is the decisive arbiter without precedents and without ground, 
although it comprises the ground of postmodernity within modernity.
Both, the formally designed discourses and the transcendent material 
reality, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary 
correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point 
of detached formalism and regard qualitative and perceptual distinctions 
with indifference. The formal indifferent and disconnected discourses lend 
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themselves to a horizontal division and increased formalisation of language 
in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of formal 
systems themselves. Correlatively, the material world can be increasingly 
differentiated and reconstructed along more complex and yet more distinct 
technical masteries and controls of the transcendent reality. In short, an 
incrementation of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an 
increase in the contingency of the material domain, leading to more possible 
rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. The lateral differentiation 
of formal discourses and their correlative material structuration, provide a 
basis for discipline differentiations, each having its own formal discourses 
and each capable of possible construction of material realisations. Thus the 
more one fragments the formal discourses into increasingly refined signs, the 
more one is able to crisscross the material by technical procedures in terms 
of the formal definitions. In this sense, the very languages of disciplines are 
coextensive with the power of shaping the indifferent material in accordance 
with definitory requirements. One could argue that this continuous division 
and formalisation of discourses is coextensive with a militarisation of 
language and society. Each increasing refinement is also a transition from 
signs to signals resulting in a restriction of human processes to reactions to 
precise and efficient embodied material codes. In this sense the discursive 
power to make leads in two directions: the making of the environment and 
the human, and the violation and destruction of all life worlds. 
What appears here is the trace of anarchistic practognosis. All events 
must be destroyed in accordance with the multiple formal discourses in 
order to remake them into something other. The life worlds of peoples 
everywhere must be disregarded and transformed. While this consciencia 
requires the adherence to its principles of formal and material detachments, 
it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both “natural” 
and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where 
semiindependent spheres call for independent functions and work. What 
is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in 
which the formal discourses divide the human “material:” the human 
is an intersection of economic, social, chemical, genetic, physiological, 
psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated discourses, each semi-
independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyse the obvious: the 
transitional intentionality, expressed as the power of these differentiations, 
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comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to 
a society of semiindependent groupings of experts, each possessing a 
discursive power to make what his/her discipline constructs as reality. 
Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary 
connection with other spheres. This multi discursivity does not seem to offer 
any common world. Hence the results of “research” in a specific domain 
can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there 
is no recourse to any external criterion concerning the intentionalities 
which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is 
to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces can be selected at will, 
arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics or cosmetics for possible 
“application”. Such a lateral differentiation decentralises responsibility and 
increases the contingency and the power of the transitional intentionality, 
appearing here in the image of arbitrariness. Every formal discourse and 
every material result become totally arbitrary. Each is empowered to go 
anywhere and make reality. This is modern nomadism. This means that there 
are no restrictions for the “making of truth”. After all, such a making has 
lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. All 
appear in the nomadic production, such that the transitional intentionality 
becomes self-warranting anarchistic enactment by anyone. Regardless of 
the domain there is no reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of 
praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease proliferating more physical 
experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic 
“growth”, no biological reasons to stop remoulding the living processes along 
new combinations, etc. Any restriction is regarded as an infringement on 
the autonomy of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has 
become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above. 
As was already discussed, this results in the notion of progress, such that 
the latter does not seem to have any purpose but itself. It must be without 
regression, without death, and all formal discourses and all transformations 
of the lived world must be remade to maintain this permanent structure. 
What is peculiar about progress is that it has no subject that would progress. 
Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is selfreferential. It constitutes 
its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and “perfectabilities” 
without of course attaining perfection. No attained construction is left 
without possibilising and hence “improvement”. But this suggests that 
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its presence cannot be deconstructed, since in its selfreferentiality it has 
no direction, no purpose, and hence every effort to deconstruct it will, 
perforce, enhance its self-referentiality. The prevalent deconstructivist 
theology, as writerly, is premised on this self-referentiality of progress 
without death. The human is also subsumed under an arbitrariness which 
includes his/her own operations. That is, the human also functions in this 
modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat 
everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a “power” which opens 
an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided 
within the context of modern anarchistic practognosis: all that is given is in 
principle to be violated to yield progress. Progress as self-warranting can never 
be fulfilled; it is ruled by an arbitrary will whose only aim is in reconstruction 
of the environment and the human is a continuous destruction without a 
final justification. Willed self-warranting progress is anarchistic violence for 
the sake of violence. 
While this form of practognosis comprises the ground of globalization 
and anarchistic violence, the acceptance of it by indigenous peoples through 
educational processes, involves such peoples in the logic of globalization 
and thus produces global practognosis. This is to say, the universal effort 
by the “underdeveloped” nations calls upon their youth to attend Western 
universities and become versed in the instrumentaltechnical reason in order 
to bring progress. Thus, the local peoples become inadequate and must be 
brought into “universal” material world history and hence be treated as a 
homogeneous labour power to be shaped technically by “education” to 
become adequate producers of commodities for the “world market”. In this 
sense, the elites, the local “bright lights” who get their “superior” technical 
knowledge in the West, the knowledge that is at base global also impose 
this acquired knowledge as a standard for their own populations. This 
type of imposition is deemed to be a way of dealing with indigenous issues 
“objectively”. In this sense, the West need not engage in being traditional 
colonial the practognosis is accepted and practiced by other cultures, 
where training of the local becomes local/global. The power to rule will be 
distributed among those who possess the technical, instrumental rationality. 
Their skills are a condition for the running and/or “progressing” the entire 
society. This includes pedagogical retransformation of the local populations 
toward productivity and ability to “humanise” the homogeneous 
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environment. But this also means that the population will be released from its 
“logocentric” qualitative culture, its belonging to a region, an environment, 
and will become nomadic in search of materials for productive use and 
consumption. One outcome of this practognosis is the well-known language 
of commodification and consumption. This practognosis enmeshed in 
scientific technocracies and selflegitimating progress, cannot permit any 
other conception of the human apart from efficient producer, consumer, and 
a nomad that is calculating and calculated. The qualitative worlds of various 
communities around the globe, what they have to offer, are of local and not 
global value, specifically if such qualitative aspects cannot become nomadic, 
circulated for global consumption. Progress offers technical means for 
anyone and anywhere to become an image of modernity: to enhance oneself 
and to make of oneself what one wills, to obtain the “ideal” image, to listen to 
the “latest” rhythms, to become sensuous body, obtainable in any drugstore, 
beauty parlour, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a 
skindeep equalisation in numerous domains lending the appearance of 
increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, 
even similar dress and walk. While there might remain vast differences in 
social class distinctions, economic and political power inequities, at the 
surface level there seems to be an apparent equitable fulfilment. Everyone 
is “enjoying” an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated ideals 
and looks. “She looks like a million” and this despite the fact that she is 
working on a global assembly line. The saturation of all domains with the 
images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, submit to the power 
of anarchistic consciencia in “flesh”. 
This is to say, idealities to be achieved are no longer a matter of 
consciousness reflecting the materialeconomic or technical conditions, 
but are inscriptions in the body, in the images, the passions and desires 
appearing directly as modes of bodily comportment. The idealities are 
coextensive with daily discourses, daily imagery, massmedia, sounds and 
tastes, architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circulation that 
make any artform accessible and “popular”, globally commodified and thus 
nomadic. The anarchistic practognosis, at this level, stems from the very 
progress that posits unreachable “purpose” that can never be achieved, and 
hence a point forever deferred. One is never adequate, and hence is exposed 
to violation and continuous selfviolation terrorism of the body, inscription of 
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the “latest” that will be immediately outdated by the “improved”, ad infinitum. 
From mechanical through electronic to bio-technologies as transcendental 
conditions, one can become any image, any shape, and anyone – but at a price.
The argument against such excelerating practognosis might be that 
it serves a more basic purpose  – prolongation and indeed an indefinite 
continuation of life and, in this sense creates what is good for as many as 
possible – increased pleasure. This might be a solution to the anarchistic 
destruction and violence and democratically speaking, the right of all 
individuals who demand such progress. After all, Lithuania has joined 
this global logic and is filled with constant novelties, opportunities, latest 
styles, technical systems, attractive investments and, above all, better jobs 
and abundant commodities. In brief, all positive signs of the success of 
global practognosis  – but at a price. The latter has various faces, among 
which a couple or so which stand out. First, the promise of prolonged life 
is being fulfilled as long as a person submits to being totally dependent and 
“attached” to the latest technologies, whether they are genetic, chemical, 
biological, or psycho/medical. Second, the protracted life is replete with 
“conveniences” that release a person from doing tasks, thinking, searching, 
wondering, imagining, striving, and even exercising. All of that is done 
by the attachments to which a person becomes subjected. To speak with 
the latest innovations, the person does not have to open an online library 
and look for a text, to read the text and to think about it. One can simply 
say “Suzie, what did Kant say about perpetual peace” and within seconds 
Suzie, in a pleasant voice will recount what Kant said and will offer the 
available interpretations of what he said. This is the price: one need not 
develop one’s own abilities of research rethinking, interrogating, since 
such functions are taken over by the technically signitive life world. Third, 
and most significant aspect of global practognosis indicates clearly the 
anarchistic violence subjecting the human subject. To enhance human 
abilities, the very composition of what is left of a human being will have 
to be violated, changed chemically, genetically, and even physiologically. If 
now one gets Suzie to provide any and all information, any pleasant story, 
she will be replaced by a chip implanted in human physiology such that the 
information will flow directly, without having to listen to Suzie. Moreover, 
the same state of affairs is in place concerning the so-called “inner” person, 
such as feelings, emotions, sensations: all are being managed by chemistry 
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where to be sad or angry are regarded as inappropriate emotions; hence, 
one will have to feel good, be always happy, and in this sense one will no 
longer be able to say “I want to be angry” since one will not be allowed to 
have a career and show anger. The price is violation of one’s “private” life.
The Clash of Civilizations
Having explicated two different life worlds at their anarchistic limit, 
we can now show their incompatibility and thus violent confrontation. The 
best way to disclose this clash is through commonly understood symbolic 
designs of both, specifically in light of declarations by members of Middle 
Eastern civilization that modern globalization, as secular, is in the hands of 
Satan. It is to be recalled that modern Western arguments have reached a 
conclusion that reality as such is unknowable or, at least, irrelevant and thus 
we are left with the praxis life world. This implies that there is no need to raise 
the question concerning the reference to any reality in the stories depicting 
the symbolic designs of these two civilizations. It was argued that each has 
its discursive practice, its practognosis constituting a specific life world, 
such that every claim about anything is interpretation – hermeneutics. For 
the sake of convenience, the type of hermeneutics, stemming from Middle 
East, could be designated as ultimate being, interpreted as “father”, and his 
relationship to a son. The relationship presents a story of submission and 
rebellion. In this interpretation, the rebel is Lucifer. Initially, Lucifer was 
designed to serve his father, to maintain his order, to find transgressors 
of paternal edicts and bring such transgressors for paternal punishment. 
At this level, Lucifer does not have a personality or identity. His identity is 
given by his maker; it is a servitude in the maintenance of paternal edicts. 
Lucifer can be regarded as a chairman of the board of unheavenly activities. 
He compels all and one to adhere to paternal edicts and those who fail 
will be regarded as evil. As discussed in the previous chapters, there is 
first a creation of something, and once that something becomes accepted, 
whether it is a divinity, a world view, or a cosmic destiny, the very creators 
become subject it. It means that the innovation of a paternal subject turns 
against the innovators, the human subjects of the Middle East, and makes 
them sons of their own innovation, to be subjected to such innovation. 
Lucifer, the son, is subservient to the edicts of his father, and must make 
sure that all others become equally subservient. This cultural interpretation 
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constitutes civilizational phenomena that can be seen as dynamics 
designed to maintain permanence. In other words, father and son, maker 
and Lucifer, are interpretive modes that constitute these phenomena. His 
rebellion has been assigned various characterisations: being the first son, 
he cannot accept the shift of his father’s love toward a younger sibling; he 
cannot endure his being created by and subjected to the total authority of 
his patriarch and thus not having his own personality – he wants to be his 
own author. Since the father is absolute, Lucifer’s rebellion is unconditional 
and absolute: he wishes to replace the order of his father-creator with a 
counter-order. In the latter, he will be the sole master. This does not mean 
that he will be able to take over the paternal throne. This is made impossible 
at the outset. His throne is only temporary from which he can occasionally 
insult his father and even do some disruptions of his patriarch’s order. In 
this tradition, Lucifer’s psychological construction is one of envy, hate, 
guilt, and disruption. Since this tradition, in the final analysis, accepts the 
patriarchal rule to be absolute and changeless, and posited as good, then 
Lucifer’s rebellion is disruptive and evil. In other words, he is a negative 
psychological being. He is not concerned with giving practical assistance or 
having empathy with others. If he were to satisfy someone’s desires, such an 
act would have to result in gaining control of someone and through such a 
control disrupt the paternal order. In this tradition, rebellion is, in principle, 
evil, even when it would help the people to grasp the paternal designs.
Lucifer’s rebellion introduces another moment of this civilization: 
dynamics that disrupts permanent order. Lucifer’s rebellion has no power 
to change the paternal order. The latter is an interpretation of absolute 
permanence and cannot be changed; it predetermines and preordains all. 
There is not a single entity that does not belong to this permanent order. 
In this sense, the rebellion against such an order, its disruption, is doomed 
to failure; it might even be regarded as quixotic. Indeed, all disruptive 
activity is destined for annihilation; it is damned as total evil and a sign of 
non-being. As we saw, the absolute of this tradition is totally anarchistic 
in relationship to the established orders of humans, such that they are 
to be destroyed without any possible replacement. There is no space to 
establish institutions that would allow the change of edicts or to change 
the environment for the improvement of human lot. Moreover, it is not 
allowable to analyse, interrogate, challenge and change the permanent 
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edicts and order, and the institutions that support them, and thus to change 
the reading of justice, good and evil. These phenomena do not admit of 
independent personalities, empowered to make independent decisions 
concerning the given permanent order and edicts, the good and the bad, 
their adequacy and their replacement. Any fundamental challenge and 
interrogation would be regarded as human pride, and any proposition to 
change such permanence would be deemed as bad faith and evil disruption, 
based on finite human thought. After all, Lucifer cannot know more than 
his progenitor, and cannot decide what he wants to become, apart from 
attempting to imitate his paternal absoluteness in a negative mirror image.
Given the arrangement of the figures in this civilization one cannot 
derive what is known as democratic institutions where self-reliant and 
responsible persons decide their practical affairs – without any appeal to 
highest authority. A person acquires value only in subjection to the paternal 
edicts and order and, in case of need, becomes a holy warrior in the name of 
the highest authority. Such a personality follows the first moment of Lucifer’s 
activity: dynamics that maintains permanence. This personality acts to 
maintain such permanence and is called upon to destroy all that is deemed 
disruptive of this order, and hence evil. These phenomena are experienced 
as justification for holy wars where everything must be mobilised and 
subjected for victory against absolute evil. At this level, there is no such 
option as an open dialogue to decide whether a holy war is justified or not; 
one either fights against evil, or one becomes an enemy of the good and 
the true. The absolute father and subservient son hermeneutics constitutes 
civilizational phenomena which does not equate with the one established in 
the West and proliferated as a logic of globalization. 
Initially this logic was depicted in the images of a relationship of highest 
authority – Zeus – with Prometheus. This relationship appears in story of 
Prometheus, who rebels against Zeus’ edict that forbids fire to humans. The 
supreme authority, Zeus, in his anger denies humans the use of fire. Divine 
intervention initiates human suffering, if not tragedy. Prometheus, moved 
by the unnecessary suffering of humans, steals fire from the gods and gives 
it to humans. Here we have practical assistance for which Prometheus does 
not ask anything. He does not wish to rule or to have others follow his way 
of life. He does not form a party or demands to be a judge on the court. 
There is no revenge present against anyone or an obedience to some divine 
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command. He simply regards Zeus’ law as unjust and, indeed, premised on 
revenge by Zeus against the humans. What is interesting is that the Greeks 
accepted the action of such a rebel as a noble violation of bad or even unjust 
laws. Although speaking formally the act of Prometheus was “bad” or 
illegal, his personal nobility and his positive attitude and qualities outweigh 
his formally bad act. Prometheus could be regarded as practically rational, 
and worldly “materialist”. His aim was to help others, but with this help he 
changes the notion of justice. Even Zeus accepts this change by admitting 
that his edict prohibiting fire to humans was a bad law. 
The worldliness – secularism – of Prometheus appears in his personali-
ty which is independent from any authority. He has his own views and 
is capable of planning his own future based on his own knowledge and 
choices. If he makes mistakes, he admits them and corrects them. After all, 
Prometheus had decided to support Zeus in the battle against the Titans, 
but after the battle he recognised that Zeus had become a tyrant. Thus he 
decides to correct his mistake by rebelling against Zeus’ laws simply because 
he decides that such laws are practically unjust. Here the highest authority is 
negated as unacceptable in principle without any question concerning one’s 
own benefits. Humanity here is in charge of its own affairs and demands 
that gods no longer intervene. In this classical Greek story one develops the 
notion of personal responsibility for one’s own action. Although one can 
make mistakes, he takes full responsibility for such mistakes and deems it 
his duty to correct them. While not having ultimate wisdom, humans are 
depicted as capable of managing their own affairs. 
In Promethean story Zeus is the highest cultural symbol of perma-
nence – as authority. Prometheus, in turn, is a cultural symbol of action. 
As an initial supporter of Zeus, he reveals an awareness of action that 
maintains permanence. He wants to insure Zeus’ victory over the Titans 
and his permanent position as the ultimate authority. Yet by becoming a 
rebel against Zeus’ bad law he reveals an awareness which is disruption and/
or destruction of permanence. Such a disruption in the story of Prometheus 
reveals, in the final outcome, a very specific relationship between permanence 
and change: the highest symbol of permanence  – Zeus  – is compelled 
to agree with Prometheus and thus to change his absolutist position. In 
this sense, permanence can be open to the requirements of change. This 
means that at the cultural level, there arises a possibility to challenge any 
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authority, law, to interrogate them sensibly, and thus to change them. In 
other words, there emerges a dialogical relationship between permanence 
and change. Every position, tradition, even the thinking of the highest 
figures, can be interrogated openly and reasonably, can be investigated, 
analysed, and requested to justify themselves in a full light of public debate 
or in a public court. If a given position, and even an accepted tradition 
cannot be justified by reason and by the well-being of humans, then they 
can be openly rejected. This is the reason that classical Greece comprised an 
arena of intellectual tension among multiple positions, views, all calling for 
a debate among individuals. This open debate comprises a cultural symbol 
of permanence that tolerated and enhanced all creative flux. This classical 
thinking unfolded permanence as flux maintenance and enhancement and 
comprises the ground of every person’s rationality and responsibility. 
On this background of “practical rationality” appears modern, scien-
tific secularism, with secular public institutions, above all open education 
accessible to all. As permanent, they enhance most diverse activities and 
the diverse positions maintained through such activities – each changeable 
in face of challenges, and specifically in face of practical needs and wants. 
Everything can be placed into question, discussed, accepted, rejected – in 
the open. This symbolic design continues to maintain one of the Promethe-
an motifs: science and/or knowledge should serve the needs and benefits 
of humans. This motif comprises one of the more significant domains of 
confrontation between the two civilizations. In many cases, the father-son 
hermeneutic reads the modern West (with its Promethean worldliness and 
practicality) as the Great Satan that must be confronted by a holy war. It 
is worthwhile to sketch the parameters wherein the discord appears at the 
level of practical life. The Promethean hermeneutic reveals a practical need 
assistance syndrome. In brief, in face of practical needs that would benefit 
the human lot, it is possible to change not only divine will and edicts, but 
also natural events. The modern Western scientific enlightenment deemed 
science’s primary purpose to be at the service of human beings, not only 
as an enhancement of such a well-being by changing the natural order, but 
also by changing the human itself. This syndrome of science as practical 
constitutes the environment and the human as technical. It allows the hu-
mans to reshape the environment and the human in terms of human rules 
and will. In this sense, the human is positioned to be the creator of the rules 
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for the environment and for her own self-construction – in brief, human 
creation of a total human-humanised world. The human subject interprets 
itself as the source of rules by which to reconstruct nature for human ben-
efit, and to establish rules for human mutual life, and thus create a purely 
human domain. Although there might appear background claims that na-
ture has its own laws, such claims also become instrumental for changing 
the environment and, gradually, circumventing such claims through tech-
nical innovations.
This practical-instrumental reconstitution of the environment and 
the human is in a total discord with the father-son reading of the world. 
The latter must proclaim that the entire nature is imbued with, pervaded 
by the paternal order and edicts and hence cannot be violated. Natural 
processes follow the rules of the creator. Nature is imago dei. Given this 
posture, it can be said that the transformation of the environment and the 
human in terms of humanly invented rules is a direct affront to the pater-
nal authority. The human not only does not adhere to the created order, 
but, in the worldly domain, the order is being changed by humanly created 
rules that disrupt the divine order. In this sense, human activity comprises 
the phenomena of total disruption of divine law. Such a disruption is not 
permitted within the configuration of the father-son hermeneutic. Within 
the latter, the civilizational phenomena would have to regard the humanly 
established rules and the technical-practical transformation of nature as 
Lucifer’s rebellion, and, in modern terms, as Satanic assault on divine crea-
tion. This logic must be extended one more step: the Promethean modern 
human not only disrupts the paternal order, but, by creating the rules by 
which such order is to be reconstructed as if out of nothing, this human 
subject creates itself and the world. In this sense, the human become the 
creator of the environment and the human. But such a stance is identi-
cal with the paternal creator and with Lucifer’s rebellion: divine-demonic 
wrapped in one. This is the divine complex of the modern Western hu-
manity. Yet, obviously, there is the noted difference between Promethean 
secular and Lucifer’s theological rebellions; and this is what irks the mem-
bers of the father-son hermeneutical culture.
In this context, all that Promethean modern secular subject enacts 
to transform the world, i.e. violates the creators order, will be regarded 
as evil and false, and destined for punishment and destruction. It is to 
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be noted that for the modern Promethean person the plans of paternal 
creator are totally irrelevant; such a person is interested in the instrumental 
reconstruction of the environment for human well-being. Seen from the 
father-son configuration, such a reconstruction must be regarded as a 
disruption of a true order. Thus the modern, secular human appears to be 
on the side of Lucifer’s rebellion – satanic. Moreover, such a human, who 
reconstructs the environment and her own being in accordance with her 
own rules and activities, is also questioning the inadequacies of nature and, 
by implication, the inadequacies of the patriarchal creator and, perhaps 
suspecting that he is not as good as the believers claim. Those who maintain 
the father-son configuration as unconditionally permanent, and nature as 
the image of this permanence, have no choice but to regard the worldly 
human of enlightenment as pervaded by pride, self-reliance and audacity 
to question the highest authority and its order in order to make it serve 
the human needs and, as argued, the global ethic that promotes pleasure. 
This is, of course, impossible from the side of the supporters of father-son 
interpretation of the world. For them, pretences by modern subjects to be 
the final grounding, is not only false, but the ultimate evil, to be eradicated 
by a holy war. Given this setting, the two civilizations cannot accommodate 
each other’s interpretation of the “making of the world, and at present both 
offer anarchistic violence of all phenomena, from the side of the Middle 
Eastern interpretation, violence against human deviance and inadequacy, 
from the global logic, constant disruption of the environment.
The Middle Path
Various political suggestions can be offered to confront the 
anarchistic practognoses? What is the basic configuration that would not 
allow either of the anarchistic practognoses to have their total sway is 
this: first, permanence is required for any awareness, as well as dynamics, 
flux. The permanence that is required is one that is open to dynamics. In 
western civilization this permanence has been regarded as a public domain 
wherein every member of society is both equal and autonomous, but 
above all, responsible for their actions and thus their life world. It is to be 
understood that such a domain is not a given; it is a phenomenon that must 
be permanently maintained by activity, participation, and engagement. 
One cannot simply say that there is a public domain, an open space for 
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decisions that cannot be purely global. Second, the local region, its streams 
and environment, its specific awareness, is local, and that means that one’s 
responsibility is not from a stance of pure autonomy, concretised by a will, 
but from a local awareness correlated to local environment – and in depth. 
The surface circulation of global means is shallow and general where 
everything is granted the status of being categorically the same: chicken is 
chicken for the market, and chemical fertiliser is homogeneous and must 
be used everywhere. But by now we are somewhat aware that chickens and 
soils vary and depend on the regional conjunction of solar outlay, winds 
and storms, traditional nutrition habits and ritualistic celebrations with 
bounty from local soil and streams. Third, while being part of European 
Union, Lithuania must adhere to European rules, but Europeans should 
understand another form of interpretation: the universal rules cannot be 
seen in their purity without being translated into a local discourse, such 
that they will be understood only in such a discourse. And this is the 
conjunction: local/global.
What has been said with these brief remarks is an effort to point out 
that the anarchistic practognoses that may include the divine market, are 
phenomena; they do not grow on trees, nor are they derivable from some 
ineffable will. We enact them and we can re-enact them differently.
Yet the re-enactment of this difference requires an entirely new 
conception of “world”. We can argue that the types of anarchistic practognoses, 
articulated so far, are worldless. Their proposed ontology and metaphysics 
appear only when humans “apply” them and thus assume, at the outset an 
inevitable violation of the directly experienced life world. In principle, any 
“application” is coextensive with deviation from what is toward what ought 
to be in terms of a constructed ontology and metaphysics – valuation that 
becomes the medium through which the immediately present life world 
is seen. In this sense a specific civilization, intent on articulating modern 
Western modernity with a view toward maintaining its own identity, can 
counter the globalising logic and theological autocracy at the level of 
cosmic and not metaphysical and ontological understanding. While there is 
no getting away from ontology, i.e. the way that the world and its events are 
present, there is a getting away from atomistic, fragmenting, quantitative 
ontology. What would remain is the classical Greek and Lithuanian ontolo-
gy and cosmos.
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First, let us look at ontology, which is regarded as “natural” and 
constitutes a legitimation for proper human activity toward the environment. 
While unnoticed, there is a dramatic shift in awareness: its medium is not 
language, discourse, method, explanation, divinity, but the world. The ethos 
of human activity is equivalent to the qualitative presence of all beings and 
events, with their requirements and limits. Thus it is natural for humans 
to use fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use autocraticimperial 
edicts to deprive humans of fire. It is appropriate for humans to raise crops 
and have animals, but inappropriate to mistreat the animals on which 
we depend, and discard them as waste. In this sense, the understanding 
of legitimation must be adjudicated discursively in the gathering of local 
public, with full attention to the primary medium – the world. To speak 
philosophically, the logocentric conception is what legitimates both, the 
awareness of natural qualitative environment and the place of humans in it. 
And being in the place means that humans are not “transcendent” subjects 
looking at the world from “outside” but direct participants in their world. 
Our being, as inhabitants of the world, also means that what we do in and 
to that world will be done to ourselves. If we poison the soil, if we pollute 
our waters, if we create mountains of refuse, then we poison ourselves, we 
pollute ourselves and will have to live in those mountains. After all, we 
breathe the air, drink the water, and discard synthetic materials by the ton. 
Mount Everest is regarded as a set of “paths” marked by discarded refuse – 
from plastic bottles, cameras to tents. Masses of “tourists” want to take a 
photo at the summit. This is the case everywhere, more severe in some 
places, where breathing clean air is a luxury. 
In a logocentric world, there is a “rule by the best” who are not 
nomadic technocrats and bureaucrats, but the experienced who have 
direct awareness and contact with their world, who have lived and learned 
from the accumulated concerns of an entire tradition and who can be best 
advisors as to the needs of the local inhabitants – all of them. Such a rule 
would be partially justified by the logocentric conception of the world where 
wisdom is deemed to be in a position to decipher and hence correspond to, 
and indeed be capable of ruling in accordance with the all ruling logos. 
Thus those in possession of episteme, the councils of elders, or the ones 
who tend a specific domain, such as crops, gardens, bees, should rule by 
virtue of their knowledge. What is to be understood is that knowledge 
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could not be regarded as a legitimation to make, to transform the world. 
Knowledge of what is the case by nature is knowledge how one should act. 
This sort of rulership does not use power against a person or nature, but it 
can show discursively the mistakes the person might make with respect to 
the nature of the cosmos and its logos. If a person is made to understand 
what is natural, he/she will act in accordance with such an understanding. 
No imperative from emperors or wills of divinities could alter the enduring 
logos. To the contrary, emperors and divinities come and pass with the sway 
of the cosmic logos. 
What is at issue here is that the cosmic logos is not to be understood 
as power, but as enduring and elastic strength that yields but cannot be 
defeated. Those who live in accordance with its sway are also the enduring, 
the ones who bend with the storms but remain unbroken. The difference 
between strength of logos and power is that logos is ever present and never 
vanishes, while power has its rise and fall. It can be conquered, dissipated, 
abolished, or decadent. In this sense it is distinct from the strength of logos 
that is not nomadic, it does not come and pass, even if it is never at rest. 
These two modes appear globally with the inevitable supremacy of 
logocentrism, in the form of cyclical time and seasonal events which defy 
all metaphysics of will, whether in divine or modern form of a subject. We 
live by seasons, by what grows where and what can be raised in what place 
for human survival. Not only that, we live by such cosmic cycles every 
day, we take our seasonal vacations, and have seasonal celebrations, we 
get up in the morning and go to bed in the evening, we shop for seasonal 
fruits and vegetables, and buy appropriate seasonal attire, even if it is 
designed to adhere to the latest style, whether it is winter, spring or fall, 
and despite what the latest style of such an attire might be. We do not wear 
transparent bathing suits in January in Siberia or Minnesota, or Alaska, 
and do not dress in fur coats on Turkish beaches in summer, at this level 
of logocentrism, deconstructivists and their counterparts, the metaphysical 
anarchists will have to be silent, since they too must adhere to the cosmic 
rhythms. Thus, in contrast to the all enduring and ruling cyclical time, the 
shifting powers of kings, whether legitimated or not, have no say. Just as 
the nomadic rulers cannot completely transcend the logos, so the kings 
with their powers cannot escape the verdict of time. Given this context, 
the nomadic legitimation efforts should not be identified with a particular 
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ruler’s wish to justify his rule, but more basically with the effort to extricate 
from the strength of the all-pervasive Logos, i.e. to make the transient 
power last and indeed become superior and transcendent to the strength of 
Logos. We shall argue subsequently that the current cult of deconstruction 
is premised on this notion of abolishing the enduring strength of logos, of 
“logocentrism”. And this means that deconstruction wants to continue the 
transcending nomadic rulership with the aid of the old, recouped, divinities 
and their supplicant servants. This effort to shift toward the superiority of 
the detached, nomadic transcendence may constitute an effort to bend the 
rule of the logos, and if possible to exercise will over it.
Lithuania: Tradition and Future
An essential dimension of Lithuanian tradition is not just its past, 
with a grand history of an empire, significant titles from Western Medieval 
Powers, but the concrete life of the population: agrarian. The uniqueness of 
the agrarian life world was its total attunement to nature, seen as vital and 
alive, from a grain of soil to most powerful natural forces. Indeed, such forces 
stem from The Old matriarchal Europe which predates the Arian invasion 
with its Parthenon of natural patriarchal forces. The closeness to nature is 
apparent in Lithuanian language which is regarded as a sole preservation of 
Indo-European origins. It is also plausible that the language is not regarded 
as a medium of communication but as a direct “speaking of nature” without 
any distance. The customs were equally agrarian and depended on seasonal 
labours in the fields and forests. Even months were named after the specific 
creatures which would show up in spring and the sprouting of specific trees 
in summer and required labours in the fall. For example, April is Balandis, 
the showing up of the dove, and May is the month of the kuku bird Gegužis, 
June is the birch tree, Birželis, and August is the month for cutting the rye 
fields, Rugpiutis, and so on. In brief, they had a direct meaning because they 
were identical with natural entities and events. By now, they are abstract 
media to mark a temporal sequence. 
As Lithuania immerses itself in globalization, it becomes increasingly 
urban, where the agrarian language and rituals are best paraded on a stage in 
a city and filmed for school children to see; but they are not performed in the 
fields, where the hard labour of tying the cut rye into bundles was performed 
by rhythmic bending and thus rhythmic chanting. In brief, the labours were 
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coextensive with the rhythms of seasons which had a cyclical repetition. 
The life world moved in cycles, from days, months, years, always repeating 
themselves. In this life world the cyclical cosmos did not allow for “progress” 
or historical direction. One is born. Lives and dies, as happens with every 
generation repeating the same labours and rituals. This kind of life world 
and cosmos was destroyed by Russian/Soviet Empire, with collective farms 
(panoptical prisons) and five year plans dictated by dialectical materialism that 
promises a radically new “Soviet man”. Add to that the majority of population 
whose life world is based on linear progress, requiring daily novelties, fast 
pace transformations, and the result is obvious: two incompatible life worlds 
and two distinct ways of interpreting the cosmos. 
Thus the challenge at the cultural level is the accommodation of two 
distinct cosmologies, leading to question the modern universe in terms of the 
traditional cosmos. In short, is the modern time awareness universal? This 
means that the cultural logics must be investigated within the parameters of 
peoples’ understanding of their world not only in terms of a life world and 
discursive practices, but also a life world that is subtended by the cultural 
preconceptions of what constitutes the universe as time. Within this context, 
we hope to articulate the limits wherein even the power confrontations of the 
dual consciousness find their own limitations. Each culture has its own world 
conceptions as conditions for their own self-understanding. If there is going 
to be any adjudication among cultures underneath the power confrontations 
such adjudications will have to articulate the world conceptions of various 
peoples. In this sense, the challenge to the globalising logic will not come 
from the acceptance by the other of the efficient technical means that make 
their own culture inadequate, but by the recognition that their own culture 
has a very different world understanding. We know from other cultures, 
whether Mayan, Hindu, or Taoist that the world understanding, even at the 
ontological or metaphysical levels, is different from the Western scientific 
and linear conceptions, as is the case with traditional Lithuanian cosmos. So 
the task of cultural studies is to find the cosmic awareness that underlie their 
cultural parameters Lithuania is offering one such awareness, but whether 
it may be adequate to disrupt the modern globalising awareness is the main 
issue.
Indeed, as already suggested, there is logocentric thought that may 
constitute an intermediary between the willed discourse as the transcendent 
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rule over the world and the human, and all ruling logos. The intermediary is 
the rule by the best who know the logos not as inherent in the world, but as 
transcendent to it and hence to be brought to recognition pedagogically and 
not imposed by will. Nonetheless, this very promise of recognition assumes 
a position that is different from the world and hence a possibility to impose 
it as would be the case in Plato’s Laws, or in the historicising of such laws to 
be achieved in a utopian state. What appears, here, is a claim that the world is 
an inadequate and hence a contingent process with respect to transcendent 
ideality discoverable by thought. The ideality, then, must provide a guiding 
principle how the worldly events must correspond to what thought provides. 
What is worldly cannot be destroyed by will, nonetheless it must be modified 
and hence violated. To speak with the modern Western technical modernity, 
there is a standard of beauty and you must get a facelift to come closer to the 
standard 
What, then, can Lithuanian culture add to this middle ground? First, 
its understanding of the world, or more precisely “world understanding” is 
prior to any metaphysical or contrived ontological mediation. It is a direct 
awareness of the ways that the world turns, its seasons, the creatures and 
their habits, the taste of fields and the solar outlays of “vitality”, the rains and 
flows of streams, the births and deaths, and above all the integral awareness 
of how things, creatures, life forms belong together. Lithuanian culture and 
language is regarded as one of the oldest Indo European languages due, 
perhaps, to the fact that up to Twelfth century there was little influence from 
external cultures – until the Christian knights/monks started their terroristic 
incursions. If one wanted to hear how the initial Indo European language 
sounded, one could simply speak to a Lithuanian farmer. His very being 
was impassioned by natural sounds of the environment. This suggests that 
Lithuanian culture allowed the environment to speak directly through the 
language, precluding the notion that language represents or points to “reality”. 
Lithuanian language makes present the directly experienced world without 
obfuscations or speculative spider webs. In addition, the language retains 
seven cases and a proliferation of diminutives which capture the nuances of 
the richness of the environment and human attentive attunement to nature. 
While this might sound as a deviation toward linguistic poetics, but in fact it 
is a disclosure of a careful realism of the depth of awareness. No doubt, poetic 
nuances are present because the richness and variety of nature is “poetic. 
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The presentational value of language accounts for the cultural preoccu-
pation with singing as a mode of displaying the phenomena of Lithuanian 
world. This means that Lithuanians do not “sing about” some thing; to the 
contrary, they “sing that something as it manifests itself in different daily 
shadings of sunlight, clouds, seasonal storms and celebrations. To use a 
metaphor, Lithuanian songs sound like the eyes of innocent creatures, seeing 
the world without any intermediaries. As oral culture, all wisdom acquired 
through ages, is passed on from generation to generation by songs, direct 
showing of the different features of plants, vegetation, their tastes, healing 
power, the places where they thrive, their beauty, which animals prefer 
which foliage, and which mushrooms are to be avoided. All such knowledge 
was not abstract, because specific herbs, weeds, leaves were integral part of 
the home – hanging in braids on kitchen walls and in hallways. Such local 
understanding is global not in the sense that it would be viable everywhere, 
but as an example how ecology is an integral part of a Lithuanian community. 
The latter also contains very unique features, allowing a continuation of a 
family with a place for each member in its composition. A person knows 
his/her identity not by verbal magic, pronounced by Middle Eastern 
shaman, but by being a thread in a web of relationships. Thus one was a 
great granddaughter of so and so and a niece of someone and a third cousin, 
and so on, composing an extended family. Those who died are not gone, 
because they too belong to the family and their place is significant to know 
one’s own place and lineage. Even today it is common to say “Let us visit 
great grandmother, and at the same time “Check on uncle Ainis” – integral 
community as is its world.
Suggested Readings
Dumezin, G. (1973). From Myth to Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1978). Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Compa-
rative Study of Civilizations. New York: The Free Press.
Hall, J. S., & et. al. (1991). Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies, 1972-79. Abingdon: Routledge.
Kavolis, V. (1995). Civilization Analysis as a Sociology of Culture. Lewiston: 
E. Mellen Press.
Lauf, D. I. (1976). Symbole: Verschiedenheit und Einheit in aesthetische und Westliche 
Kuktur. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag.
245
Chapter VI. Clash of Civilization
Luhmann, N. (1994). European Rationality. New York: Routledge.
Mickunas, A. (2008). Cultural Tensions and Civilizations. In: Comparative Studies, 
Vol. VIII.
Mickunas, A. (2009). Civilizations and Cultural Hermeneutics. In: Comparative 
Studies, Vol. IX.
Mickunas A. (2009). Globalizing Metaphysics of the Will. In: Choi, J. M., ed. 
Globalization and the Prospects for Critical Reflection. Dehli: Aakar Books.
Mickunas A. (2009). Lifeworld and Global Civilization. Limes: Cultural Regionalis-
tics, Vol. 2, No. 2. Vilnius: Gedimino Technikos Universitetas. 
Mickunas, A., Pilotta, J. (2012). Civilizations, Cultures, Lifeworlds. Vilnius: Mykolo 
Romerio Universitetas. 
Toynbee, A. J. (1960). Civilization on Trial. New York: Meridian Books.
Toynbee, A. J. (1966). Change and Habit: The Challenge of our Time. London: 
Oxford University Press.
 Mickunas, Algis
Mi53  LITHUANIA AND GLOBALIZATION. Monograph. – Vilnius: Mykolas 
Romeris University, 2016. 246 p.
  ISBN 978-9955-19-784-3 (print)
  ISBN 978-9955-19-783-6 (online)
  The text is designed to explicate the logic of globalization at various levels, in 
distinction from other forms of presumed building of global systems. The argument 
is presented to show that the latter is a building of autocratic empire on the basis 
of some national or theocratic basis. This type of global reach is not designed to 
involve the populations, whether they are local-national or subjected to the edicts 
of such autocratic/theocratic domination. Modern Western globalization is based 
on a unique ontology – nature is a composite of material parts – and on math-
ematical metaphysics – all material events can be constructed in accordance with 
calculations and thus transformed to serve human needs everywhere. In this sense, 
this globalization is regarded as a progress for human benefit. In contemporary 
epoch, there is a confrontation between the autocratic/theocratic structures and 
the modern Western globalization. Lithuania being in the “middle” between them, 
is in a position to offer an alternative culture which is both ecologically sound and 
ethically responsible. Thus the preservation of Lithuanian culture is significant for 
the preservation of all life.
UDK 316.77(474.5)
Algis Mickunas
LITHUANIA AND GLOBALIZATION 
Monograph 
Layout: Jelena Babachina
SL 15.375, 2016 02 05.
Number of copies published 100. Order 10014293.
Mykolas Romeris University
20 Ateities str., Vilnius
Website: www.mruni.eu
E-mail: mrulab@mruni.eu
Prepared and Printed by JSC „Vitae Litera“
Savanorių 137, LT-44146 Kaunas
Website: www.bpg.lt
E-mail: info@bpg.lt
